LETTERS

CONCERNING

EDUCATION:

ADDRESSED

TO A GENTLEMAN

ENTERING

AT THE UNIVERSITY.

Suſcepiſti onus grave et ATHENARUM et CRATIPPI; ad quos cum tanquam ad mercaturam Bonarum Artium ſis profectus, inanem redire turpiſſimum eſt, dedecorantem et Urbis auctoritatem et Magiſtri: Quare quantum conniti animo potes, quantum labore contendere (ſi diſcendi labor eſt potius, quam voluptas) tantum, fac, ut efficias; neve committas, ut, cum omnia ſuppeditata ſint "ab amicis," tute tibi defuiſſe videare — Multa etiam ad te cohortandi gratiâ ſcripſimus.

CIC. *De Offic.* III. 2.

LONDON:

Sold by Meſſ. REVINGTON in St. Paul's Church Yard, and T. PAYNE and SON at the Mews-Gate: Meſſ. MERRILL at Cambridge: J. FLETCHER in the Turle, and W. JACKSON, High Street, Oxford.

M.DCC.LXXXV.

LETTERS

CONCERNING

EDUCATION:

ADDRESSED

TO A GENTLEMAN

ENTERING

AT THE UNIVERSITY.

Sed quidlibet cum quibusvis ingenuis et liberalibus artibus; ad quas cum tantopere ad morum honestam institutionem pertineant, inanem redire tirpidissimum est. Ad hominum et Urbis institutionem et Magistri: Quare quantum colendi animi potes, quantum labor conjunctus (si dilexeris labor et pena, quam volupes) thesaurum, sic, ut cuniculus mere communitas, ut cum omnis, superbissima sua et sibi satisfacit, tuo sibi delitiis videntur — Multa enim ad te adjuvandi genus fortunam.

CIC. De Orat. III. 2.

LONDON:

Sold by MESS. RIVINGTON in St. Paul's Church-yard, and T. PAYNE and SON, at the Mews Gate; and at Cambridge: J. FLETCHER in the Turl, and W. [illegible] Bridge-street, Oxford.

M.DCC.LXXXV.

PREFACE.

THE following Letters, such as they are, were in reality written from motives of Friendship: From the same motives they are now sent into the world; for the Author of them wishes to be a Friend to every man living. Their first and great aim is to direct the attention of Young men to things Fair *and* Liberal, *endeavouring to excite in their breasts a spirit of Honest Emulation, and thus contribute, in some degree, towards promoting the cause of Virtue and Sound Learning. Should they succeed herein, the Author need not say it will be matter of sincere pleasure to him: Should he fail, the Consciousness of having acted from no base views shall temper whatever regret he may feel upon seeing his Book sink into Contempt, or Ridicule, or the more peaceful shades of Oblivion.*

If, moreover, he should haply approve his endeavours to the Worthy and Ingenuous part of mankind, he is ready to acknowledge that he is not insensible to the approbation of such: Their *approbation affords one of the purest pleasures we are capable of: It confirms a man in his own opinion, and enlarges his ability of doing good: Yet this is a consideration (however powerful its influence) which, in comparison with that already mentioned, has but very little weight with him.*

Apologies are for the most part but foolish things: And yet it may be necessary to urge some Apology in behalf of the Author for saying so much, or indeed for saying any thing, on a topic where little that is new or entertaining can possibly be said; Education being a subject which hath been treated of by a thousand different pens, and considered in a thousand different points of view. The only proper *Apology he can urge is the infinite magnitude and importance of the subject.*

Was it necessary to enlarge upon this, he

would do it chiefly in the words of Dr. Priestley; *for he cannot say any thing himself more fit and applicable: Young Gentlemen (says he*) so frequently hear the Learning which is taught in Schools and Universities ridiculed, that they often make themselves easy with giving a very superficial attention to it; concluding from the turn of conversation in the company they generally fall into, and which they expect to keep, that a few years will confound all distinction of learned and unlearned, and make it impossible to be known, whether a man had improved his time at the University or not — This evil certainly calls for redress; and let a person be reckoned a projector, a visionary, or whatever any body pleases, that man is a Friend of his Country who endeavours to re-*

* *See his Miscell. Observations on Education, p.* 192. — *The great Industry and Abilities of this Writer claim our esteem and admiration. But it is to be wished he would not be so forward to lay before the Public his* Reveries *(for do they deserve a better name?) on certain parts of our Holy Religion. How can it be consistent with* Christian Charity *to be perpetually perplexing and disturbing well disposed Minds with metaphysico-theological and unprofitable Speculations?*

medy

medy it, either by supplying any defects respecting the Education of Youth, or by encouraging them in the pursuit of what is right and liberal: *A well meaning man may be mistaken; but a good intention, especially if it be not* wholly *unaccompanied with good sense, ought to be exempted from censure.*

So much for the end proposed by the Author of this Book, and for the motives of making it public.

With regard to the Book itself, he need not observe that the materials of it are common, and that he has used observations which he had seen before, or heard from others; but such, as far as his memory or his notions of propriety would allow him, he has been careful to attribute to their respective Authors — All sorts of obligations he trusts he will ever acknowledge not without readiness and gratitude. He confesses fairly then that he "has served himself all he could by reading." So that, upon the whole, he would not advise, those who can be pleased with nothing but wit and novelty to read or

purchase

purchase this Book: In the matter of it there is nothing witty; nothing new.

Instead, however, of treading in the steps of those who have travelled the same ground before him, he hopes he has followed a Method which has not hitherto been so particularly delineated and pointed out. Indeed this very circumstance may occasion complaints against him for having had one Particular Plan of study too much in his eye. Be it so. He by no means scruples to confess that the general outline of his Book was drawn from a Plan actually existing — And hence he would observe (he trusts not impertinently nor yet uncharitably) what little credit is to be given to Writers of a certain cast and temper, who would represent the modes of Education adopted in our Universities as barbarous and vain, as inadequate to the end proposed, and altogether destitute of order and consistency: Spleen, disappointed pride, and self-sufficiency are bad qualities in an Author — This by the way.

Though he has been guided in the main by a

particular

particular Plan of study, he is totally *unconcerned and unconnected with it: He cannot then (at least with any shadow of reason) be accused of prejudice or partiality. His Correspondent may have been engaged in this: he himself may think it an admirable one: he may wish to see it more general: and as there seemed to be a necessity of following some regular method, for these reasons he may have adopted this: but he pretends not to say any thing decisive on a point which is so very variously considered and pursued. Let every man think for himself. For his own part, he is wont to form his opinion with candour and deliberation; and when he is sure it is thus formed, there is no man or set of men, whose favour or disfavour — nothing, in short, but fair, dispassionate, and convincing Reason shall ever, in any case, make him change it: In this there is nothing of obstinacy, or pride, or arrogance — If he is mistaken, he is mistaken.*

It is scarce worth while to take notice that in a Publication of this familiar kind, the

Author

Author never thought of writing any thing like a finished Composition, of investigating his subject so as to consider it in every point of view, and that philosophically: The groundwork was too extensive: His abilities were too limited: And, besides, he is of opinion it would have been improper to do this — He addresses himself (it is true) to a young man entering upon a Course of University-Education, but him he knows to be placed under proper Guides and Tutors; and here he would avoid all sort of interference: not wishing to direct *young men or read them Lectures of Philosophy, but rather (as hath been said already) to inspire and confirm in them Manly Resolution and Perseverance in pursuit after what is* FAIR *and* GOOD. — *For the most part therefore he has treated his subjects historically, and after an easy, familiar manner; thinking that the most amusing and effectual.*

But, nevertheless, should his subject at any time lead him so far out of the way as to make him incroach somewhat on the province

of College-Tutors, it is always done with reluctance: For he has no doubt but those, who undertake that Weighty Office, study to discharge it with all integrity, and inculcate such topics as he has just touched upon with much greater force and elegance: — *Tamen videbatur arbitratur, ratibus aures juvenum vocibus* undique *circumsonare; nec eas, si fieri posset, quidquam aliud audire.*

A propos — *Need he apologize for inserting so many* Greek *and* Latin *quotations into the body of his Work? He has only this to say in his own defence: He is always anxious to support his own opinion by the* best *authorities: He could not express the same thought half so elegant: And his Book is calculated for those only who can read such passages with all possible ease and pleasure.*

Let it be observed farther, that it seemed necessary to enter now and then upon subjects, which to some will appear trifling and low, perhaps contemptible. — *But in matters of this nature it will never do to be guided by a few*

individuals.

individuals. With such then this consideration should have its weight.

The Author would only add, that throughout he has aimed at something like Order and Regularity: But here, and in every other respect, he does not challenge his Young Readers (for to Young Readers only *he addresses himself) to use the severity of Criticism, but relies entirely upon their Candour: and Candour he hopes they will not refuse to show towards him; especially when he assures them, and that solemnly, that he has nothing in this world more at heart than their welfare and advantage.*

THE CONTENTS.

ERRATA.

Page 3. Line 1. *dele* the ˋ over the *u* in *dulcius*. P. 3. L. 8 and 9. *dele* the , in each line; the Sentence being quite perverted by them. P. 11. L. ult. for ' Elments,' read, *Elements*. P. 17. L. 17. for ' proper a superstructure,' r. *a proper superstructure*. P. 22. L. 2. for ' Πaιδεια,' r. Παιδεια. P. 23. L. ult. *dele* the words, ' like every thing else belonging to man.' P. 141. L. 8. for ' forty,' r. *four*. P. 123. Note b. for ' Royaflue,' r. *Royaume*. P. 151. L. 6. for ' that is superfluous,' r. *that is superfluous*. P. 160. L. 18. for ' a way,' r. *away*. P. 176. L. 16. for ' This no other,' r. *This is no other*. P. 183. L. 14. *dele* ' the.' P. 190. L. ult. for ' de,' r. *du*. P. 224. L. 6 from the bottom, *dele* ' op.' P. 249. L. 9. for ' honour able,' r. *honourable*. P. 274. L. antepenult. for ' Hence it came pafs,' r. *Hence it came to pafs*. P. 283. L. 10. for ' a regular, and dramatic performance,' r. *a regular, dramatic performance*. P. 327. L. 1. for ' fountion,' r. *foundation*.

LETTER I.

I AM much pleaſed, *Eugenio*, to hear of your ſafe arrival in College; and to find that the little experience you have had of that way of life has ſuggeſted to you no diſagreeable apprehenſions. For my own part, when I look back on the hours I paſſed within thoſe venerable Walls, I do it with a great deal of pleaſure, and perhaps ſome little regret:—with pleaſure, in recollecting the time and place that gave birth to my beſt and moſt durable comforts, the comforts I mean which attend ſtudy and reflexion; and with regret, in experiencing that the whole of Human Life is not *equally* free from ſolicitude and trouble.

Let me intreat you ever to remember, that your ſucceſs and behaviour in future depends, in a great meaſure, upon the man-

ner you paſs theſe ſeven ſucceeding years. It is entirely in your own power to make them productive of much ſorrow and infelicity: and it is alſo in your power to render them the pleaſanteſt as well as the moſt uſeful period of your life. The indolent and the profligate ſhall have to complain of every thing they do; but the thinking and induſtrious young man feels true pleaſure increaſing daily with his improvement: With no wordly engagements on his hands, and ſpurred on by that which is the *very life and ſoul* of literary purſuits, a *laudable emulation*, he there enjoys ſuch eaſe and tranquillity as are neceſſary for the acquiſition and advancement of ſound Knowledge: And being once fixed in the path which leads to Virtue and honeſt Fame — to every thing deſirable in life—he finds a thouſand reaſons encouraging him to perſeverance, till at length he acquires ſomething of that philoſophical compoſure, which, as it is the effect of much thought and reflexion, lies, in ſome meaſure, beyond the influence of fortune. It is *then*, and *not before*, he can enter into the ſpirit of thoſe well known lines of the *Roman* Poet:

—*Nil*

— Nil dulcius est, bene quàm munita tenere
Edita doctrina Sapientum templa serena:
Despicere unde queas alios, passimque videre
Errare, atque viam palanteis quærere vitæ;—
Certare ingenio,—contendere nobilitate;—
Noctes atque dies niti præstante labore
Ad summas emergere opes, rerumque potiri.[a]

It is needless to say how ardently I wish, my young friend, to be of this turn of mind. Though I have great confidence in your prudence and abilities, yet I will not scruple to communicate occasionally what may stand a chance of serving as a barrier against any irregular desires, or as an incentive to worthy actions. Having but just trodden the same path before you, I may possibly hit out some things which it may be of service for you to know. Think not, however, that I have any notion of interfering with your Tutor's province, had my slender attainments enabled me:—Far from it:—I rather wish to second his endeavours, by pointing out only such particulars as may be likely to contribute to your *amusement* more than to your *instruction*. The character of a candid,

[a] Lucret. II. 7.

faithful friend is always preferable with me to that of a dictatorial governor: You are therefore to consider the observations I shall send you not so much as precepts for *regulating your conduct*, as hints *submitted to your judgment*; only I must beg of you to consider them well before you reject them, as in general they are the result of *experience*—I pretend not indeed to any other advantages.

A Correspondence of this nature will, I am persuaded, be *mutually* serviceable:—it will inure me to digest and methodize my notions of things; for the mind, being fixed on some particular object, will be kept from that vacancy, and those vague reveries, which it is otherwise so apt to fall into. Besides, we shall by this means, I hope, cultivate a *true* and *lasting friendship*: And let it be our endeavour, *Eugenio*, to make this social and virtuous principle recover something of its ancient vigour: The endeavour will not be chimerical: The native temper and propensities of the human heart are, in all ages, much the same, and capable of course of the same improvement: Of these propensities *this* certainly is one of the *noblest* and *most exalted*. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER II.

WOULD you not consider me a mere trifler, was I to send you any strictures with regard to the furnishing of your *Rooms?* However, being convinced that many are guilty of very chimerical whims, and absurdities on this head, I will, at all events, run the hazard. Endeavour then, as soon as possible, to fix on a comfortable sett of *Rooms:* To be changing and shifting from place to place is attended with many disagreeable circumstances.—*Rousseau* declaims violently against buying Books and Paintings on account of the chagrin that must arise from the deficiency of all Private Collections of that nature: Though one be not of the same mind with this whimsical Philosopher, yet I would not be desirous of making of my *Room* a *Picture Shop*, or of my little *Study* a *Public Library*. In the one, if I had any Pictures at all, they should be few and well selected; and in the other, no Books but what were necessary for the prosecution of my studies. All my furni-

ture should be neat, but plain: nothing glaring, nothing superfluous: Care should be taken,

——— ne turpe toral, ne sordida mappa
Corruget nares, ne non et cantharus et lanx
Ostendat tibi te.[a]

To have things clean and comfortable about one tranquillizes the mind, and prepares it for study; but all foolish and extravagant ornament tends in my opinion to take off the attention. Besides, I would endeavour in these smaller matters, as well as in things of greater importance, to show an elegant and cultivated taste.

But in order to *exemplify* what I have been just saying, I will send you a short sketch of the character of a young man whom I never think of without *pleasure* and *instruction*; and be not displeased if I do it with a view to somewhat more than the main subject of this letter.

A Contemporary of mine, whom I shall call *Cleanthes*, was remarked for having in every thing about him that *neatness* and *simplicity* which persons of true taste have

[a] Hor. Ep. 5. lib. 1.

always

always admired. In his *Room*, above the fire-place, was hung the fine Print of Raphael's representing *Our Saviour's first appearance to the Apostles after his Resurrection*; on the opposite side was an elegant Looking-glass, at the top of which there stood a small Bust of TIME; and facing the door a full-length Picture of honest *Homer*, standing in proper attitude and holding forth to some ancient assembly. Over the fire, in a snug little *Study*, was the Portrait of a Friend, of whose accomplishments *Cleanthes* would often talk in the warmest terms, and whose exemplary conduct he professed to imitate: Above that was a fine old Statue of the *Athenian Orator*, in the very act of defending himself against *his rival* ÆSCHINES. The rest of the furniture of the *Study*, besides a few chosen Books and *D'Anville's* Maps, consisted of nothing but a Pair of Globes, and the ingenious Charts of *Dr. Priestly*.—In a corner of his bed-chamber was a large and well finished Painting of the *Choice of Hercules*.

Thus did this amiable young man contrive to render every thing *ornamental* conducive to some *useful* purpose;—to warn

him of his errors, or remind him in *Virgil's* words engraved under his buſt of TIME

Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile TEMPUS—

—to inſpire him with an *honeſt*, but *well regulated* love of fame;—or to keep freſh in his memory that every thing would yield to *induſtry* and *perſeverance*.

Cleanthes was equally neat with regard to his perſon. As in his *Rooms* one ſhould ſeldom ſee a book lying on the table but what was neceſſary for preſent uſe, ſo in his dreſs there was nothing ſlovenly, nothing coxcomical. He was, in ſhort, what *Horace* would have diſtinguiſhed by his *ſimplex munditiis*, what *Shenſtone* would have called *elegant*,* and yet not be able to convey a true idea of what they wiſhed to repreſent.

Theſe things you will probably think *trifling*: But, for my own part, I think that ſuch a turn of mind, when *free from all kind of affectation*, ſets Learning off in its moſt amiable colours; and it is often found connected with a taſte for elegant erudition, and with good morals: Indeed there is a natural *affinity* between them.

* *Shenſtone* uſed to think that this epithet conveyed the full meaning of *Horace's* expreſſion.

The

The union of these appeared in no one more conspicuously than in *Cleanthes*, for he had a great store of sound knowledge, together with the sweetest disposition and a truly honest heart. Whatever he undertook, he executed in a way that bespoke the man of *scholarship*, and *politeness*, and *integrity*.

And yet we are not to ascribe *all* this to Nature. He had, it is true, naturally, very strong abilities, but they had been improved with the greatest care and diligence. Call to mind the *Lares* that inspired him, pushing him on to worthy actions, and teaching him to consider *nothing* as *insurmountable*. Few can boast of the acquisitions he had made, and yet most young men are *capable* of attaining to them. All the *Graces* looked propitiously on this excellent youth, and almost every *Muse* held him in equal favour. Think of *Cleanthes*, and fare you well.

PHILANDER.

LETTER III.

THE first piece of advice which is usually given persons in your situation, is, to warn them against keeping improper and disorderly company. Care, however, should be taken, lest by carrying this caution to an *extreme*, the young and passive mind be impressed with ideas of *suspicion* and *distrust*: the consequences of *these* are ever to be dreaded. If he has but common faculties, and if those have been properly cultivated, you will readily allow that a young fellow at eighteen must have sufficient penetration to distinguish between a *manly confidence*, and a *credulity which belongs only to the simpleton*. So that the difficulty lies not so much in being *able to discern* the man of virtue and understanding from the mere trifler and debauchee, as to *put on a fixed resolution to avoid* the one and *win the affection* of the other.

Although I might probably depend upon your own prudence in this particular, yet I will endeavour to explain to you, in a few words, the truth of the well known observation,

vation, *That your own life will necessarily resemble that of the company you keep:* My regard for you is too sincere to suffer me to pass over in silence a matter of so great importance.

My *Lord Kaims* * observes, that "virtuous actions are found by induction to lead us to imitation by inspiring emotions resembling the passions that produce those actions—and hence the advantage of choice books and choice company." He might have spoken more generally: For as the mind acquires *strength* and a *right turn* by being conversant with *vigorous* and *regular* understandings, so likewise, for *the very same reasons*, it becomes wonderfully *base* and *degenerate* by a continual acquaintance with those of a *vulgar* and *distempered* habit: And here we see why *Charondas*, the celebrated Legislator of *Catana*, punished those as criminals who were *found only in the company* of profligate and wicked people.

This then being the case, you are next to observe that you are now arrived at that *critical* period, when the impressions the mind receives will last, it is probable, *during*

* Elments of Criticism, Vol. 1. p. 179.

life:

life: *Now* associations of ideas begin to form themselves; — and upon *this*, Philosophers will tell us, depends the present happiness or misery of man: [a] *Now* therefore is the time to *fix on a sure basis*, and to *confirm*, those principles of Truth, and Honesty, and Benevolence, which have been already instilled into you. Reason may convince you of the excellence of what is right and manly; — the study of Ethics or Moral Philosophy will point out the road and encourage you to the practice of it; — and the Examples which you find in History, drawn out in just and lively colours, will enforce it still more successfully; yet all these put together will not make such efficacious and permanent impressions as the Example and Conversation of your friends: Those made by the *former* are too apt to lose their influence as soon as our thoughts are directed to other matters; whereas the *latter* will make them sink so as time shall not be able to obliterate them, nor engagements destroy their force.

Considering these and other observations of the like kind, it becomes you to be ex-

[a] This point is treated of in an able manner in *Hutcheson's Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, Sect. 4.

tremely

tremely careful and determined on this head. It is true indeed that, in that venerable Seat of Learning, Virtue ſhines with ſuperior luſtre, yet there are to be found in it too many debauched and worthleſs characters. Now in caſe we frequent their company, we are *naturally* inclined either to *adopt their manner of living*, or to *deſpiſe* them: But a rational man ſhould do neither of theſe things: The beſt way is to have no further connexion with them than what the common forms of civility and good breeding neceſſarily demand. When indeed a perſon has properly formed his mind, he may then with ſafety occaſionally frequent ſuch company from *the beſt of motives*, the motives I mean of ſhowing them the Amiableneſs of TEMPERANCE, and of thus endeavouring to reform them. But before we are *thorough* maſters of ourſelves, it is very dangerous to do it.

And beſides, putting every regard to *literary and moral improvement* out of the queſtion, and excluſive of the havock you make in your own conſtitution, any thing like friendſhip with diſorderly perſons muſt, in the

the end, be a ſource of much greater pain and infelicity than of pleaſure; for the *miſery* of ſuch is much more probable than their *happineſs*;—and it is in our nature to ſympathize with our fellow-creatures, eſpecially thoſe, with whom we have been on intimate terms: By the like reaſoning, intimate acquaintance with perſons of *corrected minds* and *regular conduct* will be attended with effects diametrically oppoſite—

Εστω καταφυγη πασιν οι χρηστοι φιλοι.[a]

When you ſhall have picked out a few friends of this laſt deſcription, (for they ſhould be *few in number* as well as ſelected with proper care) it would be uſeful were you to ſend me, at a leiſure hour, in a fair and honeſt way, the general outlines of their characters. By thus inuring yourſelf in time to ſcan the humours and diſpoſitions of thoſe you live with, your pen would be exerciſed, and your mental faculties would acquire keenneſs and penetration. And as long as it is done with ſome care, and with modeſty and candour, you will derive no leſs pleaſure than advantage in thus beginning to form your opinion

[a] Men. Frag. Ed. Cler. p. 254.

of

of men and manners: The genuine and ſpontaneous diſcovery of its own notions is ever agreeable to the human mind; and it will retain more forcibly, becauſe it is better ſatisfied with, the remarks it makes of its own accord, than thoſe which it paſſively receives at ſecond hand;—and this too is the only ſure way to make the deepeſt impreſſions on the heart and bring conviction to the underſtanding, which it is found neceſſary to do, before that any principle can become of habitual ſervice.

When, moreover, we ſcrutinize characters, either in a moral or literary view, with candour and deliberation, we ſhall ſoon ſhake off that petulancy and ſelf-conceit we are apt to bring with us from ſchool; acquiring thus, by degrees, a right and liberal way of thinking, and making ourſelves diſpoſed to allow the full value to every virtue and quality in Human Nature.

I have only to beg, that whilſt you are taken up with your College-Friends, you will not forget him, who thus preſumes to adviſe you, and who would have you conſider this and every other Letter, though a

poor,

poor, yet an *honest* and *disinterested* proof of his affection.

Vive, vale, Eugenio, *nostro charissime cordi;*
Inque tuo vivam pectore, ut ipse meo!

PHILANDER.

LETTER IV.

HAVING chosen a few companions of Virtue and Good Sense, you will presently find that their *Conversation* will be no less conducive to *invigorate your understanding*, than their *Example* to *keep you from the paths of vice and folly*; both together conspiring to make you ambitious of attaining the character of the *real Gentleman*; or, in other words, the man of *integrity, good breeding*, and *sound erudition*. But before any sure and effectual advancement can be made this way, you should think in time of regulating your Mind, and of directing the Passions, (which are the organs whereby the Mind exerts itself) to right and rational

objects—

objects — Virtue and Learning are only the natural *effect* of this.

Experience, as well as Theory, informs us, that the Passions are in the end our great motives to action: There cannot then be a fitter employment for Reason, than to conduct and balance them properly; — to purge the mind of whatever bad tendencies it may have by nature, and prepare it for those excellent qualifications and endowments which it is so capable of receiving. This is the great end of a right education; and hitherto it has been fully kept in view with regard to you. But the authority of Tutors and Parents being now a little relaxed, and as you begin to use your thinking powers with a degree of independence, the raising of proper a superstructure on this foundation will principally depend on your own care and exertion. And, believe me, *Eugenio*, the whole of the matter lies in your being able to manage yourself —— *Totum in eo est, ut tibi imperes.*[a]

As long as man retains any thing that is *decent* and *rational* about him, he can never doubt of the *wisdom* and *propriety* of being able to regulate his Passions: The question

[a] Tusc. Quæst. 11. 22.

 is,

is, *whether* and *how* this can be effected. That it *can* be effected, there remains *not* certainly the least shadow of doubt: Ill indeed would man have deserved to be so emphatically stiled by the Physiologists a MICROCOSM, if the Passions, which make up so important a share of his internal structure, contributed nothing to the excellence of his frame, but tended rather to *obliterate the grandeur* and *destroy the dignity* of the *noblest* part of it. The wonderful contrivance that is observable in this divine fabric, is not confined to the rational faculties, or to the contexture of the human skeleton, but is strikingly extended over the *whole*. It follows then that the Passions, though some of them, upon a slight view, may appear violent and perverse, must be modelled nevertheless, and tempered by Nature, so as to tend to the welfare of the Individual and of Society: If so, we must *necessarily* have the power of directing them to *just* and *proper* ends: And indulgent Nature has not been less careful of giving us this power for the right conduct of life, than of furnishing us with eyes to see and hands to ward off an impending evil.

But

But how to acquire a regular ſway over our Paſſions is not perhaps ſo obvious as the *neceſſity* and *intention* of the thing.

Much has been ſaid reſpecting the imbecillity of Reaſon, and the violence of Paſſion during the ſtate of youth: It is certain, however, (as has been hinted above) that Reaſon, properly ſo called, is ſtrong enough, in every ſtage of life, to keep the reins in her hand: But this will not hold true, unleſs we live ſo as to retain ſomething of that plainneſs and ſimplicity which is conformable to Nature: Every one will readily acknowledge that our general mode of living *at preſent* is by no means according to this ſimplicity, and that therefore it tends no leſs to give preternatural ſtrength to Paſſion than to diminiſh the influence and authority of Reaſon: Hence the human Paſſions become too often the occaſion of much miſchief to the Community, as well as of miſery to thoſe under their ſway: But wiſe Nature is free from blame.—If then we wiſh to obtain a proper command over theſe powerful incentives to action, the firſt and great maxim is, TO LIVE TEMPERATELY: For thus we ſhall ſhut up every avenue

 whereby

whereby any improper force may be conveyed to them.—" And perhaps we ſtand in need of nothing more than *temperance*, an *honeſt mind*, and a *vigorous and conſtant exerciſe of the powers of Reaſon*, to render our nature nearly as amiable in its low ſphere, as ſuperior natures indued with nobler faculties, and influenced only by pure deſires."[a]

I truſt you will not only allow the *propriety*, but endeavour to reap the *advantages* that accrue from the right government of the Paſſions. And let me add, by the way, that the being able to exerciſe this government can never appear with *ſo much* luſtre and applauſe as it does in *youth*—To ſubdue a reſtiff and vigorous enemy reflects honour on the ſkill and integrity of the commander, and fills his ſoul with pleaſure; but it is in *every* man's power to overcome that which is exhauſted or worn out from natural decay and infirmities.

As this is a point of the laſt conſequence, I may perhaps add ſomething more reſpecting it by way of an appendix to this Letter, and ſhall only obſerve here that there is no

[a] See *Hutcheſon's Nature and Conduct of the Paſſions*, Sect. V. and VI.

need

need of wasting time and words in exposing the *brutish* notions of the Disciples of *Epicurus* on this head, or the *rash* and *haughty* ones of those of *Zeno* — both the one and the other acting evidently against Nature and right Reason.

LEANDER.

Leander was the eldest son of a Gentleman of no inconsiderable fortune. His father, a man of sound sense and reflexion, was aware that not only his own and his children's happiness, but also that of the Community, in some measure, depended on their Education; and that their Education depended no less on the choice of a person to conduct it. Knowing then the *importance* and the *difficulty* of the thing, he took care to fix on a proper Tutor for *Leander* and his brother. He was a man of elegant manners, and a great admirer of the *Ancients*, though not *(as some are)* an *Enthusiast* in that respect. Had it not been foreign to our purpose, I should have been glad to send you some account of his method of educating his young pupils. I shall only just observe, in a general way, that he always kept in

view what his favourite *Grecians* meant by their ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ and ΠΑΙΔΑΙΑ when applied to the buſineſs of Education, and ſeemed to be perfectly acquainted with the great ſecret of making *bodily* and *mental* Exerciſes ſerve reciprocally as a ſpur and relaxation to each other.

Furniſhed with a decent ſhare of elementary Learning, and, what is of ſtill greater importance, beginning to form a taſte for the Sciences and for ſound Knowledge, *Leander* about twelve years ago was admitted a member of the *Univerſity*, to which you belong. His Tutor accompanied him. He was juſt arrived at his eighteenth year,—a period when the paſſions are as turbulent as the bluſtering ſubjects of old *Æolus*, and when it requires great ſkill and reſolution to keep them within due bounds. Thoſe of *Leander* were ſtrong and impetuous; inſomuch indeed that either from the want of true courage, or more probably from a *principle of vanity*, which *commonly* leads ſpirited young men to licentious practices, he gave them for a ſhort time a ſcope that was inconſiſtent with the character of the real Gentleman. Little room indeed had we to

expect

expect in him the least deviation from the path of Virtue and true Honour;—but the best grounded expectations of man are not on this earth always realized.

His Friend and Tutor—for the *former* should *ever* be involved in the *latter*—was far from being at ease upon seeing *Leander* following this course of life: Though he never winked at his irregularities, yet he did not always din his ears with them: Sometimes he would expostulate, but never without temper, and good nature, and good arguments. If, in short, during the first half year the *Pupil* yielded to some of the passions which reigned in the breast of young *Alcibiades*, it must be confessed that the *Tutor* had something of the wisdom and dexterity of that great Teacher of Youth, the admirable *Socrates*.

It has been often observed, "That when a right turn is given to the mind in our early years, and when right notions of Virtue and Religion have been properly impressed upon it, though they may be in some measure effaced for a time by impressions of a heteregeneous nature, yet there will be always good hopes of their revival." *Leander*'s Tutor, confiding in the truth of this observation,

observation, still hoped to bring him back to his right senses. Upon this he was *wholly* bent.

The first short *Vacation* he took him up to *London*; and just before their return to the *University* they passed the greatest part of one morning in *Westminster-Abbey*, in surveying the monuments of the illustrious Worthies of our Island: And immediately after, he conducted him, *as it were by chance*, into an *Hospital* wherein were lodged those who were in danger of dying martyrs to the impetuosity of their lusts:* Having for a few minutes contemplated this scene of horror, "*Leander*, my friend," said he, being just at the door, and taking him affectionately by the hand, "behold these emaciated wretches, and call to mind the inhabitants of *Westminster-Abbey*: Was it not by means of the *same* instruments, *the human passions*,—but how *differently* applied!—that *those* arrived at *immortal renown* and *happiness*, and that *these sad spectres* have reduced themselves to the lowest state of *infamy* and

* This last circumstance was perhaps suggested from a passage in *Rousseau's Philosophical Dream* about Education. See his *Emilius*, towards the end. It is but justice, however, to say, that there are many good hints and observations interspersed in this book, which I make no doubt might be put in practice.

despair?

despair? You are now returning to College — Consider this matter, my worthy friend, with the attention it deserves."

The scheme had its intended effect. It made him seriously *consider*; and this is all that most young rakes stand in need of (if they are capable of this) to make them return to the path of Virtue. He found it, however, no easy task to establish that admirable mode of living, and that propriety of conduct, for which he became afterwards so deservedly distinguished. Believe me, *Eugenio*, there is need of great courage and resolution to pass from a life of gaiety to that kind of study which is necessary to the attainment of *valuable* accomplishments; When Virtue is not altogether an *artificial* thing, but stands on the firmest foundation and is in a manner made to become *habitual* (as was at first the case respecting this young man) even *then* the Passions may seize an unguarded moment, and upbraid Reason with its frailty: But when once they have got the rein, to call them back to the station for which wise Nature designed them, becomes far more difficult — *Hic labor — hoc opus est* — These, like every thing else belonging to man,

man, if they meet with too much indulgence and ſucceſs, are apt to grow reſtiff, and leap over the boundaries preſcribed them from the beginning, continuing intractable and uncontrouled.

But *Leander*, as he was nothing more, ſo was he nothing leſs, than a Man. His thoughts having continued to flow in the channel wherein his excellent Tutor had put them, he was ſoon convinced that it was a *manly* and a *noble* thing to barter the *fleeting* and *unſatisfactory* pleaſures of the *Senſualiſt* for thoſe *ſublime* ones of the *ſober-minded Philoſopher*. He reflected much on the day's adventure in *London*,—he called to mind the virtuous character of young *Scipio*, and the aſtoniſhing inſtances of fortitude and reſolution to be met with in ſeveral others at his age: Theſe and ſimilar reflexions made him pant after "*the Great and the Honourable*." In two words—He *conſidered*: He *conquered*.

Thus *Leander* preſently found that his taſk was not of an invincible nature. Knowing that the brighteſt parts ſtand in need of diligence and application, he ſoon contracted a habit of ſtudy. And by thus rendering a

great

great part of his happineſs independent, he blunted the edge of every violent and leading paſſion: If indeed he found any improper ſolicitation from this quarter, he would immediately divert his attention to other buſineſs and amuſements;—and by thus giving a new turn to his thoughts would prevent them from dwelling on any object which might tend to corrupt them. He had recourſe to ſuch little precautions, becauſe he knew that by means of them great Virtues are eſtabliſhed: Small matters often prevent great improprieties and misfortunes: *And a truly honeſt mind has a variety of little reſources againſt vice, which others either know not or deſpiſe.* Thus he proceeded with *diffidence*, indeed, but with *reſolution*, confirming thoſe notions and tender habits which his Tutor had taught him in the ſhades of a retired life: And habits of Virtue, when once properly confirmed, are more difficult to be ſhaken off than any other whatſoever.

In all this you muſt not ſuppoſe that he affected any kind of ſingularity; or was converted into an auſtere liver, or the unſocial book-worm. Far otherwiſe. He was ſen-

ſible

ſible that good company, rational converſation, and the endearments of true friendſhip, fill the mind with every ſocial pleaſure and give one a right enjoyment of life, and this he conſidered as nearly the *whole* of Philoſophy; he therefore devoted ſome part of every evening to ſociety: The conſcious improvement of his intellectual faculties, the integrity of his life, and the careſſes of every man of true worth made him there ſhow that cheerfulneſs which it is not eaſy to expreſs, and which none but a *Leander* can feel.—He got up early—divided the firſt part of the morning between reading and reflexion, and ſpent about two or three hours every day in ſome manly Exerciſe. He was a great enemy to that fooliſh cuſtom of having breakfaſt-parties, wherein, he uſed to ſay, was planned many a ſcheme ending in vice and folly; and was of opinion that the evening was the fit time for relaxing the mind with the ſweets of converſation.

After this manner did *Leander* wiſely diſtribute his time between *contemplation* and *action*—between *ſolitude* and *ſociety*; the *one* gave him an opportunity to meditate on the works of Nature,—the end of his own exiſt-

ence,

ence, and the character he was to support whilst he enjoyed it on this earth; and from the *other* he derived that elegance of language, that ease and sweetness in behaviour which give an amiable lustre to Virtue and every other valuable accomplishment. It may be observed, that his Companions consisted of a small number of congenial minds.—The polish to be derived from *mixed* society must be acquired elsewhere, not at the *University:* That is not the place; nor is it the time.

In this uniform conduct he resolutely persevered, which became at length, if I may use the expression, *a practical* translation—I never expect to see a *literal* one—of the *τ καλον κἀγαθον* of the *Greeks:* It also furnished a striking proof of the truth of that fine maxim we find in *Plutarch:* ΕΛΑΒΕΙΟΝ ἀρέσκον, ἡδὺν δὲ αὐτὸν ἡ Συνήθεια ποιεῖ. And we may justly consider the man, who forms and preserves such a conduct, as an honour not only to his Tutor, or his College, or to any society of men whatsoever, but, as we now find it, an honour to the nature we are of: It was evidently the intention of the Author of this nature that we should preserve its

full

full dignity: And it is yet in the power of us all to bring it to a high pitch of perfection: And this ſhould be an argument, though of an inferior degree with great minds, to encourage us all to the attempt: *Poſſunt quia poſſe videntur* — But theſe reflexions are growing too ſerious. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER V.

NOTHING on earth, *Eugenio*, can be more pleaſing than that pure and ſolid ſatisfaction which ſprings in the heart of an honeſt man from the perſuaſion of his being of eſſential ſervice to thoſe he loves. I feel ſomething like this ſatisfaction, when I find that the friendly hints which I propoſe to you, are neither laughed at nor careleſsly thrown aſide; — when, on the contrary, you tell me " that your inexperienced years ſtand in need of ſuch a monitor; — that the obſervations, though they may not be new and ſtriking,

ſtriking, ſhall loſe none of their influence,—but that what is dictated by ſo diſintereſted a motive, as a real concern for your welfare, ſhall not be lightly regarded or wantonly miſapplied."——This is the language of *friendſhip*, and it is more perſuaſive than that of the *Athenian Orator*. In friendſhip raſhneſs and exceſs is ſometimes pardonable: In other things I ſhould condemn the man who aims at what is above his reach; but when he does it from the honeſt motive of endeavouring to ſerve his friend, even ſuch an attempt is at leaſt *excuſable*. Hence it is that I am not unwilling to liſten to your ſolicitation, and proſecute our plan of Correſpondence with a degree of confidence.

I have now good reaſon to be convinced that you begin to *feel* the influence of *Virtue*, who I truſt will appear to *Eugenio* in the ſame light, and with all the attractive ſweetneſs and ſimplicity ſhe did to young *Hercules*;[a] and that you, like him, will accept her offers, and cheriſh the lovely Nymph in your boſom—It is in her power, and in her power *alone*, to give true cheerfulneſs, and inward peace and tranquillity.

Now unleſs this tranquillity, this ſelf-

[a] See the *Memorabilia*.

complacency

complacency was taking place, the closest application would answer but little purpose. It is morally impossible that Learning should yield its choicest fruit in a soil which has not been duly cultured and prepared. To this previous culture and preparation my young friend has already directed his attention, and is exerting himself not without success. He is fit, therefore, to enter upon a Course of study—such a Course I mean as it is necessary for every liberally educated person to go through, and in which he now promises fairly to acquit himself like a man. Lest, however, he should at all deviate from his right path through the boundless and beaten plain which is now opening to his view, I am ready, nay solicitous, to stretch out a friendly hand; not, indeed, that I am under any sort of apprehension on this head, because I am well persuaded that you are entrusted to a much *abler* guide, of whose abilities and integrity I have the highest opinion;—But as the most trifling assistance may not be unacceptable at this *momentous* and *decisive* period, it shall be my business to go on with my *Eugenio* hand in hand, pointing out the adjacent beauties,

and

and endeavouring to amuse him with some *pertinent*, though *trivial* conversation, so as to render this important journey less tedious and less fatiguing. But, if I may continue the metaphor still farther, let me here apprize you, that though it is likely to be at first a rugged road, full of steeps and difficulties, at which perhaps your youthful mind will be dismayed, yet fear not but in time it will surmount them all: For, like *Virgil's* FAME,

Mobilitate viget, viresque acquirit eundo;
Parva metu primò, mox sese attollit in auras;
Ingrediturque solo, et caput inter nubila condit.

There is need of nothing but resolution and perseverance. A tolerable foundation has been laid: The superstructure will rise apace, and it will rise with security.

Upon looking over what I have written, I find it to be little more than *metaphor* and *quotation*: But as I cannot divest my mind of those lines which suggested the greatest part of it, and as, moreover, they will do in every respect to preserve an uniform complexion throughout the whole, I will try your patience a little longer—They

 are

are those beautiful lines quoted by *Xenophon* in his *Memorabilia*—You know them well—They are six of the best that old *Hesiod* ever wrote—I will therefore transcribe them without further apology.

N. B. Under the word ΑΡΕΤΗ is comprehended every qualification that is *good* and *manly*, and *liberal*: Under ΚΑΚΟΤΗΣ, the contrary!

Την μεν τοι ΚΑΚΟΤΗΤΑ κ' ειλαδον εστιν ελεσθαι
Ῥηϊδιως· λειη μεν οδος, μαλα δ' εγγυθι ναιει.
Των δ' ΑΡΕΤΗΣ ιδρωτα Θεοι προπαροιθεν εθηκαν
Αθανατοι, μακρος δε κ' ορθιος οιμος επ' αυτην,
Και τρηχυς το πρωτον· επην δ' εις ακρον ικηαι,
Ῥηϊδιη δη πεσετα πελει, χαλεπη περ εουσα—

Observe the sweetness and encouragement contained in the conclusion;

επην δ' εις ακρον ικηται,
Ῥηϊδιη δη πεσετα πελει, χαλεπη περ εουσα.

Continue to equip yourself for the journey, and farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER VI.

MY *Lord Bolingbroke*, in his *Letters on the Study of History*, obſerves, "That an application to any ſtudy, which tends neither directly nor indirectly to make us better men and better citizens, is at beſt but a ſpecious and ingenious ſort of idleneſs; and the knowledge we acquire by it is a creditable kind of ignorance, nothing more"—This is no leſs true than elegant. We ſhould therefore be particularly on our guard againſt contracting that vague and deſultory habit of ſtudying, which, having no certain and uſeful object in view, can never be productive of any good effect; and, inſtead of *invigorating* the mental faculties, tends rather to *diſtract* and *enervate* them. Did we but always remember, that the great aim of all our ſtudies ſhould be "to make us better men and better citizens," we ſhould ſeldom deviate from the right road.

Now nothing is more likely to keep us fixed to this point, than to proceed with *humility* and *reſolution*. There has never

been so great an obstacle to the advancement of true Learning, as that *haughty* and *impatient* spirit, which, pluming itself with its own attainments, however slender and puerile, and willing to follow wherever Fancy leads the way, cannot brook the idea of undergoing the labour that is necessary to the acquisition of sound Knowledge. This is for the most part a foible belonging to youth. It too commonly happens, that, during this age of *levity and presumption*, when the darkness in which Nature involves the human mind begins to wear away, we are inclined to suppose that we *already* know sufficient to carry us through life with decency and with credit. All of us, unless we wink hard indeed, must see the folly of this; but too few have patience and courage enough to avoid it. Among these few I will venture to put down *Eugenio*: For he I trust is disposing his mind for the reception of wholesome Literature, and is aware that it cannot be acquired but by *patient industry*.

There is likewise need of *order* and *regularity*. "We should march all the way, even from the first perception of senses (to use

use *Bacon's* words[a]) by line and level, should be secured and fortified by a certain rule and constant method of proceeding.[b] It is only by the observance of some perspicuous method, that we can proceed with any degree of certainty, and be able to acquire any solid improvement and satisfaction. Without it, application and perseverance lead into greater perplexity; but by observing it, the judgment will be gradually formed and regulated, and the memory will be assisted —— Ordo etiam manifesto juvat *Memoriam*.

Having then right objects in view, and proceeding with perseverance and regularity, *it is in the power of every one of us* to make long strides towards that pleasant place, where (as old *Hesiod* has it) VIRTUE and LEARNING have fixed their seats. Neither the *length*, nor the *narrowness*, nor yet the *roughness* of the road should discourage us. And we should not be dejected from a consciousness of our own weakness. It is not indeed possible for us to know either the strength or weakness of our abilities, unless we exert them with resolution and sincerity; and such an exertion will never fail of suc-

[a] See his Essays. [b] Bacon *de Aug. Scien.* 12mo. p. 337.

cess. To be *humble-minded* is a necessary thing, but to be dismayed at a little labour indicates a *mean* and an *irresolute* soul, a soul which will *never* arrive at excellence in any thing that is fair and manly.

You see I do not wish to lead you on by any false allurements. To suppose that the road to Solid Erudition is from beginning to end a road of pleasure is a fanciful dream,—the dream of a *Sybarite*. But still, pleasures (and those of the *sublimest* kind) there certainly are, though we cannot count at the full possession of them at once. The pleasures of Learning, like those of Virtue, can be enjoyed only by those who have made some proficiency, and who sincerely wish to enjoy them.

I cannot conclude this Letter, long as it is, without congratulating you on having so many favourable circumstances attending your present situation which tend to *confirm* your resolution of prosecuting your studies in a proper way. Of this kind particularly are those pleasant Walks and Gardens, which some of the greatest men of this island have been used to frequent—"[a] Et tanta vis admo-

[a] Cic. de fin. &c. lib. 5. cap. 1. & 2.—The six first words are brought a little out of the place they occupy in the original.

nitionis

nitionis inest in locis, ut, cùm *ea loca videamus*, in quibus memoriâ dignos viros constiterimus multùm esse versatos, *magis moveamur*, quàm siquando eorum ipsorum aut *facta audiamus*, aut *scriptum aliquod legamus*. Atque id quidem *infinitum* est in *illâ* urbe: quacumque enim ingredimur, in aliquam historiam vestigium ponimus." To this should be added the healthfulness of the climate, and the opportunity you enjoy of spending your leisure-hours in cheerful and rational conversation with those, who, like yourself, are candidates for fame.—Surely, such things as these will excite in *every* mind, which has in it the smallest spark of *magnanimity*, an *honest* and a *liberal* emulation. And this passion, let grave Moralists say what they will, was no doubt implanted in us for wise purposes; else why should we feel that sublime and pure delight which arises from the reflexion on our having excelled our equals in any thing that is *valuable* and *praise-worthy*?

Cherish it in your bosom; but remember, at the same time, that you *cannot* take *too much* care to *regulate* and *direct it properly*. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER VII.

MANY entertain wrong notions with regard to reading. The generality of young men read *too little*: some, *too much*; not apprehending the *use* and *intention* of the thing. To secure yourself from falling into any mistake, I would advise you to consider the matter coolly and deliberately. And by way of giving you some assistance, I cannot perhaps better employ this rainy afternoon than in throwing together, *just as they occur*, a few general observations on the subject; and after that, we shall come to *particulars*: It is here of the highest consequence to set out aright, otherwise the best laid plan, and the most vigorous exertion and perseverance, would be of no avail; for the *abuse* of reading, instead of *advancing*, becomes, on the contrary, an *impediment* to the progress of Knowledge.

In perusing books we are influenced principally by two motives; the one is, to amuse ourselves; the other, to improve our reasoning faculties. If we suffer ourselves

to be led on by the *former*, any more than what may be just necessary to relieve the attention, we shall be on the high road to dangers and mistakes. But it would be certainly an important step towards the attainment of Learning, if we could make our pleasure to consist chiefly in being influenced by the *latter*. I grant, indeed, that those Authors which sport with the imagination are, to young men, *generally speaking*, by far the most agreeable; because (with many other reasons) the perusal of these requires no exertion of the thinking powers of the Mind. But here you must use resolution: A little will do; for if you will boldly oppose, at first, this propensity, I can assure you of success: A Mind, which contains any seeds of what is *great* and *liberal*, perceiving the *emptiness* and *dangerous tendency* of what merely dallies with the fancy and the passions, and feeling inwardly a wonderful *desire* and *capacity* of being polished and enlarged, will soon turn with pleasure to *that mode of reading*, whereby alone it can acquire any degree of *polish* and *enlargement*. This being once settled into a habit, all is secure. If Nature should have given

us

as a Mind too volatile to undergo at once the labour of nice deductions and inquiries, we should inure it to them *by degrees*, gently exerting its powers nevertheless, lest they become languid and paralitic: But it ill becomes us, if we are friends to ourselves, to consider *cowardice*, or *indolence*, or *irresolution*, as any natural volatility of disposition.

But although we may be right and determined as to the *object* of our reading — the improvement of the Mind, that is; yet we are frequently apt to be mistaken with regard to the *means* used in endeavouring to acquire it. Many there are, who, after the perusal of several Volumes, not finding themselves making the progress they expected, conclude too hastily, that to obtain any portion of true Learning, falls to the share of *only a few favourites of Nature*, from which number they would modestly exempt themselves: The fault originates with themselves, and possibly with those who preside over their education: Such want order and judgment to direct them: Nature, in the distribution of the powers of the human Mind, is, for the most part, extremely equal.

Others,

Others, again, are of opinion that if they induſtriouſly collect ſuch curious and valuable books and manuſcripts as are unknown or inacceſſible to the greateſt part of the *Literati*, they are on the direct road to true Learning. Theſe people, all whoſe knowledge lies in their fine *Libraries*, may well be compared to that ſilly *Roman*, who, as *Seneca*[a] informs us, uſed to pay able and ingenious men for being conſtantly about him — For what, think you? — why, in caſe any learned topic was ſtarted (and ſuch no doubt was perpetually hunted after) theſe were to ſupply him, one with an acute ſaying from *Ariſtotle* or *Plato*, — this with a witty one from *Ariſtophanes* — a third with a verſe of *Homer* and ſo on — every one giving him a ſcrap out of his own Author: However, *Claviſcus Sabinus*, for that was the fool's name, thought himſelf a man of very great learning, becauſe it was in the heads of thoſe whom he kept in his ſervice.

Theſe men collect indeed and run over a multitude of books, but never reflect on their contents; never exert the powers of the Mind, nor try to make them capable of

[a] Epiſt. 27.

diſcerning

discerning and digesting that which is useful forgetting altogether, that he

who reads
Incessantly, and to his reading brings not
A spirit and judgement equal or superior,

Uncertain and unsettled still remains,
Deep vers'd in books and shallow in himself,
Crude or intoxicate, collecting toys,
And trifles for choice matters — worth a sponge,
As children gathering pebbles on the shore.[a]

When the celebrated Dean of *St. Patrick* said, that all who wished to make themselves Scholars ought to *read* seven or eight hours every day during the first part of their life, he meant no doubt that they should spend that time in using themselves to think regularly, to canvass the opinions of the Authors they perused, and to draw from them proper conclusions and information. It is thus we shall make a progress in acquiring Knowledge. By thus following the track wherein Authors make their observations and discoveries,

[a] Par. Regained iv. 322.

veries, we shall learn to exert our own powers of invention, and be supplied with materials to exert them with advantage: This is the great use and intention of books. —"[a] Non *paranda* nobis solum, sed *fruenda* etiam Sapientia est." Let it not be your concern to read *much*, but to read *well*.

It would, I think, facilitate very much what I am anxious that you should attend to, if, upon meeting with any thing extraordinary in any man's life, or any new observation recorded in an Author you read, you were to shut the book and imagine yourself in their circumstance or situation, and consider the merit or demerit of the action or sentiment, comparing it with what *you* might have done or said on the same occasion:[b] Or, if, when you meet with a General, who, though he has an opportunity of making a speech to his soldiers, yet opens not his mouth, you were to put yourself at the head of his army, and compose an harangue for him: Or again, when you find a Senator sitting silent, you should make him rise up, and, having properly considered the matter in debate and the character of him

[a] Cic. De Fin. l. 1. [b] De Aug. Scien.

you

you would wish to speak, deliver in his stead an Oration adapted to the purpose; endeavouring to make the matter and words such as he might have been supposed to use—These, and other incidents of the like kind, often occur in the speech-making but admirable Historians of Antiquity. Numerous are the advantages to be derived from such a practice. Among others, it would tend to make you observe the peculiar and hidden excellencies of the Authors you peruse;—it would exercise your faculties in applying properly your own sentiments, and your pen in imitating their language;—and thus by inuring you to think after their manner, and by polishing your style, it would teach you in time to catch something of their spirit and elegance, and make their several beauties as it were your own.

Take the following account of one who went on in another way:

PHILOPHEMES.

It has been said, that since the birth of the Arts and Sciences, reading was never so much

much in fashion as in the *present age*; and that men, generally speaking, were never so *ignorant* and *superficial*. However dogmatical this assertion may be, it is nevertheless too true that there are many who read with no *other* view than to *talk* and *shine in company*: This being the summit of their ambition, they suppose that the remembrance of some particular facts, some fine sentences, or humourous anecdotes will make up for every other deficiency. It is, I believe, amongst these glittering bawbles we must rank *Philophemes*. He was sent to the University at about eighteen, possessed of no small share of school-learning: This, however, he did not much increase.

The love of praise, when *moderate* and *well directed*, gives birth, at least it gives *vigour* and *refinement* to several noble qualifications; when *otherwise*, it is the cause of much mischief. This was the ruling passion in the breast of *Philophemes*.

His aim was, to be considered as a man of the most extensive knowledge, as well as of the most elegant and refined taste: The principles of the latter, indeed, had been given him by Nature; but these were rather

vitiated

vitiated than improved by the method he adopted in acquiring the former. Instead of reading those models of the *sublime* and *beautiful* in composition with the attention they deserve, he thought of doing the business by a much nearer way; for rather than peruse the great Writers of ancient *Greece* and *Rome*, so as to be able to imitate their beauties, and enter into the true spirit of their works, *Philophemes* had recourse to enervated translations and paltry abridgements. His time was therefore principally taken up in running over the more showy but slimsy productions of the day; in learning the several languages of *France*, *Italy*, *Spain*, *Holland*, *Portugal*, and *Germany*; and in dabbling with the elements of Geometry. In conversation, he would quote, with seeming facility, *Voltaire*, or *Tasso*, or *Camoens*, or any other first rate Author in these *centum linguis*, the bare *enumeration* of which is enough to perplex and confound one. And as to *Hebrew*, *Persic*, *Arabic*, *Syriac*, and *Greek* and *Latin*, his knowledge in these was not inferior *(ut fama erat)* to that of a *Pocock* or a *Scaliger*. Among readers of the common sort, like myself and others, he

he would talk of *Thucydides* and *Livy* as of his moſt intimate companions. Honeſt *Homer* he was wont to extol with a degree of enthuſiaſm, and would have us believe that he had peruſed all the voluminous commentaries and compilations of the indefatigable Biſhop of *Theſſalonica*. Of ſuch vaſt extent was the capacity of *Philophemes!*

But let us not be carried away with appearances. A diſcerning eye might eaſily perceive that his knowledge went but a very little way beyond the Grammar; or, more properly ſpeaking, (for he had never well digeſted the elementary principles of moſt of the languages he uſed to dabble in) he was juſt able to make a fine quotation, and to paſs a pretty accurate opinion on the principal Authors in them: That was all. This, however, is apt to dazzle a common obſerver. And beſides, "ſuppoſe a Linguiſt (as * *Milton* ſtrongly expreſſes it) was to pride himſelf to have all the tongues that *Babel* cleft the world into, yet, if he had not ſtudied the ſolid things in them as well as the words and lexicons, he were nothing ſo much to be eſteemed a learned man, as

* In his *Tractate on Education.*

any yeoman or tradesman competently wise in his mother-dialect only." Suppose not, however, that I think *lightly* of studying the languages: I only wish that all studies, whatever they be, were made subservient to some *useful* and *rational* end.

Philophemes it is true *read* a great deal, but it may be questioned whether he ever really *thought* in his life. His conversation was forced and artificial: His Memory was naturally retentive; to this he was *wholly* indebted: His powers of reasoning and invention were never exerted: So that whatever his acquisitions were, he was possessed of no *real knowledge*; for it cannot be called any real knowledge to know any thing by *rote*—*It is only a bare retention of what has been entrusted to the Memory.*

His method was, whenever he had any previous notice of the company he should meet, to furnish himself with materials for discourse—Apud *alios* loqui videlicet didicerat, non multum ipse *secum* *—Being once present at a Gentleman's house, where two Surgeons, sensible men, spent the evening; *Philophemes*, as his manner was, introduced

* Cic. Tuscul. Quæst. v. 36.

Anatomy

Anatomy on the carpet without the least apparent intention. The topic was discussed with great eloquence. The sons of *Æsculapius* were now in their element, and on the subject of *osteology* in particular they displayed no small share of skill and erudition. But *Philophemes* ransacked over the whole *Ars Medica*; and his superior volubility attracted the eyes of all: "In truth" (said one of the company, after a while, with perhaps more pleasant *sarcasm* than *good-nature*) "my friend *Philophemes* has *Cheselden* and *Haller* at his finger's end;—to be sure he was at them till *past twelve last night*." We smiled. He blushed.

I need not point out to you more particularly that such a method of going to work, besides the *futility* of it, will at length be sure to bring one into very *ridiculous* and *disagreeable* circumstances: For all fictions will soon fall away, as the blossoms do from the trees: there is nothing feigned, any more than violent, that can possibly be of long duration: So that the *nearest* and *most secure* way to honour and respect is, in the end, the same as was chalked out and recommended by the excellent *Socrates*, *To*

be, that is, *in reality what one wishes to be esteemed.*[a]

I have just this moment called to mind another anecdote, which may perhaps, if there was any kind of necessity, set this matter in a clearer light—I will therefore mention it.

Philophemes was designed for the Church. He was appointed, soon after he was ordained Priest, to preach at a Visitation held by the Bishop of . . . . . .—The appointment was highly pleasing to this young man; for as the audience was likely to be learned and numerous, he looked upon it as a good opportunity for extending the limits of his fame. But where was the Sermon to be had? for the brain of *Philophemes* had never attempted to put together any thing like a regular composition of any kind. But no matter how or where:—he was pleased with the appointment. The thoughts of making a Sermon himself—and to his praise be it mentioned—never once entered into his head. He therefore, like another *Claviscus Sabinus*, had recourse to a Curate

[a] See *Cicero's Offices*, 11. 12. and *Xenophon's Memorabilia*, passim.

of

of his—for you muſt know that *Philophemes* was a DIGNITARY in the Church, pampering himſelf at the age of *ſix and twenty* with the revenues of a GOLDEN PREBEND and a no leſs GOLDEN LIVING!!!—— But this Curate, who he underſtood was eſteemed a liberal and ingenious man, either from want of time, or from ſome neceſſity or other, played his young Rector on this occaſion but a ſcurvy trick. Attend the ſequel. Behold *Philophemes* now in the Pulpit, diſplaying his oratorial talents with no leſs energy than *Mark Tully Cicero*; and now behold him—ſad contraſt!—receiving this anonymous note, juſt as he is going to dine with the Biſhop: "If your vanity ſhould prompt you to *publiſh* the Diſcourſe which we juſt now heard, a friend adviſes you to apprize the world in the title-page, that it is at leaſt *the Second Edition*, for it has *already* appeared in print about ten years ago, when it met with univerſal and deſerved approbation. His Lordſhip, no doubt, and the reſt of the learned audience are much obliged to you for delivering it with ſo much eloquence and ſolemnity."

Are

Are you not moved, *Eugenio*, with something like a mixture of pity and contempt for this frivolous young man?—If you wish to be the cause of such emotions, imitate *Philophemes*.

Such a character, however, is considered by some men as a kind of prodigy. For my own part, (and I adopt the words of old *Melibæus* with all sincerity) "Non equidem *invideo: miror* magis." For, in my opinion of things, the contracted span of human life is too short to be wasted in this desultory and puerile way; and it seems to me to be much wiser for us, and much more agreeable to the intention of our present existence, to proceed in some *regular*, *rational* manner; and to *read*, as well as *act*, not with views to *ostentation*, but to *acquire true Wisdom and Virtue*; improving our reason with the utmost diligence, and making every faculty we have as beneficial as possible both to *ourselves* and to our *fellow-creatures*.

LETTER

LETTER VIII.

I AM glad to hear that your Public Lectures begin with the Mathematics. It is entering on a Course of Study in a proper way, and after the ancient manner of proceeding. Every one knows that the old Philosophers of *Greece* used to consider an acquaintance with Geometry as a key to the understanding of the other Sciences: When *Pythagoras* opened his famous School in that part of *Italy*, which was formerly called *Magna Græcia*, his Scholars were always advised to begin here as at the fountain head of Literature. And a similar plan was afterwards adopted by *Plato* in the *Groves* of *Academus*, who never admitted to his Lectures in Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics those who were unacquainted with the elements of Geometry. To the same purpose also is the saying recorded of his Scholar *Xenocrates*, who, having in time succeeded *Speusippus* in his School, and being desired by one that was ignorant of the Mathema-

tics and the principles of Arithmetic, to admit him to his philosophical Lectures, replied, *Friend, I would advise you to go your way, for you have not the* HANDLES *of Philosophy*——Πορευε, εφη· ΛΑΒΑΣ γαρ ου εχεις Φιλοσοφιας.[a]

Of the same opinion we find all other great men who did not want sound sense and proper experience in these matters. Out of the great list of Moderns, I will only mention the celebrated *Bacon*,[b] and the Author of *Paradise Lost*, whose capacious mind seems to have been no less adapted for the study of Philosophy in general, than it was for Poetry: "As for the usual method of teaching Arts and Sciences, says he,[c] I deem it to be an old error of *Universities* not yet

[a] See the account of him by Diogenes Laertius. We have no word to express λαβη exactly.

[b] He speaks of this in very pointed terms in his Book *De Augmen. Scient.* p. 98, 99.—12mo.

[c] In his *Tractate of Education*. There are a great many valuable remarks in this little piece: But the plan he proposes is impracticable, in as much as he requires more than the generality of men can compass. The Author of *Paradise Lost* seems to have thought that all men were possessed of his mighty genius, to which every thing was feasible and easy—So apt are men to judge of others by themselves, and so liable are they to be mistaken.

well

well recovered from the scholastic grossness of barbarous ages, that instead of beginning with Arts most *easy*, (and those be such as are most *obvious to the sense*) they present their young unmatriculated novices at first coming with the *intellective abstractions* of *Logic* and *Metaphysics*," and so on. But with you what this great man very justly complains of (and what is too often practised even at this time of day) seems to be entirely removed, and a beginning made just as he would wish; for nothing can be more *easy*, nothing more *obvious to the sense* than the elements of Geometry: Indeed they are so much so, that some have gone so far as to say, that *everybody* might make himself master of Mathematics if he would.

I need not quote any more authorities nor assign any further reasons (though there are many more at hand) to assure you of the *propriety* of your setting out: And hence I have good hope that you are guided by men who study to discharge conscientiously the duties of their high office, and who dare *throw off* the authority of meer *custom* when it *opposes* the dictates of more *enlightened Reason*, and of *better Experience*—These

two

two considerations are of the greatest importance imaginable.

Much less need I use many words either to *remove the objections* made to this Science, (for objections have been made to the most useful things in the world) or, on the other hand, to *shew* you its *excellence and utility*. The little that has been said against it in former times originated in the disordered heads of the *Sceptics* and *Epicureans*—and who is ignorant that *Pyrrho* and *Epicurus* have had, in all ages, their followers and adherents? But the ridicule of such men will always reflect honour instead of contempt, it being an infallible proof of some superior worth and excellence in the object of their attack. The readiest way to answer the cavils of prejudiced or little minds on this head is, to oppose to them the advantages which accrue from the study of Geometry: And here we may say, and that with the utmost truth and impartiality, that they are *more numerous*, and of *more extensive use* than what result from *any other human Science* whatsoever—To you, or any young man of reflexion, it would sufficiently recommend it by saying, that this is a

principal

principal clue to whatever we find valuable in the whole compaſs of Literature. For there is not one ſingle Art, whether of the neceſſary or liberal kind, nor one ſingle Science, which is not, in *ſome meaſure*, ultimately indebted to this—There is little need of mentioning particulars. Now ſuppoſing a competent knowledge of theſe might be acquired without underſtanding the Mathematics, yet it muſt be allowed that thoſe who begin with the firſt principles of Science and in a *regular, approved* method, are alone on the right road to proceed with moſt accuracy and ſucceſs.

To enter at large upon this ſubject, and ſhow minutely how the whole of Learning reſts, in a great meaſure, upon this foundation, is a thing foreign to my preſent intention: I leave this to thoſe who are better able, and whom it may more immediately concern: And perhaps, indeed, at this time, it would be a matter of no great conſequence; The conſideration moſt likely to weigh with you now, is, that the Mathematics tend to the immediate improvement and ſtrengthening of your reaſoning faculties.

It is a maxim, that to acquire by gentle degrees

degrees a habit of reasoning can alone teach us the right and perfect use of those rational powers and principles which Nature seems to have implanted in us. The perusal of a *Poem* of HOMER, of an *Oration* of DEMOSTHENES, or of the finest *Dialogue* of CICERO, cannot effectually do this. Nor is such a habit to be acquired any where else with *so much certainty* as in the Schools of the Mathematicians. By being used to contemplate that *close* and *elegant chain* of arguing, that wonderful *connexion* and *perspicuity* which pervades the whole of their *sublime* Science, you must *necessarily* catch *something* of their method and acuteness. And after having once known the way of forming our notions of things with any accuracy, and of expressing them in a perspicuous and regular manner, it will perhaps be no easy matter to make us deviate from it.

With regard to affairs of Literature, we are told by *Aristotle*, the great Arbiter in these things, that every Composition should be ἓν — *one:* And *Horace*, following his master in this, as well as in other particulars, has the same doctrine:

—— *Sit quodvis simplex duntaxat et unum.*

In

In a multitude of other passages in his *Art of Poetry*, and indeed in all works of the like kind, we find this precept repeatedly inculcated. Now it is not possible to preserve this *whole*, this *totality*, this *oneness*, (call it as you please) without being first able to exert our Reason aright, and arrange our thoughts in due order and proportion. If the Mathematics have the least tendency to enable us to do this, (and they most evidently have) he who has the noble ambition of being any thing like a Scholar should want no other *stimulus* to make him get a competent acquaintance with them.

The study of Geometry, by thus forming and correcting the faculties of the Mind, will soon divest it of that *unsteadiness*, that *pride* and *volatility* which we so often find about young persons—And hence they will be able to prosecute every literary business in a proper manner, and will learn to fix in time on some certain and rational pursuit in life.

Notwithstanding this, and *all* that *might* be said upon the subject, many enter upon this study with reluctance, and few have resolution enough to make any tolerable pro-

ficiency

ſiciency in it; not perhaps that they deny its *uſefulneſs* ſo much as complain of its *inſipidity*. But ſurely this is a very ill-grounded complaint; and can ariſe from no other cauſe than that irkſomeneſs and repugnancy which the human Mind feels at firſt to any ſort of conſiſtency and exertion. For the Mathematics, when properly ſtudied and when but a little progreſs is made, cannot fail of affording the higheſt delight and ſatisfaction: We all know that the firſt principles of every Art and Science are tireſome and unpleaſant, unleſs indeed we may except the Science now before us: For the Elements of *Euclid* will, as I have juſt ſaid, ſoon produce in attentive minds very different emotions—emotions I mean of Pleaſure and Admiration: It is on all hands allowed, that the *inveſtigation*, and eſpecially the *diſcovery* of *Truths*, however *ſpeculative* they may be, naturally affords us the ſublimeſt of all pleaſures. And beſides it is allowed, that *Order*, *Harmony*, and *Proportion* are things amiable in themſelves, and highly delightful to the mind of man:—No *rational* and *thinking* Being can contemplate without wonder, or rather without

out a degree of ecstacy and rapture, that fine symmetry, that curious gradation, that admirable connexion and dependence on each other, that—(I want words to express myself)—which we find throughout the works of the Divine Architect of Nature:—Now whatever bears *any sort of resemblance* to this, either in the works of *Art* or in matters of *Science*, will always produce *effects* of the *same kind*, which indeed shall be *proportionable* to their *causes*.—Let it then be remembered, that there is in Geometry such a beautiful *arrangement* and *connexion* of the several parts, together with so fine a *variety* of *subjects* rising one upon the other and adapted for the exercise of the sublimest faculties, as we may look for in vain in the *other* branches of human Learning—But of this enough.

Multaque præterea tibi possum commemorando
Argumenta fidem dictis conradere nostris:
Verùm animo *satis hæc vestigia parva* sagaci
Sunt, per quæ possis cognoscere cætera tute.[a]

Upon the whole, then, I would have you rest satisfied that you are now entering on

[a] Lucret. 1. 400.

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an *useful* and a *pleasing* Science, and that a competent knowledge of it is a thing *necessary* to be acquired by all who wish to go through a Course of liberal Education in the most advantageous way. Supposing even you *did not at first see* its direct use and tendency, you should not for *that reason* reject it; for believe me, you will perceive, in time, that it has so *powerful*, though perhaps *insensible*, an influence upon the Mind, as to enable it to prosecute other pursuits with greater *strength* and *advantage*. Remember what I have told you before, that a *haughty*, *impatient* spirit is no less an impediment to the progress of sound Knowledge, than *indolence* and *timidity*. Be not discouraged at the first setting out, and I will venture to assure you of success. Let me again remind you, that there is no *Happiness*, no *Virtue*, no *Literary Attainments* to be arrived at without *manly resolution* and *perseverance*.

Nunc animis opus, Eugenio, *nunc pectore firmo*.

As to the *method* of studying this Science, I do not apprehend any difficulty. Commentators will be of no real service to you:

At

At this time, however, every thing of that nature ſhould I think be avoided — But here you have a better guide to direct you — *Euclid* has choſen the beſt Problems and Theorems, and has placed them in, perhaps, as clear and elegant a manner as poſſibly can be. Many have attempted to alter his ſelection and arrangement, but their attempts have only ſerved to make his excellence the more conſpicuous. Be ſure to underſtand his Definitions thoroughly — Definition being what all Science is built upon, it is well known that the old Philoſophers of *Greece* have taken uncommon pains to treat this matter with all poſſible accuracy and preciſion; *Ariſtotle*'s care in this reſpect is remarkable: And *Euclid*, generally ſpeaking, is not deficient. Have therefore, in the firſt place, (I ſay it again) a clear and thorough knowledge of his Definitions; after that, attention is all that is neceſſary, and this cannot be diſpenſed with. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER IX.

THE detached tractates of the ancient Historians and Philosophers, which you say you read at your Private Lectures, will do well to prepare the way for perusing with greater ease and advantage a regular History of the *Greek* and *Roman* Polity. No doubt your excellent Tutor will give you proper directions as to the *end* and *manner* of reading them; yet here, as well as in other things, there are perhaps certain *minutiæ*, which, though scarce worthy of his notice, ought to be attended to nevertheless. It shall be the business of this Letter to glance at such particulars.

There are many who admire the writings of Antiquity for no other reason but because all the world admires them: Whilst a few others, on the contrary, depreciate and undervalue them from the mere affectation of being singular — So capricious a thing is the mind of man when not guided by *unprejudiced* and *cultivated* Reason! Now these persons are equally in the dark with regard

to

to the beauties of the *Ancient Compoſition*; the one being not *able*, the other not *wiſhing* to underſtand it. In truth there is need of a very correct taſte and judgement, to ſee all its excellencies, and to reliſh that *genuine ſimplicity* in which it is handed down to us: Yet he that is not capable of doing this, cannot poſſibly derive either *pleaſure* or *improvement* from reading the works of the Ancients: But they are highly productive of both; and it ſhould be the great care of every one, devoted to ſupport the character of a Gentleman, to fix upon and adhere reſolutely to that track which leads this way with greateſt certainty; taking care, at the ſame time, to avoid the enthuſiaſtic notions of thoſe who contend, that what is *uſeful* and *elegant* in Literature is to be found *no where elſe but in the productions of Antiquity*.

The great end of ſtudying the *Claſſics* is, it is plain, to make them uſeful and ſubſervient to you in ſupporting the dignity of the ſtation you are to fill in life. To do this effectually, you muſt read them ſo as to be able to ſee their ſeveral beauties, and (yet without being a ſervile copyer or a plagiariſt) to transfuſe into your own ſtyle and compo-

ſition *ſomething* of their *ſpirit* and *method*, *ſomething* of their *majeſty* and *ſimplicity*. Whoever thus ſoberly analyſes theſe great models will, it is true, acquire leſs *general* and *faſhionable* learning, but, which ſhould be the firſt object, he will treaſure up a ſtock of *ſound knowledge*; and having inured himſelf to a habit of reflexion, will always have it in his power to draw out and apply this knowledge with *eaſe* and *propriety*.

Again: In order fully to reap this advantage, we muſt render theſe writers eaſy and agreeable to us, ſo as to be able to enter into the true ſpirit of their works: Here it is ſeen at once that to make oneſelf at leaſt a *tolerable* maſter of the language in which they wrote is altogether a neceſſary thing: And this is not to be done in a little time or with a little trouble: That, however, it is not *inſurmountable*, many a worthy character of our own country and of our own times will both convince us and encourage us to the taſk.

Now as to the means of attaining theſe points, let us look up in particular to the example of the claſſical writers of *Ancient Italy*. In the *philoſophical works* of *Cicero* we ſhall find perhaps not a great deal more than the

the thoughts and opinions of *Pythagoras*, of *Plato*, of *Aristotle*, and the other Philosophers of *Greece*, judiciously selected and applied after his own way :[a] — The bee, it has been said, though she culls her materials from various and different flowers, works up her honey so as to make it have a taste wholly original and peculiar to itself. So perhaps in this respect we may say of this great man, — *Homer*, *Hesiod*, and *Theocritus* were confessedly the luminaries whereby *Virgil* steered his course. And upon comparing the *Commentaries* of *Julius Cæsar* with the *Anabasis* of *Xenophon*, we shall be inclined, it is probable, to give no less praise to the *imitative* manner of the *Roman* than to the *original* work of the *accomplished* Scholar of *Socrates*.

These and every other subsequent writer of credit and correctness had some model before

[a] So much indeed is repeatedly confessed by himself — See *de Nat. Deor.* I. 4 and 5. — his *Tusc. Quæst.* — his *Academ. Quæst.* and his *De Fin.* passim. We shall find him also endeavouring to imitate his favourite *Plato* both with regard to his subjects and his manner of treating them. "His chief design was to give his countrymen, in their own language, a History of the Ancient Philosophy, rather than any system of his own, and explain to them what the old Philosophers had said or written on those subjects that were considered most important."

 This

them: This indeed they ſtudied to imitate, but they did it with the *hand of a maſter*; borrowing ſome particular graces, according to the nature of their ſubject and the idiom of their language.

Horace acknowledges that *Archilochus* was the pattern he followed in Iambic Poetry, and tells you what uſe he made of him; defending at the ſame time the *merit* and *propriety* of ſuch Imitation:

——— numeros animosque *ſecutus*
Archilochi, non res *et agentia* verba *Lycamben.*
Ac ne me foliis ideo brevioribus ornes,
Quod timui mutare modos et carminis artem.[a]

But after what *manner* did they *ſtudy* theſe models? Not, we may be ſure, through the medium of *abridged* or *tranſlated* copies of them. It is true indeed that *Cicero* and others uſed to tranſlate *Greek* Compoſitions in order to form a good ſtyle; but they never dreamt of doing it with any further views, or of facilitating to others the acquiſition of the orginal language. This was the invention of a more indolent period, when man-

[a] Lib. 1. Ep. 19.

kind

kind became too listless to exert properly their intellectual powers.

However serviceable Translations may have been at some particular period, or considered in some particular points of view; yet from the time they have been looked upon as necessary assistants to young learners, I am fully persuaded, in my own mind, that they have not only retarded the progress of solid Erudition, but have greatly contributed towards the engendering of that false, showy, and mixt sort of Literature which is now so much in fashion — Indeed the *one* is the *consequence* of the *other*. If we cast our eyes but a hundred years back, we shall find that the dead languages were much more generally understood *then* than what they are at *present*. The crudities which we are now daily pestered with must be owing to this decay of sound Learning. And what cause is to be assigned for this speedy and manifest decay? *Several*, perhaps, co-operate: But the general and wrong use that is made of Translations, is not I think to be considered as one of the *least efficient*.

It

It may be said, that *numerous* and *plausible* are the arguments which have been advanced in support of a contrary opinion — True — But they are far from being strong or conclusive; and most of them are overthrown by this single observation, if properly examined and followed through all its consequences: "*That* way of learning must be the best and most secure, which comes *nearest* to the method of *investigation*, because *here* there is room left for the right *exercise* of the intellectual faculties; and it is only by the right exercise of these, that the knowledge of any *Language*, as well as of any liberal *Art* or *Science*, can *surely*, though perhaps *slowly*, be acquired." To proceed any other way is to *add to*, instead of *removing*, that darkness and inability of due exertion, with which our understanding is naturally attended.*

When, therefore, persons run over the writings of the Ancients in a hasty manner,

* The celebrated *Dr. Busby*, than who no one, I suppose, had greater capacity or experience with regard to the instruction of young men, seems to have been convinced of the bad tendency of translations; for he would never allow, it is said, the use of any thing besides the *bare original*, fairly and correctly printed.

without

without understanding either their language or the full excellency of the composition, they put one in mind of those *petits maîtres* of modern times, who think to preserve health, and get vigour and activity to their lungs and muscles by riding out on every occasion in some easy vehicle of modern luxury and refinement — It was not *thus* that the *Roman* Youth attained to any eminence in their Literary Exercises, or in the Field of *Mars*.

If translations must be read, let them be read by way of *amusement*, and not with a view of understanding an ancient writer, or of learning his language. In these things they will certainly prove defective. Of the few that I have read since I became capable of forming any judgement on things, those of XENOPHON's *Anabasis*, done by *Spelman*, and of his *Cyropedia*, by *Ashly*, and that of VIRGIL, by *Warton* and *Pitt*, are the only ones I met with, which seemed to preserve any thing of the *true elegance*, and *majesty*, and *simplicity* of the original. The merit of our famous translation of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, is perhaps justly pointed out by *Mr. Blackwell*,

Blackwell,[a] where he says, "That *Pope* has taught *Homer* to speak *English* incomparably better than any language but his own." These translations, and *such as these*, together with the annotations subjoined to them, may be read, during leisure-hours, with a degree of pleasure and improvement.

Dr. Johnson indeed observes, "That the HOMER of *Pope*, as well as the ANACREON of *Cowley*, has admitted the decoration of some modern graces, by which he is undoubtedly made more amiable to common readers; and, perhaps, if they would honestly declare their own perceptions, to far the greater part of those whom Courtesy and Ignorance are content to stile the *Learned*."[b] This observation is, perhaps, rather vague and dogmatical: However, there seems to be much truth in it: But this is to be attributed to nothing with more justice than to that mischievous practice of encouraging the use of translations, which naturally tends to give the mind an *indolent* and *careless* turn, and a *distaste* to the labour necessary for the attainment of the original language. And

[a] In his *Inquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer*.

[b] See his *Life of Cowley*.

besides,

besides, it is too generally supposed, "that modern Erudition hath *superseded* and *rendered useless* an acquaintance with ancient Authors." When such a practice and such a supposition prevail, or are even *countenanced*, where is the wonder that *Pope* should be more eagerly sought after than *Homer*, or that *Cowley* should be allowed to have tuned the *Lyre of Love* with greater skill than *Anacreon*?

I am persuaded, however, that he who has naturally what may be formed into a correct taste, will, with a *moderate* knowledge of *Greek* and of *ancient manners*, (for the *one* is as *necessary* as the *other*) derive much greater pleasure from reading the *simple*, *energetic* language of *Homer*, than what the *smoothly-flowing English Iliad* is capable of affording even to "a *common* reader;"[a] And the forming of such a taste should be attended to in time, before the

[a] *Cervantes*, with his usual humour and good sense, observes, That to read an Author in a *translation* is like viewing a piece of *Flemish Tapestry* on the *wrong side*, where, though the figures are distinguishable, there are so many ends and threads, that the *Beauty* and *Exactness* of the Work is obscured, and not so advantageously discerned as on the *right* side of the hangings. See *Don Quixote*, Part II. 62.

palate

palate is vitiated with the less wholesome flavour of modern Literature.

These things I speak from my own experience: And I have dwelt the longer on the subject, because you are now at full liberty either to use Translations or not: If you do, be assured that it is not the way to reap solid advantages; you may perhaps *read more*, but you will *study less*: If, on the other hand, you resolutely avoid them, there will be no reason to repent: And, furnished as you are with the principles of the two languages, and with no inconsiderable stock of words, if you sit down with a mind willing and determined to wade through a few difficulties, having your *Scapula* or *Ainsworth*, and *Potter*'s or *Kennett*'s ANTIQUITIES by your side, believe me, neither *Greek* nor *Roman Classic* will have any obstacles to throw in your way; but, softening that harsh visage which *Cowardice* or *Ignorance* supposes them to wear, they will soon become most agreeable companions. And whilst you *expand* your mind and render it *fit* for *general investigation* by *thus exerting* its powers, you will, at the same time, gradually

dually acquire an accurate knowledge of those two classical languages which have been the *delight* and *admiration* of succeeding ages. Farewell,

PHILANDER.

LETTER X.

——QUITE in a reverie this morning:—absolutely unfit for any thing which requires the least thought or attention—I will, however, try to compose myself so as to give you an account of the manner in which I have been trifling these two days last past: And for doing this, your favourite Author will abundantly excuse me: You remember how he writes to his beloved *Virgil*:

Misce stultitiam *consiliis brevem*:
Dulce *est* desipere *in loco*.

Our common friend, the gay and sprightly *Hilario*, came to see me about a week ago.

On

On *Thursday* last he and I sallied forth a partridge-shooting,—a diversion which we are both fond of. Having ranged the fields for some hours, not without much sport and success, we found ourselves hard by the house of the good old *Philoxenus*. Was you but acquainted with this worthy Gentleman, you would perhaps suspect that our game did not *casually* lead us this way. His greatest happiness is to administer comfort and pleasure to those about him. To a great stock of sound and elegant Learning, he joins all the hospitable and benevolent qualities of honest *Axylus*—one of the loveliest characters, in my mind, THE POET ever delineated; and that he has done in two lines:

Αφνειος βιοτοιο, φιλος δ' ην ανθρωποισι·
Παντας γαρ φιλεεσκεν, οδω επι οικια ναιων.

Here we met a neighbouring Gentleman, and the sensible *Hortensia*, who had just arrived with her only daughter, the amiable *Clara*. *Philoxenus* was of the happiest of men. Between walking, and a lively and rational conversation, we passed the after-

[a] Iliad Z. 14.

noon

noon in a manner the moſt agreeable: Had the miſanthrope, *Timon*, been there, his heart muſt have again felt ſome of its *natural* emotions.

Soon after tea, "*Philander*, (ſaid *Hortenſia*,) you have juſt ſeen what difficulty I have had to prevail on our hoſpitable neighbour to leave his houſe for but one day, and come to celebrate *Clara*'s birth-day tomorrow: You know I don't mind ſuch things,—only I think it may give riſe to a little harmleſs mirth: And *Philoxenus* and yourſelf have taught me, that it is our greateſt wiſdom to make our abode on this earth as ſmooth and eaſy as poſſible, and that nothing can do this like *Philanthropy*, and *Innocence*, and *Cheerfulneſs*: Now, Sir, having finiſhed my *preface*, (proceeded ſhe, ſmiling) will you be ſo good as to carry this *Card*, which I intended to have ſent from hence, to your mother and our young friend *Catharina*:—And, Gentlemen, if you would be pleaſed to attend them, I cordially give *you* the ſame invitation."—"And we moſt cordially accept it," replied *Hilario*, before I had time to ſpeak, riſing nimbly from his chair and making a profound bow

to

to *Hortensia*.—" A thought has just come into my head"—(continued he, in his ratling way,) " I must inform you, Madam, that I have some little skill in musical matters — you have perhaps observed already how fond I am of speaking of my own accomplishments — however, be that as it will — what I was thinking of is this: That I should put my German Flute in my pocket, and *Philander* put in his a pretty little *Ode* on this happy occasion; for this friend of mine makes verses, and shoots partrigdes with equal skill and dexterity: *I* will set it to music; then this lady shall sing it,—this shall play the Harpsichord,—this the Guitar,—and I myself will play the Flute—and thus, Madam, we shall spend the day most gloriously:—Ladies, what say you to the motion?"—" A better motion, (exclaimed *Philoxenus*) there cannot be:—It requires no amendment, and will be carried without a division:—*Clara*, my girl, thou must not object to it—'tis entirely innocent:—Go, *Philander*, and invoke your *Thalia*:—my Carriage shall be at your *Villula Tusculana* by eleven to-morrow morning to

fetch

fetch your mother and ſiſter:—you and your friend may come on foot."

See what an aukward ſituation this rattle-pate brought me into. I declare I had not tagged a couplet theſe ten years—an employment fit for mere boys and girls—and what could one ſay on a ſubject ſo *backneyed*, and ſo *barren* of every thing *new*: But here one was obliged to comply; for it was not poſſible to get off without being very rude indeed, and ſpoiling at the ſame time a ſcheme which promiſed ſo much harmleſs amuſement.

To be brief: We met at *Hortenſia*'s: There was a ſplendid company: The birth-day *Ode* was played with much parade and good humour: We dined: We drank tea: We ſang: We danced: In a word; we celebrated the *Eighteenth of October* with as much joy and feſtivity as if we had been celebrating the *Eighteenth of January*, which we always do, *in our humble way*, and always mean to do, as long as our amiable QUEEN remains on this earth.

I am afraid you would accuſe me of ſomething which ſhould not be in a plain, honeſt friend, was I not to ſend you this *illuſtrious*

ode: I will therefore inclose it. However despicable you may consider it, it cost me more cudgelling of my brain than you can easily imagine:—when accompanied with the soft and moving notes of *Hilario*, I assure you it had no paltry effect: He dispatched his part in less than an hour;—he excels, you know, in all the *superficial*, but *agreeable* accomplishments; and his abilities in the musical way are astonishing. I was not able to send it you as he set it, and, naked as it is, you must read it with more than your *usual candour*.—The metre of pensive *Hammond*'s *love-lorn* lays was adopted by the desire of *Hilario*. Adieu.

VERSES

On the Birth-Day of C. B. R.....s, Oct. 18.

I.

HAD I but Prior's *skill to blow the reed,*
With warbling strains I'd usher in this morn;
I'd celebrate with notes of matchless meed
The Day, when Clara, *loveliest Maid, was born.*

Tho'

II.

Tho' never warm'd with true poetic fire,
Unfit for song, unfit for homelieſt lay,
Yet Cibber-*like, I ſeize th' unwilling lyre*
To greet fair Clara's *happy* NATAL DAY.

III.

For ſo much BEAUTY *with ſuch* SENSE *combin'd*
Make e'en my thoughts in meaſure ſmooth to flow;—
That well proportion'd Shape—that heav'nly Mind,
Would cauſe a Zemblan's *frozen breaſt to glow.—*

IV.

Tho' SPRING'S FRESH FRAGRANCE *pleaſe us now no more,*
Tho' Nature's gay embroid'ry 'gin to fade;
Tho' SUMMER'S ROSE-AND-LILY *Scenes are o'er,*
And all th' AMBROSIAL COOLNESS *of the ſhade:*

V.

MILD AUTUMN *too, in ſtole of ſweeteſt hue,*
Slides SMILING *on with ſmooth, majeſtic pace:—*
Adieu, blythe SEASONS, unbewail'd *adieu,*
Since Theſe *your charms* ſtill bloom *in* Clara's *face.*

VI.

And, WINTER *hoar—with all thy ſurly train—*
All hail, in mantle clad of watchet dyes!
Lo! all thy arrows dart at thoſe in vain,
Who've ſeen but Clara's BLUSH, *and* Clara's EYES.

LETTER XI.

IT gives me pleasure to find that you discover unexpected beauties in the Elements of *Euclid*. You begin also, you say, to perceive how the study of the Classics tends no less to meliorate the heart, than to correct the judgement and form a good taste — These are the great ends of studying them; and the consideration of becoming well acquainted with those fine languages in which they wrote (especially the *Greek*, as being of all others most the effect of art and philosophy) ought to be an additional encouragement to the reading of them.

There is scarce need of apprising you of the excellency of this language: You must soon see it yourself: However, there can be no harm in endeavouring to confirm the notion in you: With this view, therefore, I will try to recollect the little that I have read or observed respecting the nature of the *Greek* Tongue, and shall probably throw out a few general hints with regard to the study of

of it—Mistake me not—I by no means pretend to enter on a Philosophical Inquiry into its structure and original formation, or to point out even any of the numberless advantages which arise from being accurately acquainted with it—These things I leave to abler hands—To have contributed, in the least, towards making you read it so as to be able, at some future period, to undertake such an Inquiry *yourself*—this I shall consider no unpleasant circumstance in my life—and this is my only aim.

Language, then, in general, is the medium whereby we communicate the perceptions of our minds to each other with greatest speed and accuracy: Like every thing else belonging to man, it is in its nature *changeable* and *imperfect*: The several media for this communication have of course their peculiar excellencies and defects: But none have been more *universally* and more *justly admired* than the languages of the ancient *Greeks* and *Romans*: It has been said indeed that *these* are the *only* ones which have in themselves any real *dignity*, and *rythm*, and *harmony*: Certainly they of all others preserve the most exact measure and value on their

their words and syllables, and are capable of course of the finest musical periods.

But it is allowed, on all hands, that the *Latin* is in *every respect* far inferior to the *parent-language*. Of all the languages ever known, it is perhaps in the *Greek only* that we find the *best* and most *copious* Alphabet — that we meet with *proper* names for every thing without being compelled to the unnecessary use of metaphorical expressions — and see all its derivatives, and, it is probable, all its roots and primitive words, deduced from no *foreign* source, but all contained *within itself*. For these, with numberless other reasons, the *Greek* Language is to be considered as the fullest and most complete of any that we are acquainted with. *Compare it* with *any other whatsoever*, and the truth of this will appear in the strongest point of view.

If, indeed, any human art, or science, or acquirement, have ever arrived at any thing like perfection, may we not in that light consider the language of ancient *Greece*? Casting our eye over the extensive plain of Literature, whatever meets us in the way appears, when described in this admirable language, in comparison to any other, with

superior

superior elegance and *precision*. In the hands of the Philosopher, the Poet, the Historian, the Orator, the Mathematician, the Physiologist — in a word, in every species of Learning, it is no less astonishing than curious to observe with what wonderful pliableness it moulds itself, and with what *accuracy* it conveys their *several* sentiments.

By this facility indeed with which they joined together and compounded their words, they give in a *single sentence*, often in a *single word*, a *full* and *lively* description; insomuch that it has been justly doubted whether the mind of the reader is most affected by the impression of the thing painted to it, or his ear charmed with the rythm and harmony of the language, and the noble copiousness of its sound. And thus is THE GREEK TONGUE, (as one,* who *thoroughly* understood it, observes) *from its Propriety and Universality, made for all that is* GREAT, *and all that is* BEAUTIFUL, *in every subject, and under every form of writing.*

GRAIIS *ingenium*, GRAIIS *dedit ore rotundo*
Musa loqui —

* *Mr. Harris*—in his most elegant book, HERMES, III. 5.

Happy

Happy it was for the *Greeks*, who had naturally a fine genius for the Arts and Sciences, that at the same time they were furnished with a language *copious* and *elegant*, *capable* of *every variety* of *composition*, and full of *nerves* and *majesty*; so as to be able to express themselves in a style *somewhat worthy* of their inward feelings, and observations. Did it not contain in itself something thus *peculiarly* excellent and noble, it would have been hardly worth one's while, perhaps, to bestow so much time and labour on the acquisition of a dead language; and, except in *particular* cases, we should be the less inexcusable for getting at the knowledge it might contain through a medium the most *easy* and *familiar* to us.

The soberest judges are of opinion that it is scarce possible to discover from what Language the *Greek* derives its origin; Should it be said that it originally sprang from the *Hebrew* or from some other *Oriental* Dialect, yet all must allow that it retains not a tittle of the genius and idiom of such a Dialect; but is to be considered as a language, in every respect, *totally distinct*: Indeed one of the correctest and most elegant Scholars of

our

our time and country obſerves, That it is quite of its own growth; "that it ſeems to acknowledge no parent-ſtock, nor reſemble any model more ancient than itſelf; that it ſeems, in ſhort, as the *Athenians* uſed to ſay arrogantly of themſelves, to be purely *αὐτόχθων*." But the ſuperior excellence of it is to be attributed to the extraordinary diligence and ingenuity of thoſe who formed it: For the *Grecians*, *naturally* a moſt witty people, of a fine ear, and living under a free government, cultivated and refined the mother-tongue, whatever it was — whether they carried the firſt principles of it into *Greece*, or was by them derived from ſome neighbouring Dialect — cultivated, I ſay, and refined it in ſound as well as in expreſſion; whilſt the reſt of mankind were ſatisfied with little more than being barely able to make themſelves *intelligible* to each other.

Yet, nevertheleſs, a long time muſt have elapſed before a Language ſo copious and wonderfully excellent arrived at its perfect ſtate: But there are not many materials whereby to trace its continual and progreſſive improvement: Indeed the INSCRIPTIO SIGEA is, I believe, conſidered as the

only

only Book of the kind; and it is there we are to look for it in its *rudest*, and most *ancient* form. So that we shall find it involved in a good deal of obscurity before the time of *Homer*; and in his writings it appears with its full splendor — in all its perfection. He indeed fixed the standard of the *Greek* Tongue. And though the *particular Dialects* formed themselves after him, and were perpetually changing and diversified by reason of their wars and commerce, yet as these wars, until the time of *Alexander*, were chiefly among one another, the general complexion of the Language continued one and the same. So then it did not lose much of its purity, even as a speaking language, for about the space of a thousand years: And those who *wrote*, imitating the uncorrupt style of the old Authors, used it with almost all its elegance and chastenes for above twice that period; I mean till after *Mahomet* II. took *Constantinople*: Except, however, among the learned *Greeks* that were in this city, it had begun (as was just hinted) to degenerate a long time before; for we are told that, as early as the reign of *Domitian*, even more than *Thirteen*

Centuries

Centuries before the taking of *Constantinople*, it ceased to be spoken with its true accent and pronunciation: As soon indeed as the *Roman* Government was established in *Greece*, this degeneracy immediately took place: For the *Latin* names of offices, terms of Law, &c. over-ran the old *Greek* Language; insomuch that we have Dictionaries of *barbarous* words in it as voluminous as those of the *true* ones.[a]

But laying aside enquiries of this nature, let us consider which is the most probable way of getting at the knowledge of it with greatest *ease* and *certainty*.

As no advantages are to be derived from an *University-Education* without a grammatical knowledge of the learned languages, you must have been already tolerably well grounded in the fundamental principles of the *Greek* and *Latin*: And yet what you learnt in School, was learnt as it were by rote, being then scarce able to see its full *meaning*, or *tendency*, or *application*. I would not therefore think it below my notice to read the Grammar (and that the *compactest* I could get) over again, with as much care as

[a] See *Dr. Bentley's* Dissertation upon *Phalaris*, p. 405.—a Dissertation which abounds with genuine Wit and Learning, and should be read by every *Greek* Scholar.

possible,

possible, acquainting myself *thoroughly* with the flexions of the Nouns, with the signs and formation of the several Tenses,[a] the Conjugations of the Verbs, and with the exact meaning and property of the Middle Voice.[b] Unless one sets out in this manner, it is *here* as absolutely *impossible* to make any real improvement, as it is to understand the *sublimer* parts of Geometry without being well acquainted with the *Elements* of *Euclid*. And would it not be adviseable to lay by one half hour every day for putting in practice the method lately pointed out for learning *Greek* on the plan of *Clarke's Introduction to Latin*?[c] Though it was principally calculated for boys in School, yet, as it is certainly the *surest*, and, upon the whole, the *speediest* way to get a perfect knowledge of the language, there is no need, in case you have not been already used to it, of being ashamed to adopt it.

In being able to know the *primitive*, together with the *secondary* and *metaphorical* mean-

[a] An excellent Philosophical account of the Tenses is to be met with in my *Lord Monboddo's Origin and Progress of Language*, Vol. II.

[b] *Kuster de usu Verbi Medii* may be of service.

[c] By *Mr. Huntingford, of New College, Oxford.*

ing

ing of the *Prepositions*[a] lies, it is generally confessed, the great difficulty of the *Greek* Tongue. With the hopes of removing this difficulty, in *some measure* at least, I will send you an *Essay* written on this subject, which, as there were but few Copies of it at first printed, is now become very scarce — It is, I think, well worth your perusal. As we evidently see throughout the language a very striking *analogy*, the method which this *Essay* points out will, perhaps, assist you in investigating and ascertaining the precise signification of the *other* parts of speech as well as the Prepositions. No small advantage would be derived, were you to endeavour, just by way of amusing yourself, to put in practice what the ingenious Author did not live to accomplish,

[a] My *Lord Monboddo*, who seems to understand *Greek* as well as his mother-tongue, seems to confess as much. There is something begun, says he, upon this subject, (he means the Essay affixed to this Letter) by an Author very eminent for his knowledge of the language; but which I regret is not finished: The use of the Prepositions in composition gives a particular beauty and accuracy of expression to the *Greek* language. They use commonly enough two of them, and sometimes three in composition with their Verb, by which they describe so minutely the action of the Verb, that it is really a kind of painting. Thus *Homer*, in describing water coming out of the foot of a rock, uses the word ὑπ-εκ-προ-ρεῖν, by which is described, 1. its coming from *below*; 2. its coming *out* or *gushing*; and lastly, its running *forward*. See the Or. and Pr. of Language, Vol. II. p. 176.

Not

Nor let it be supposed that the *Particles* are unworthy of attention: So far otherwise, that without knowing their proper use it is not possible to see all the beauties of the *Greek* Composition: *Mr. Wood*[a] observes, that they are to Hexameter Verse, what small stones are to a piece of Masonry, ready at hand to fill up the *breaks* and *interstices*, and *connect* those of a larger size *so exactly* as to give a smooth *compactness* to the whole: But they are by no means condemned to this *expletive* duty: They contribute greatly to the *clearness* of a Poet's *meaning*, as well as to the *length* of his *Verses*: The best Prose-Writers have in this respect imitated *Homer*, and we must confess that they have a great share in the *connexion* and *perspicuity*, which is remarkable in those early productions.

Devarius and *Hoogeveen* have written on the *Greek* Particles, and with great knowledge of their subject.—*Vigerus* on the Idioms, and *Mattaire* on the Dialects contain much information as to these points.—In tracing out the *changes*, *variations*, and *gradual progress* of the different Dialects consists no unimportant part of the study of *Greek*:

[a] *In his Essay on Homer.*

Although

Although it be difficult to know the exact period and manner of ſuch variations taking place, and all the niceties attending them; yet with care in reading, beſides an accurate knowledge of the characteriſtical diſtinctions of each Dialect, you may form a general notion of the time and place they were in uſe, and alſo of the cauſes which gave them birth.

And with regard to the Quantity of the words, a thing by no means to be neglected, *Morrell*'s learned THESAURUS * is, I believe, the only practical book upon the ſubject. *Hephæſtion* is too difficult for a beginner, and *Terentianus Maurus* too tedious and obſcure.

Theſe, and all other books of the like kind, are uſeful for *referring to occaſionally*, and they may ſerve to give you ſome little

* Had the Quantity of the ſyllables been pointed out by ſome particular marks, as for example, in the *Gradus ad Parnaſſum*, this book would have been more generally uſeful; for in order to reap any advantage from it, as it is, one ſhould be acquainted with the different metres of the *Greek* Poetry, which for the moſt part is the acquiſition of *thoſe only* who have made conſiderable proficiency in the language, and not always of *thoſe*.—Since writing the above, I happened to meet with a ſenſible little Pamphlet by *Mr. Seale*, of *Chriſt College, Cambridge*; entitled, *An Analyſis of the Greek Metres*—which, I truſt, will remove the objections uſually made to thoſe who have written on this ſubject.

assistance towards making you a *Greek* Scholar: But you must not forget that *the whole* of the matter depends *chiefly* upon *your own care* and *industry*: — And in case you properly exert yourself, I have no doubt in the world but the study of the *Greek* will soon become as *entertaining* as it is *instructive* and *philosophical*.

Such are the observations that have now occurred to me on this topic: Should they suggest any thing useful to you, my wishes will be amply gratified.

Χρω τοις ειρομενοις, η ζητει βελτιω τουτων.

PHILANDER.

AN ESSAY ON THE PREPOSITIONS OF THE GREEK LANGUAGE.[a]

WHEN I first began to give Lectures on the *Greek* Language, nothing gave me more uneasiness than the manner in which I found the Prepositions explained; even by those who are very deservedly celebrated, as the best *Greek* Scholars of their times; such as *Budæus* in his Commentaries; *H. Stephens* in his Thesaurus; the Gentlemen of *Port-Royal*, in their Grammar; and *Vigerus*, in his Idioms; who is, in this part, the most copious of them all. Their manner, universally, is this. In the course of their vast reading, they remarked the several *Latin* Prepositions by which one and the same *Greek* Preposition might be neatly translated, at different times; and, in their books

[a] It was written by *James Moor*, LL. D. Professor of *Greek* in the *University* of *Glasgow*; and read, as an *Introductory Essay*, *to a literary Society in Glasgow, at their weekly meetings within the College.*

on the Principles of the *Greek* Language, they made a full enumeration of all these, which they took to be so many several significations of each *Greek* Preposition; and with that they seem to have contented themselves, as a full explication of this part of the language; without pointing out any *one*, as the natural, primary, and radical signification of the Preposition; or attempting to show any connexion, or analogy, between the several numerous acceptations which they affix to almost every one of the *Greek* Prepositions, even when governing the very same case: Nay more, they have not scrupled to assign to the same Preposition, while governing the same case, significations, sometimes entirely disparate, sometimes very nearly contradictory to each other, sometimes altogether so; without apprehending any imputation from thence to the *Greek* Language, as capricious and barbarous, in that part of it; though in my opinion it would be so, in the highest degree, were that really the case. Thus they tell us that παρα sometimes signifies *contrary to*; as παρα την φυσιν, *contrary to nature*; sometimes that it signifies *compared with*; as ανθρωπος, παρα τα αλλα ζωα, *Men*,

Men, compared with the other animals, βιοτευουσι ὥσπερ θεοι, says *Socrates* in *Xenophon*; two significations quite disparate. In truth the Preposition signifies neither one nor the other, but really answers always exactly to our *English* Preposition *by*, or *near*.

So they say that Επι sometimes signifies *over*, and sometimes *under*; thus Επι Κλαυδιου Καισαρος, *Sub Claudio Cæsare*: — Θεος ὁ Επι παντων, *Deus Supra omnes*. These two significations again are contradictory, the one to the other. The word, however, signifies neither *over*, nor *under*; but always *upon* exactly; whereas, *under* is always expressed by ὑπο, and *over* by ὑπερ. In fine, which is the most surprising of all, they tell us, all of them, that εις sometimes signifies εν, and, vice versa, εν sometimes signifies εις; as εβαπτισθη Εις Ιορδανην: He was baptized *In* Jordan: — απεστειλεν οπλιτας Εν τη Σικελια: He sent soldiers *To* Sicily: — That is, that the *Greek* Language is so rude, that it considers motion *to* a place, and rest *in* that place, as one and the same idea; and expresses both by either of the two words, indifferently.

In making these remarks, I do not mean, in the least degree, to disparage the pains

and labours of these very learned and communicative men, to whom the world is indebted for the restoration of the *Greek* Language to the Republic of Letters. Far from that, I hold their works in the highest esteem, as so many Treasures of their kind. And any one, who attempts to make any further improvements for facilitating the knowledge of *Greek*, will find these works to be so many large ample store-houses, copiously filled with almost all the materials he will have occasion to use; and cannot but be extremely thankful, that the unwearied industry of the former Scholars saves him the tedious and toilsome labour of digging again for the *same* materials, in the original mines. These men began with what is undoubtedly the first, grand, and most necessary step towards the recovery of the knowledge of an ancient language; I mean their copious and ample enumerations of the several different acceptations of the same word. The only matter of regret is, that they rested there; without exerting themselves to trace out, and explain the connexions, if there were any, between such different acceptations; and point out the transitions, by which the

word

word passed from one signification to another: For a Language, in which there are really no such connexions, nor transitions, and in which, to one and the same word, there are arbitrarily affixed, a number of opposite, or even of different significations, deserves in my opinion to be accounted a language capricious and barbarous, to the highest degree; and the inventors of it, a race of mortals extremely savage, and of a very low degree of rationality.

But the world has not that opinion of the *Greeks*, and their language. Far the contrary: They are allowed to have been a most ingenious people; and to have cultivated and refined their language to the utmost; even so far, as to furnish, with ease, elegance, and perfect precision, the fullest range and compass of expression, for the most abstract ideas of the most subtile Metaphysics. It was also known, that, (whatever might be the case with the Prepositions) in the other parts of the language at least, there is every where to be met with the most elegant, easy, natural connexion, and transitions from one acceptation of the word to another; so that one perceives, with ease and pleasure, how

the ſecondary one took its riſe from the primary. This might have afforded a preſumption, that the *Prepoſitions* were not *ſingular* in this reſpect; though the connexion of their different acceptations was not, at firſt ſight, ſo apparent as in ſome parts of the Language; and the great obſtruction they occaſioned to the compaſſing a ready knowledge of the Language would ſeem to make the experiment of tracing out theſe connexions well worth trying. I reſolved to attempt it at leaſt; and that, with the utmoſt application; and even to perſevere in the attempt, though I ſhould not be very ſucceſsful at firſt; being perfectly perſuaded, that, in a Language ſo exquiſitely fine in other reſpects, the fault would not lie in the Language itſelf, as utterly deſtitute of all analogy in this part of it; but would certainly lie in my own want of ſkill to trace out that analogy; which perhaps might mend.

I was, moreover, excited to make ſuch an inquiry, as I found that I could never teach this part of the Language, with any ſort of pleaſure to myſelf, nor with any hopes of conveying any eaſy, or ſatisfactory knowledge of it to my ſcholars by purſuing

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the method of the Commentators above-mentioned; that is, for example, when, in one sentence of an Author, there occurs the expression τα επι εμοι; to tell the scholars, as a sufficient explication, that the Preposition επι governs three several cases, and has many various significations with each case: particularly, with the dative it oftimes corresponds to the *Latin* Preposition PENES, *in the power of*; as here, τα επι εμοι, *the things in my power*. By and by, the very same words may occur again in an Historian, when one must be content to say, that, at other times, επι with the dative corresponds often with the *Latin* Preposition PONE, *behind*; as here, τα επι εμοι means *the parts* (of the army) *behind me—the battalions in my rear*.

Such a way of explaining any part of a language appears to me to be equally disagreeable, and uncomfortable to the teacher, and to the scholar.

Wishing then, of all things, not to be under the necessity of having recourse to such an unpromising method, I set about this inquiry with all the earnestness I was capable of; and, as I had, in general, a notion, that, in perhaps all languages, each

word had, originally, some *one primitive, radical* signification; from which its other significations gradually took their rise, by metaphor, and other natural analogies, arising from the various modes of human intercourse, commerce, war, laws, government, &c.: I resolved to try, first of all, whether this, perhaps, might not even be the case in the *Greek* Prepositions. With this view, I studied them carefully in the purest Authors, when occurring in the most easy, simple, and natural expressions. By *natural* I mean free, both from metaphor, and from any artificial turn of expression; and also free from any abbreviation, or words left to be understood. By pursuing this method, I fancied that I had, at length, discovered both to each Preposition one natural, primary, radical signification; and which could, almost always, be expressed in one *English* word; and, at the same time, that I could perceive the natural reason, and foundation, why the same Preposition governed more Cases than one.

Having gone thus far with each Preposition, not without some satisfaction and encouragement to proceed, though far from being

being fully assured that I was right; I took a careful review of them all, comparing these radical significations together. From which survey of the whole, compared also with the flexions of Nouns, I imagined, that I did plainly perceive the true use and design, in the *Greek* Language, of that part of speech called PREPOSITION, viz. that the three chief circumstances of relation, or connexion, in human life are expressed by the flexions of Nouns in the three oblique Cases; and, that all other circumstances, of relation or connexion, are expressed by the Prepositions. By the THREE *chief* circumstances of relation, or connexion, in human life, I mean POSSESSION, INTERCHANGE, and ACTION. *Possession*, or the *relation* between the *Possessor* and *that which he possesses*, by the *Genitive Case*: *Interchange*, or, *mutual communication*, whether of words or things, by the *Dative Case*: *Action*, or, the *relation* between the *Agent* and *what he acts upon*, by the *Accusative Case*. All other relations were, I thought, in *Greek* expressed by the Prepositions. These other relations, all, refer to *Rest* or *Motion*; *Place* or *Time*; and are what the Schoolmen would call the

Accidentia

Accidentia Motûs et Quietis; Loci et Temporis. According to the mutual connexion between the ideas of *Place* and *Time*, all Prepositions express *place* and *time* equally, though, perhaps, *Place* was the primary idea, or signification in all of them. With respect to *Motion* and *Rest*; some Prepositions express only the *one* of these; and then they govern only *one* Case. Others express *both*; and then they govern *two* Cases; one, when they express *Motion*; the other, when they express *Rest*. By *motion* in this Inquiry into the signification of the *Greek* Prepositions, I always mean *progressive motion*; or, in common language, *motion towards*. When a *Greek* Preposition expresses only motion, the *one* Case it governs is ALWAYS the *Accusative*; or Case of the *active* Verb; by a very proper and natural Analogy in Language; as all external action implies *motion towards* that we act upon. If my hand strike the table, it must move towards the table. When a Preposition expresses only *rest*, or *situation*, the *one* Case which it governs is NEVER the *Accusative*; but always one of the other two oblique Cases, the *Genitive*, or *Dative*. When the same Preposition

position expresses BOTH motion and rest, it governs TWO Cases; when *motion*, *always the Accusative*, as before; when rest or situation, *always one of the other two*; not *interchangeably* but *invariably*; the ONE or OTHER of the two. Thus the *Greek* επι, which answers exactly to the *English* Preposition *upon*, expresses both *motion* and *rest*. We say equally, "The Ball is FALLING UPON the ground, or, is LYING UPON the ground: In Greek, ἡ σφαιρα πιπτει επι THN ΓΗΝ; and, ἡ σφαιρα κειται επι THΣ ΓΗΣ: the difference of Case governed, expressing distinctly the difference of acceptation meant; even suppose the Verbs were not expressed. For, επι την γην, by itself, would show that *motion upon*, that is, *progressive motion pointing upon*, was meant; and, επι της γης, *rest upon*, or, *situation upon*; but not interchangeably, επι τη γη; if only rest, or situation, was meant to be expressed, and nothing further. For when, besides the *two* Cases appropriated to express *motion* or *rest* in general, a *Greek* Preposition governs a *third* Case, it then expresses *some one* particular and remarkable *mode* of the general signification. Thus επι with the third Case, the *Dative*,

expresses

expresses *close upon*; either in *place*, or in *time*; that is, *next-behind*, or *next-after*. For example; επι εμοι, when meant of *place*, signifies *next-behind me*; when meant of *time*, *next-after me*.—So ΥΠΟ, answering precisely to our English Preposition UNDER, with the *Accusative* expresses *motion under*; that is, *motion tending under*, or *coming under*; with the *Genitive*, *rest*, or *situation under*.—*The Ball is running under the table*: Η σφαιρα κυλινδειται υπο την τραπεζαν.—*The Ball is lying under the table*, υπο της τραπεζης. ΥΠΟ likewise governs the *Dative*; and then it expresses such particular modes of UNDER, as we would express by saying, protected *Under*, subject *Under*, directed *Under*: as, υπο τω ναω, Under the protection of the temple: υπο τω βασιλει, subject Under the king: υπο τη λυρα, Under the direction of the Lyre.

To give one instance more—ΕΙΣ and ΠΡΟΣ both signify To; but with this difference: Εις signifies *motion to*, and that only; therefore governs only the *Accusative*: Προς, on the contrary, NEVER[a] signifies *motion to*; but expresses

[a] This is plainly a mistake; for προς with the *Accusative* does signify *motion to*, and that *not seldom*: He also forgot to observe its signification with the *Genitive*. There are some other assertions

expresses any other kind of RELATION *to*; being of the most general and extensive meaning of all the *Greek* Prepositions; and answering to the *English* expressions, *relating to*; *with relation to*; *with respect to*: and it governs the *Accusative*, in this its principal and primary signification; but it governs also the *Dative*; and then it signifies these particular *relations to* which we express in *English* by the words *close to*, or AT; or, by the words *united to*, *joined to*, *added to*.

These particular, or secondary significations I have only mentioned, at present, so far as they make the Preposition govern a different Case. The various other significations of that kind will properly come in under another head of this inquiry. To return.

When I had, after a good deal of pains, got thus far in my search into the proper, original meaning and use of Prepositions in

assertions in this ESSAY which are not strictly true, but I leave you to find them out; so that you should read it with care and attention — These we are to attribute to the learned Author's dying before he had time to execute his plan, or carefully revise the little he had done. — I recommend it to you *chiefly*, because of the method of analysing the language, which it enforces and points out.

the

the *Greek* Language, and began to indulge myſelf in the fancy that I was not miſtaken, having conſulted only the very beſt writers, viz. *Plato*, *Xenophon*, and *Demoſthenes*; yet I wanted ſtill, if poſſible, to put myſelf out of all ſcruple, or, doubt; whether, in theſe ſignifications, which I had affixed to each *Greek* Prepoſition, as its proper, natural, and primary meaning, I might not have ſometimes been deceived, by metaphor, artificial turn of expreſſion, or figure of ſpeech, which had eſcaped my obſervation. To make ſure of this, I reflected, at length, that if they really did ſignify as I had conjectured, I ſhould find them ſo ſignifying, and in ſuch conſtruction, and that perpetually and invariably, clear of all metaphor or figure; in thoſe writings, where the whole ſubject was entirely relating to *Time* and *Place*; *Motion* and *Reſt*; *Situation*, *Poſition*, and *Figure*; that is, in Books of Mechanicks and Geometry. With this view I immediately turned over *Ariſtotle*'s Mechanicks, and *Euclid*'s Elements. There I had the pleaſure to find my conjectures completely verified, to the utmoſt of my expectation. My ſatisfaction was the greater, as my anxiety to conquer

this,

this, the moſt difficult, and moſt troubleſome part of the *Greek* Language, had been very great.

Being now perfectly at eaſe as to the primary and natural ſignifications, I applied myſelf more cheerfully to ſtudy the ſecondary and artificial; that is, to deduce *them* from the *original* or *primary*. Succeſs in that ſtudy depends upon a proper attention to the genius of the *Greek* Tongue, in the many beautiful, ſimple, natural, and eaſy ways it takes to abbreviate expreſſion; and to free language from the diſagreeable and unneceſſary cumber of a multitude of words to expreſs ideas, which, though complex, are yet common; and which, without loading the ear with the tedious enumeration of all the ſeveral words expreſſive of all the ſimpler ideas which form the complex idea, can, readily and with perfect preciſion, be apprehended by a proper ſelection of a few words. In caſe I be expreſſing myſelf obſcurely, I ſhall mention one eaſy, remarkable example, from a moſt elegant writer, *Euclid*. You make a full enumeration of all the words, when you ſay, "The parallelogrammal, rectangular ſpace, contained by—

or,

or, in *Greek*, *το χωριον παραλληλογραμμον, ὑπο τριγωνιον περιεχομενον ὑπο.* But *Euclid*, as soon as he has, by a few expressions more complete, made his reader well acquainted with this complex idea, very elegantly, as well as very judiciously, abbreviates the language for conveying it, into the most simple expression of ΤΟ ΥΠΟ; the *first* and the *last* word; an expression, the farthest in the world from *technical*; being, on the contrary, exactly according to the spirit and genius of the *Greek* Language.

So, also, just in the same manner, *Euclid* has Η ΥΠΟ, for *ἡ γωνια περιεχομενη ὑπο*; and ΤΟ ΑΠΟ, for *το τετραγωνον ἀναγεγραμμενον ἀπο.*

By attending to this part of the genius of the *Greek* Language, I found, in time, that, in every one of the *Greek* Prepositions, all the several metaphorical, or secondary significations, in whatever disparate, or even contradictory ways, they may come to be translated in another language of a different genius; and which, in conveying briefly a complex idea, may often, among its several simpler ideas, select for expressing the whole some *one*, quite different from *that* one, which the *Greek* selects; yet, still, in the

Greek

Greek itſelf, theſe ſecondary ſignifications, may, all of them, be properly deduced from the *primary*, by an analogy, not only plain, ſimple, and natural, but even elegant and beautiful; as might be expected from the fine taſte and genius of the PEOPLE.

I ſhould next go on to exemplify this throughout all the *Greek* Prepoſitions; and indeed, even prior to that, I ſhould firſt *enumerate* their *original* ſignifications; as expreſſing the modes of motion, and of reſt; poſition, or ſituation; which I commonly do, by the familiar practice of ſhooting at butts; conſidering the arrow, firſt, in its motion, or flight towards the mark; as likely to hit, or miſs; and how far, and in what reſpect to miſs; as by going over, under, aſide, coming near, going wide, and ſo forth; then, after it is fixed, or at reſt, its ſituation with reſpect to the mark.

But theſe I ſhall defer to another opportunity, being ſenſible that I muſt have already tired the company ſufficiently with a ſubject ſo dry, and unentertaining, as a mere grammatical diſquiſition is likely to be. My excuſe depends upon the complaiſance of the company; and I hope they will be ſo

good as to remember, that when one is very much interested himself in any thing, whatever it be, he is very apt to weary other people with it.

In case, however, any Gentleman present has the least curiosity to have this THEORY (if you will give me leave to dignify a low subject with a high name) applied to any particular example, I shall just now, if it be agreeable to the rest of the company, endeavour to satisfy him.

November 30. 1764.

LETTER XII.

AS you are now engaged, during your Private Lectures, in preparing yourself to read over with all possible advantage the History of the Wars, and Popular Business of the Ancients, it will not perhaps be unpleasant to you, to take at this time a *general* and *cursory* view of the revolutions of their Literature.—This will present unto

us

us a *variegated* ſcene: For in looking back on the events of former times, it is obſervable to every one, that Civil Hiſtory wears a much more *uniform* appearance, at different periods, than that of Learning and Science: The Arts of War and Government are ſomewhat ſimilar in almoſt every nation; and as they have no connexion with refined taſte and ſentiment, they ſtand their ground with more firmneſs and uniformity than even the *uſeful* or *neceſſary* Arts: But thoſe of the *liberal* and *literary* ſort, proceeding from an elegant turn of mind, and of courſe reliſhed by the *Few only*, whoſe *leiſure*, and *fortune*, and *genius* fit them for ſuch amuſements, are frequently of no great *extent* or *vigour*, and are liable to be *varied* by education and example, and are ſometimes indeed *totally obliterated*.

With regard to the country wherein Literature was firſt known and cultivated, in any regular manner, learned men are not *entirely* of the ſame opinion: To *Egypt*, however, we ſeem to ſtand indebted for the invention, and perhaps for the *perfection* of almoſt *all* the *Sciences*, as well as of thoſe Arts, whoſe principal tendency is to furniſh the *neceſſaries*

of life: But we see little of the *fine* Arts before the rise of the Popular Governments of *Greece*. The *Egyptians*, though they were not entire strangers to *Poetry*, *Eloquence*, and *Painting*, yet, it is certain, never cultivated these Arts with any great attention; and, of course, among them they did not arrive at their full maturity: But *Husbandry*, *Architecture*, and many other of the *useful* Arts were carried to very high perfection in *Egypt*; and their principles, as they advanced towards this perfection, were regularly analysed and discussed — *Hence* originate *Geometry*, *Astronomy*, and most of the other Sciences.[a]

These continued in a very flourishing way in *Egypt*, till *Cambyses*, that unworthy successor of the Great *Cyrus*, carried his arms thither: Temples, and Libraries, and all other Monuments of Piety and Wisdom were every where totally demolished by this Barbarian: This was a most severe blow given to Learning, and is the first we have any account of:[b] It happened about five

[a] See *Strabo* XVII. sub init.

[b] See an elegant Chapter on this subject in *Orig. & Pr. of Language*, Vol. III. near the end.

hundred

hundred and twenty years before the *Christian* Era.

About ten or fifteen years after, *Pythagoras* opened his celebrated School in that part of *Italy* called *Magna Græcia*. Luckily he had been in *Egypt* before the *Persian* Conquest;[a] and, having lived there somewhat above twenty years, brought with him, it is probable, the greatest part of the *Egyptian* Philosophy: Upon the reduction of *Egypt* he is supposed to have been made prisoner and carried over to *Babylon*, where he acquired the knowledge of Music, and all the learning of the *Magi*; and in his way from thence travelling over *Greece* and the adjacent islands, he settled at length near *Croton* in the South-East of *Italy*: Here, I say, under the auspices of this Great Man, Science again raised up her head, and extended her genial influence far and near. These Schools are said to have been demolished by one *Cylon*,[b] a rich, worthless scoundrel of the neighbourhood, who with his infamous cabal dispersed the learned men who studied there, and did all they

[a] *Jamblicus de vita Pythagoræ*, cap. 4. & seq.
[b] *Jamblicus* (ut supra) cap. 35.

could to *exterminate* them from the face of the earth.

From this time Philosophy continued in an unsettled state, till it broke forth with new lustre in the celebrated Groves of *Academus*. *Plato*, who had conversed with some of the *Pythagoreans* in *Italy*,[a] and having lived himself some years in *Egypt*, was in every respect well calculated for the office he undertook: He had, moreover, reaped singular advantage from the uncommon wisdom of his master *Socrates*. And we know that his own natural abilities were wonderful.—Hence the foundation of that astonishing height which the Liberal Arts and Sciences now attained in *Greece*. This Period was the GOLDEN AGE of Literature.[b] Now we see it flourishing in all its Majesty. But as soon as *Greece* became subject to the ambitious King of *Macedon*, all the branches of this *delicate* Plant began to shrink and lose their beauty: And when the *Romans* again subdued it, they faded still more under the rigid Discipline of those severe Con-

[a] See *Laertius in Plat.*

[b] This Period was from about 450 to 300 years before Christ, taking in the Space of about 150 Years.

querors.

querors.—Thus with its LIBERTY *Greece* loſt its literary fame, and, in leſs than a Century after it became a *Roman* Province, it degenerated nearly into a ſtate of *Barbariſm*—*Sic tranſit Gloria mundi!*—This was a blow from which, probably, Learning has been never able to recover.

When the *Romans* had nothing left to conquer, the natural influence of Peace and Riches diſpoſed them, at length, to imitate the noble productions of *Grecian* Ingenuity: And thus again the Sciences and fine Arts changed their ſituation.[a] In *Italy*, though they aroſe to great eminence, yet they did not appear with their former vigour; nor did they continue for any conſiderable time: Neither the Government nor the native temper of the people were adapted to cheriſh and improve them: As they ſeem to have been at firſt introduced from a principle of *vanity*, and cultivated *merely* from a *deſire* of *emulation*, rather than from *genuine taſte*, ſo it was no hard matter for *deſpotiſm* and a *dreadful profligacy* of manners to undermine them, and check their growth.

[a] They were introduced into Italy, and began to be cultivated there about 220 years before our Saviour.

Here, however, they *lingered* in a *languid* and *expiring* way till the fourth century, when, by the inundation of the *Goths*, all that was *Great* and *Beautiful* was overwhelmed;—in short, almost every *vestige* of *Learning* and *Civility* was in the western parts of the Empire totally obliterated.

Long, however, before this period, indeed before the Arts had been carried over into *Italy*, and not a Century after the time of *Plato*, some scattered rays of Science had begun to appear in *Alexandria*, where, under the patronage of *Ptolemy Soter* and his successors, they collected strength, and shone for many ages with considerable splendour. Although the *Alexandrian* Libraries partook, in some measure, of the revolutions which happened in the *Roman* Empire, yet they were generally in a very flourishing state; any loss by war or other casualties being soon retrieved; and that in the *Serapion* stood unimpaired, and continued to produce very great men both in Government and Philosophy till near the middle of the 7th Century:* About this time the *Saracens* de-

* See *Origin and Progress of Language*, as before.

molished

molished it,[a] when their Calif *Omar* gave orders that the books it contained should be all burnt: The prodigious number of these Volumes may be inferred from their having supplied with fuel, as it is well attested, *forty thousand* public baths for the space of *six months*.

After this follows a long and a gloomy interval: For more than 700 years, we scarce perceive one faint glimmer of Literature; and what did appear, during this dark period, was amongst the very Barbarians, who destroyed the *Alexandrian* Libraries: For the *Saracens*, about a Century and a half after their mad behaviour in *Alexandria*, became wonderfully fond of *Grecian* Learning, especially the Philosophy of *Aristotle*; and being spurred on and patronized by their celebrated Calif *Almamunis*, they cultivated it with considerable success. If the West was at all illumined with any ray of Science, during these ages of ignorance and horrid darkness, it must have been derived from the *Arabians*; who, when they had driven the *Goths* out of *Spain* and *Sicily*,

[a] About A. D. 643.

came

came in large bodies and settled in those countries. Their fondness for *Aristotle* still continued, and arose at length to a most extravagand pitch; insomuch that every School was engaged in explaining him, and scarcely minded any thing besides. Hence the origin and appellation of *The Scholastic Doctors*—*The Scholastic Writers*. After this period, (it has been observed,[a]) the *European Christians* profited much by the *Arabian* Learning, and were highly indebted to the *Saracens* for the improvement they made in different parts of Philosophy.

But still, as their principal Authors, their *Averroes* and *Avicenna*, are known to contain little more than dry and obscure comments on the Acroatic Works of *Aristotle*, it may be said that all human Science and Erudition, properly so called, had its abode, as yet, amongst the *Greeks* in *Constantinople*. When this city was taken by the *Turks*,[b] the learned men it contained fled from those Barbarians; and finding refuge in *Rome* and other parts of *Italy*, they propagated throughout the western world the *Greek* Language,

[a] See Mosheim's Eccles. Hist. 9th and 10th Cent.

[b] This happened, A. D. 1453.

and

and with it a right taste for the *Grecian* Arts and Sciences —

HINC *priscæ redeunt Artes — felicibus inde*
Ingeniis aperitur iter, despectaque Musæ
Colla levant —— [a]

They no where met with so favourable a reception, as from *Alphonsus* VI.[b] and some other *Neapolitan* Princes of the House of *Arragon*;[c] and more particularly in *Florence*, from the celebrated Family of *Medicis*. Hence that spot became, in a manner, the center of the fine Arts and Sciences, and the general rendezvous of all candidates for literary repute: *La Toscane* alors était en *Italie* ce qu' *Athènes* avait été en *Grece*.[d]

Thus Ancient Learning spread itself with incredible swiftness all over *Europe*: And the *Art of Printing*,[e] which had been in-

[a] Claud. De Laudibus Stiliconis — Lib. II. sub init.

[b] *Giannone's Histoire Civile du Royamue de Naples.*

[c] See *Mosheim's Eccles. Hist.* XV. *Cent.*

[d] *Voltaire's Lewis* XIV. *p.* 17. 4*to.*

[e] *Laurent Coster* invented wooden types at *Harlem* about A. D. 1440. *Gensfleisch* and *Guttemberg*, not many years after, carved metallic ones at *Mentz*: These, though an improvement on those of *Coster*, were yet imperfect, beause they were often

vented

vented but a few years before this time, has been the means of disseminating it far and wide, and of placing the Treasures which contain it out of the reach of the rapacious hand of Time, and perhaps of every earthly Power.

After the Period just mentioned Ancient Literature met with different reception in different countries, and has been cultivated with various success — No where with more success than in *England*: But we cannot say that it is *now* in a flourishing state among us; for, however *enlightened* we may call these days, all competent judges of the matter will I believe readily acknowledge that in the last Century, and in the beginning of this, there was much more *sound* and *solid* Erudition *then* than we find *at present*: — In the room of it there is succeeding another species, showy indeed and splendid, but vain, empty, pernicious.

It would be *useful* as well as *amusing* to enter more minutely upon this history, and

unequal. The invention was afterwards perfected by *Schœffer* at *Stratsbourg*, who cast the types in an iron-matrix, engraved with a puncheon. See a Note of *Dr. Maclaine's* (in *Mosheim's Eccles. Hist.* as above) quoted from *Meerman's Origines Typographicæ*.

to

to inquire into, or rather assign more at large (for they are pretty obvious) the *particular causes* of these several revolutions: But this short sketch must suffice for the present: And from this you may observe that we are principally indebted to the *Greeks* for the Learning which we now enjoy, that people having been of all others the most zealous in the propagation of it, and advancement.

The writings which their first-rate Authors have left us contain the best rules for just Composition, and are themselves the best examples. If you wish to form a good style together with a correct taste and judgement, spend as much time as you can in the reading of them. Though the *Latins* had little more to do than to *imitate* these, yet they are no plagiarists, but have an original manner of their own; and seem, for the most part, to have derived their observations from the same unexhausted source—from Nature (that is) and the independent exertion of their own Minds. They were guided in the main certainly by those their ingenious predecessors—Indeed to have deviated from them, would have been to deviate from

Nature,

Nature, and from the standard of all human Perfection.

By being conversant with these Writers (if I may thus speak without digressing too much from our subject) you will find from experience, that the pleasures of the *understanding* have more *force*, more *constancy*, more *variety*, and much more *dignity* in them than those of the *senses*. Hence it is of greater importance to cultivate and improve such intellectual connexions than any other whatsoever.

A competent knowledge of these frequently prevents the *gay* and *social* mind from degenerating into *dullness* or *debauchery*; and besides teaching us how to *relish*, and make a *right use* of the gifts of Fortune, this knowledge alone can enable us to fill any *liberal* station in life with *propriety* and *respect*: —

His *animum succinge* Bonis; *sic flumine largo*
Plenus Pierio defundes pectore verba.[a]

[a] These lines are taken out of *Petronius Arbiter*. In this Author we meet with a flower now and then, but they grow in such bogs and stenchy quagmires, that they are scarcely worth the trouble and danger there is in going after them.

LETTER XIII.

WHEN I sent you those general strictures on the *Greek* Tongue, together with the *Essay* on its Prepositions, my principal object (as indeed I told you at the time) was to make you consider that admirable Language in a proper point of view, and to *confirm* you in the resolution of acquiring a competent knowledge of it. You say I have not been unsuccessful in this respect — 'Tis enough — I am perfectly satisfied — And hence I have been encouraged to endeavour to do something in the same way with regard to the other classical Language — With this I am now going to trouble you.

The *Romans*, it is well known, derived their Learning chiefly from the *Greeks*. But they are more indebted to them for their *Language*, than for the *subject-matter* of their Compositions. We are told by *Dionysius* of *Halicarnassus*, and by *Quintilian*, that the *Latin* is formed, though not *altogether*, yet *principally*, from the *Doric* and *Æolic* Dialects.

My

My *Lord Monboddo*,[a] (whose judgement in *such things* at least I hold in the highest esteem) instead of considering it as *debased* or *corrupted* from the *Greek*, is of opinion that it is a *distinct* Dialect itself, and the most ancient of them all, and was first introduced into *Italy* by *Ænotrus*, or *Evander*:[b] The former went there about 160 years before the time of *Homer*; the latter, about a Century after *Ænotrus* — both it is likely before the *Greek* had arrived at its full standard: — And thus this branch of the Language, having been less cultivated, has not of course all the Numbers, nor all the Voices and Tenses of the Verb; nor yet that variety of declension and modes of application, which we find in the other Dialects of the Mother-Tongue.

Its Etymology shows plainly that it is of *Greek* extraction;[c] but we must allow, at the

[a] *Origin and Progress of Language*, Vol. I and II. passim.

[b] *Evander* settled on the banks of the *Tiber*, and built *Pallantium*. See *Virgil*, Æn. VIII. 51.—Coming from *Arcadia*, he and his followers no doubt spoke the *Doric* or *Æolic* Dialect — the *former* most probably. But is it proper to divide these Dialects? For these at first, like the *Attic* and *Ionic*, were one and the same. — Τὴν δὲ Δωρίδα (scil. διαλεκτον) τῇ Αἰολίδι — τὴν αὐτὴν φασιν. See a satisfactory, though it be a concise account of this matter in *Strabo* VIII. 1.

[c] See *Varro de Linguâ Latinâ*.

same

same time, that there is a mixture of something else. Now it seems not improbable that after *Pythagoras* had been in *Italy*, (and he is supposed to have come there in somewhat less than a Century after the time of *Romulus*) the *Latin* formed itself on the *Doric* or *Æolic* Dialect of the *Greeks*, (this being the *only* Dialect used in the *Pythagorean* Colleges) incorporating at the same time several words out of the *Oscan* or *Teutonic*, or some other barbarous Language, during the different periods of its progress towards the perfection it at last arrived at.

Be this as it may, it is certain that it continued for a long time extremely rude and imperfect. It is, I believe, pretty commonly supposed that *Cicero* was the first who brought it to a just standard. But he himself disclaims that honour, and seems to attribute it to *L. Crassus* and *M. Antonius*, who were between 30 and 40 years older than himself, and the first great Orators that ever appeared in *Rome*. Having particularly mentioned their age, he adds these words: "Quod *idcirco* posui, ut, dicendi Latinè *prima maturitas* in *quâ ætate* exstitisset, posset notari; et intelligeretur *jam ad summum pæne esse perductam*,

ductam, ut *eo nihil ferme quisquam addere posset*, nisi qui à Philosophia, à Jure Civili, ab Historiâ fuisset instructior."[a]—I am aware that he is here speaking of the perfection of *Roman* Eloquence; but that will not in the least affect the matter in question: For if their *Eloquence* was then arrived at its perfect state, the *Language* must have *necessarily* reached that point *as soon*, if not *sooner*.

Earlier, however, than the period just alluded to we cannot *safely* date the maturity of the *Latin* Tongue. Being now much studied and refined, it was in a great measure divested of its former rust and barbarism: For in comparing it with the Parent-Language and by that means improving it, they made it more elegant and harmonious, so as to resemble the *Greek* much more than it did before.[b]

——*Sic horridus ille*
Defluxit numerus Saturnius, et grave virus
Munditiæ pepulere—

But by this very circumstance it lost that

[a] *De Cl. Orat.* 43.

[b] We have high authority to assert that the *Latin* from about this period was much more like the *Greek*, than what the old *Latin* was—Indeed the thing speaks for itself.

uniform,

uniform, though *harsh* and *rustic* appearance which it had so long retained.

It continued but a short time pure and uncorrupt. That strict and ancient Discipline, which forbad every other Language, even the admired one of the *Grecians*, to be spoken within the borders of *Italy*, and which obliged foreigners in their negociations with the Republic to make use of an Interpreter;[a] — this Discipline, I say, tending certainly to preserve the Language, if not to improve it, was relaxed more and more, and the *Greek* became so prevalent as to be considered the *fashionable, acquired language of every polite Roman*. But the great Cause of the corruption and decay of this, as it will be of all other languages, was the EXTENT *of* EMPIRE. Before *Duillius*'s time in the First *Punic* War, says our admirable Critic,[b] the *Romans* had got nothing beyond *Italy*: But in the following Century they carried their Eagles almost all over *Europe*: So that the vast confluence of people from all the Provinces, the introducing of foreign artificers and captive slaves from every quarter,

[a] See *Valerius Maximus, Lib.* 2, *Cap.* 2.

[b] See the *Dissertation upon Phalaris*, p. 403.

and the Natives that returned home from the Expeditions, made an innovation of language at *Rome* itself. And thus the *Latin*, even among those who composed in it and who had perfect models to imitate, began to lose its purity immediately after the *Augustan Age*; *Paterculus* being looked upon as the last Author, who wrote in a chaste, classical style. It lingered, however, in a corrupt and decaying state till the time of the Philosopher *Boethius*,[a] with whom the *Latin* Tongue, and the last Remains of *Roman Dignity*, may be said to have sunk in the *Western World*. In the beginning of the Seventh Century, we are told it was no longer *spoken even* at *Rome*, and was dwindling fast into what they called the *Roman-Runic*,[b] from whence sprang the modern *Italian*, *French*, and *Spanish* Languages.

[a] He lived about the beginning of the Sixth Century.—See *Hermes* III. 5.

[b] The same as what was called the *Romance-Tongue*, a mixture of the language of the *Francs*, and of bad *Latin*.

LETTER XIII. Continued.

BUT it is time to say something of the Language itself.—The *Latin* has its *defects* as well as *excellencies*. Among the *former* none is more striking than its incapacity of expressing philosophical matters with any degree either of *conciseness* or *precision*: Of this *Lucretius* complains not seldom:

Here in particular:

Nec me animi fallit, Graiorum obscura reperta
Difficile inlustrare Latinis *versibus esse*,
(*Multa novis verbis præsertim quom sit agendum*)
Propter Egestatem *Linguæ*, *et Rerum Novitatem*.[a]

Here too:

Nunc et Anaxagoræ scrutemur Homæomerian,
Quam Græci memorant, *nec* Nostrâ *dicere* Linguâ
Concedit nobis Patrii Sermonis Egestas.[b]

[a] Lib. I. 137. [b] Lib. I. 830.

And once more:

Nunc, ea quo pacto inter sese mixta quibusque
Comta modis vigeant, rationem reddere aventem
Abstrahit invitum Patrii Sermonis Egestas.[a]

This perhaps may be owing, in some degree, to there being so few in *Italy* who studied the more abstracted parts of *Grecian* Philosophy; for the *scientific* and *metaphysical* investigations of the *Greeks*, their *Obscura Reperta*, (as *Lucretius* calls them) were not much sought after by the *Romans*. Indeed before the time of *Cicero* they knew little or nothing of them — He is the only one who made any figure this way. And yet we must consider him, if we would consider him impartially, rather as one who hath *collected* and most *elegantly related* the old Philosophy, than as the inventor of any new or original System. He too, like the *Epicurean* Poet, complains much of this deficiency of his mother-tongue, and is often obliged to express his meaning by a *Periphrasis*, or *borrow words from the Greek*, or else use terms of his *own coining*.[b]

[a] Lib. III. 259.

[b] Of this last Sort indeed the Author of *Hermes* mentions

But

But the Poverty of the *Latin* in this particular may probably be accounted for from the original ſtructure of the Language: And this it was difficult, or perhaps it was not poſſible, for any but the firſt framers of it, to have altered or amended: Its having but one Tenſe to expreſs *the Aoriſt* and *Præter-Perfect*; its wanting an *Active Participle Paſt*, and *Preſent Participle Paſſive*; and above all, its want of the *Article*, together with the *ſtubborn nature* of the Language *not admitting* of being compounded or joined together, force thoſe who uſe it to the frequent uſe of a *Periphraſis*, and often to leave an *ambiguity in their meaning*. Of theſe, and its other anomalies and defects, if you wiſh to have a *full* and *accurate* knowledge, I would refer you to *Hermes*, and to the *Second and Third Volumes of Origin and Progreſs of Language*—Books theſe, as good and elegant, with regard to Languages and their uſe in Compoſition, as any that have been written either *before* or *after* them.

To glance at its *excellencies* will, I ſhould think, be more agreeable.

only *one*, which was properly new coined by him, namely, *Qualitas*. See B. 2. Ch. 3.

It is commonly observed that the *Latin*'s chief perfection lies in its fitness for expressing things which *relate to War*: This arises from that prevalent, but, I think, rather *vague* opinion, that all languages resemble in their nature the disposition of the people who first formed and used them: I readily grant that the *Latin*, like the ancient *Romans*, breathes a *martial* and *gallant* spirit; but at the same time, it seems to be *equally* well adapted for topics of a very *different* sort. To confine ourselves to the Poets.

As the *philosophical* parts of *Lucretius* convince us no less of the *barrenness* of his *Language* in that particular, than of the *absurdity* of his *System*, so the *fine descriptive* passages in that elaborate Work may serve to show how admirably fit it is for delineating the *calm Scenery* of Nature. *Ovid* and *Catullus*, with the tribe of amorous bardlings, are a sufficient proof that it is perhaps *too well calculated* for the *Affairs* of *Love*; it being capable of conveying the *grossest* ideas with a degree of cleanliness even, and of modesty. In the *courtly Horace* we see with what wonderful *elegance* and *propriety* it can hand down to posterity both *moral* and *literary*

rary precepts, as well as the effusions of a *gay*, *social*, and most *friendly* heart. Nor is it less evident from *Virgil*, in whose hands this Language acquired all the *gracefulness* and *majesty* it is *capable* of, that the sports and employments of the *Shepherd* and honest *Husbandman* can be as *happily* described in it as those of the *Statesman* or the *Warrior*. Hence we conclude that the *Latin* is *equally* elegant and nervous, whether it be applied to things relating to *Peace*, or to *War* and *Popular Businesses*: As long as it has something *corporeal*, something I mean *palpable to Sense* and common observation, and not the *abstract conceptions* of *Mind* to treat of, it flows with a *sweetness* and *energy* of expression which you must forcibly perceive by reading the best Authors in it, but of which it is not *possible* to give any just idea.

I think it quite needless to say any thing with regard to the study of this Language: It is less difficult, because less copious, than the *Greek*: You are sensible you should endeavour to be able to compose in it with (if possible) a degree of *Cæsar*'s elegance and simplicity, or else that of *Cicero*: Not that I imagine you'll have much occasion to

write

write it any more than what your College Business may require, but because I am convinced that this is the only sure way to obtain a *thorough* knowledge of any language: None of the hidden beauties, the delicate touches can be perceived by him who is unable to do this—And for the same reason it was that I advised you to use yourself to *Greek* Exercises.

As you have a turn for *Latin Poetry*, there cannot be a more *liberal* amusement than to indulge it: It will tend also to *correct* and *polish* your taste, and bring you to a *critical* acquaintance with the language: *Virgil*, *Horace*, and *Tibullus* should be your only models.

I admire very much some modern productions in this way. The Poem on the *Immortality of the Soul*, and that on the *Judgement of* PARIS have no small share of *Virgil's Purity*, and *Elegance*, and *Majesty*. In the little Volume, entitled *Carmina Quadragesimalia*, you'll find a vein of Wit *equal*, though not *similar*, to that of *Martial*, and expressed in the *modest* and *harmonious* numbers of *Tibullus*. What we have of Bishop *Lowth* of this kind are admirable. *Smith's Ode on Pocock*,

Pocock, together with those of his friend, the Author of the *Splendid Shilling*, have been deservedly considered as breathing a spirit truly *Horatian*.

Others might be pointed out; but as your own good taste and good sense will prompt you to spend a leisure hour in regaling yourself with such flowers as these, it would be quite superfluous to say more.

I am not ignorant that the modern practice of writing the dead languages, whether in *Prose* or *Verse*, has been repeatedly and violently attacked. These attacks, however, have proceeded from persons totally *unable* to see the advantages attending it, or from those *fools* and *innovators* who exert the whole force of their minds to overthrow opinions which are commonly received, and which are known from *Experience* to be productive of *Utility* and *Pleasure*. Such an affectation for singularity, as long as it meddles not with that which is *Pure* and *Holy*, deserves not any regular or sober confutation——I would rather *laugh at* and *despise* it.

Vive, vale!—si quid novisti rectius istis,
Candidus imperti: si non, his utere mecum.

LETTER

LETTER XIV.

THOUGH I be a warm and zealous Advocate for the constant study of *Greek* and *Latin* Authors, yet I am far from thinking that all Human Knowledge is treasured up in the productions of those celebrated Geniuses. This, however, was the prevailing opinion from the Revival of *Letters* till the beginning of the seventeenth Century,[a] and some even now are inclined to think so. — About that time my *Lord Verulam* introduced the method of Inquiry by means of *Experiment*, and thus removed the prejudices of former times, and placed Philosophy on a *new* and more *extensive* basis. Those, who pursued the track which was pointed out to them by this our Great Countryman, have traversed and investigated the vast regions of Nature, opening, as they went, scenes for Science and serious Contemplation, though little known or attended to before, yet capable of affording the noblest kind of Pleasure, and Instruction.

[a] See *Mosheim's Eccles. Hist.* Vol. IV.

It

It reflects much honour on your University for having early eſtabliſhed a Profeſſorſhip in this ſublime and uſeful branch of Literature, the duties of which have been always diſcharged by men of the firſt abilities, and with true dignity and propriety; never certainly more ſo, than by the very learned and amiable Man who now ſits in the Chair. By attending his well digeſted Courſe of Lectures in *Experimental Philoſophy*, and in *Aſtronomy*, this part of your ſtudies will be rendered eaſy, as well as agreeable: And having but juſt gone through the Elements of *Euclid* and ſome higher parts of the Mathematics, this no doubt is the propereſt time for you to attend them: Some indeed are perſuaded to it, when they ſcarcely know the very firſt principles of Geometry, and are of courſe unable to reap all thoſe advantages and improvement, with which they are ſo replete—Whatever may be ſaid to the contrary, there is certainly nothing like to one's having a competent and ready ſtock of previous, elementary knowledge.

You can want no motive to recommend theſe ſtudies to you: For theſe, more perhaps

haps than any other, contain something which *necessarily awakens* our *curiosity*, and, when they are conducted in a proper manner, so as to be most successful, they tend in an eminent degree to enlarge and elevate the Mind, and promote a right spirit of Piety, by exciting our admiration of the Divine Works and Divine Providence: In the prosecution of these pursuits, marks of Perfect Wisdom and Perfect Goodness, appear throughout the wonderful arrangement of things, perpetually obtruding themselves upon us, and tending to inspire every ingenuous heart with the most profound sentiments of reverence, and love, and confidence: These sentiments, sufficiently impressed, exalt our nature to the highest dignity and happiness of which it is capable, and diffuse a pleasing and uniform serenity over every scene of life: They dispose a man to behave with propriety and honour *here*, and give the best founded hopes of the *continuance* and *increase* of this solid felicity, through *endless* ages, in a *better* and *future* state?[a]

[a] See the whole remark in *Dr. Priestley's Observations on Education*—It is little more than a paraphrase on what the *Abbé Fleury* says in his sensible little book *Du Choix et de la Conduite*

As

As well as thus *expand* and *improve* the mind in what is *virtuous* and *manly*, they will alſo *inure* it to *habits* of *induſtry*, and *prepare* it for *undertaking other ſtudies* with *better ability* and *ſucceſs*.

I will only add, that you ſhould take care to read with proper attention whatever Books are recommended to you: Without doing this, it will never anſwer one's purpoſe to attend any Public Lectures of what kind ſoever; for it is only by peruſing what has been well written on the ſubject that laſting impreſſions can be made: He who deſpiſes or neglects proceeding in this manner will never, it is certain, make any right progreſs in literary, or any other liberal purſuit; and there are much better hopes of the *heavy*, but *induſtrious plodder*, than of *him*. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

des Etudes, p. 185.—Not that I wiſh to inſinuate Dr. P. took it from thence; (and indeed if he had I ſee no harm) for the ſame Obſervation muſt occur to every man of ſenſe, who properly conſiders the ſubject.

LETTER

LETTER XV.

THE transition from Mathematics to Logic is easy and natural, and according to the practice of the oldest and best Instructors. The Mind, by a due application to the former of these Sciences, having been used to reason with certainty and precision, is now more fit and able to enter upon the "*Intellective Abstractions*" of Logic. Accordingly we find that as the ancient Philosophers did not chuse to admit into their Schools those who were totally unacquainted with mathematical Learning, so their first business was to teach them, being admitted, a proper skill and knowledge in what is commonly called *The Art of Reasoning*:—And this they did from a conviction, that the study of it contributed, in an eminent degree, to the general improvement of the faculties of the Human Mind;—that it was of universal application;—and that this part of Literature, in conjunction with Mathematics, is to be considered as forming the great source

ſource from whence all the other Arts and Sciences derive their origin:—Hæ *Rationales Scientiæ* reliquarum omnino CLAVES ſunt[a]—Et ANCILLARUM loco erga Phyſicam ponendæ ſunt—And hence, by the way, the neceſſity of ſtudying theſe two Sciences ſo as to *exemplify* and *illuſtrate* each other; for whoever does this properly, "will become not only by Mathematics a more expert *Logician*, and by Logic a more rational *Mathematician*, but a wiſer Philoſopher, and an acuter Reaſoner, in all the poſſible ſubjects either of ſcience or deliberation[b]."

As to the ſtudy of Logic in particular, if it be at all conducive to thoſe important ends which have been already mentioned, you cannot certainly want motives to undertake it with courage and reſolution: Though there are many arguments ready in hand to make this point as clear as the moſt evident Theorem in *Euclid*, yet I ſhall only throw a *hint* or two on the ſubject, and leave you to the farther inveſtigation of it.

Thoſe who have, with moſt accuracy and penetration, inquired into the Hiſtory of

[a] *Bacon de Augment. Scient.* Lib. 3.—& 5, cap. 1.

[b] See *Hermes*—the Preface.

Letters and of the faculties belonging to us, ſeem to agree that the Principles of Reaſon are by Nature implanted in the Mind of man: Theſe Principles are the ſeeds from whence Learning and all our mental acquiſitions have firſt their origin; and they have always flouriſhed and brought forth fruit in a good ſoil and under a favourable climate: But, like the *other* gifts of Nature, they firſt of all require proper culture and attention, and are capable no doubt of *different* degrees of improvement: Now every tolerable degree of improvement is to be moſt ſurely attained to by following ſome technical method, ſo as to accuſtom them to *frequent* and *regular* exerciſe; for it is by right and regular exerciſe that our *intellectual* as well as *corporeal* endowments can, in general, acquire any ſort of readineſs and activity. Hence we may ſee the neceſſity, I mean if we were to enter at all into the argument, of calling in the aſſiſtance of Art; and the Art employed here is Logic, which, by purging and regulating the Mind itſelf, tends of courſe to ſtrengthen and improve all the powers with which the Mind is indued. *Lord Verulam*, ſpeaking of this

Science

Science and Mathematics, has an obſervation very pertinent to our purpoſe, and which I think is finely expreſſed: "Non ſolùm *dirigunt* eam, (ſcil. Mentem) ſed et *roborant*; ſicut ſagittandi *uſus* et *habitus* non tantùm facit, ut melius quis *collimet*, ſed ut *arcum tendat fortiorem*." And *Locke*[b] would recommend them as neceſſary not only to make us *ſcholars*, but even to make us *thinking* and *rational* creatures.

Again: Logic is a Science of *univerſal application*. Perhaps all the other Arts and Sciences have certain boundaries which they cannot paſs: But it is not ſo with this: For tending to ſtrengthen and enlarge the powers of the Human Mind in general, it extends itſelf and is to be applied to whatever thoſe powers can comprehend or inveſtigate. Even in Mathematics, that beautiful regularity and connexion, that uninterrupted chain of reaſoning which pervades them, is to be attributed to Logic: And it is to this ſpeculative and uſeful Science we are ultimately indebted for that pleaſure and advantage, which, in every branch of human Art

[a] De Augment. Scien. V. 1.

[b] See his Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding.

and Literature, is to be derived from due Order, and Perſpicuity, and Proportion.

With regard to the *Greek* Language, it is readily acknowledged that its characteriſtic excellence conſiſts in its *Copiouſneſs* or *Univerſality*:—I ſee no reaſon why it may not be argued, upon the *ſame* principle, that the *Univerſality* of Logic is a plain proof of its *dignity* and *uſe*: And as to its importance in Society, it is by ſo much ſuperior to the *Greek* or any other Tongue whatſoever, as is Sentiment or Perception of Mind, to the Words in which that Sentiment is expreſſed. So then we may ſafely conclude, that all the other parts of Learning, how ſublime ſoever and delightful they may be, unaccompanied with "a ſound and correct Logic, are in fact no better than warbling Trifles." *Galen*,[b] we are told, upon contemplating the many wonderful uſes of the HAND, "upon obſerving the ſuppleneſs and variety

[a] *Hermes*, I. 1.

[b] By conſidering the divine mechaniſm of the *Hand* this celebrated old Phyſician was converted from Polytheiſm to believe in the *One Living God*: And upon his converſion he compoſed a Hymn, conſiſting of little more than of praiſes on this member of the human Body, and an enumeration of its various uſes.

of

of joints in his fingers, their bending all the ſame way, the counterpoiſe which they receive from the thumb, the ſoftneſs and fleſhy parts of the inſide, with all the other circumſtances which render that member ſo fit for numberleſs different uſes," cried out in a kind of exſtacy: Ιδε, Το Οργανον οργανων. Thus, when we conſider all the *various uſes* of Logic, and the *different ways* in which it is to be applied with ſo much ſucceſs and advantage, may we not properly ſay? Ιδε, Η Επιςημη επιςημων. Accordingly this, and Mathematics are ſtiled *Artes artium* by the great Man to whom I ſo frequently refer.*

But ſtill farther—Logic is, to ſpeak accurately, the proper ſource from whence all the Sciences and all the Arts derive their origin. Before we can underſtand, and of courſe before we can form a right judgement of any thing, we muſt firſt of all inveſtigate the principles on which it is founded: Now, the firſt principles of the Arts and Sciences being naturally implanted in our Minds, it is the buſineſs of Logic to cultivate and im-

* De Augmen. Scient. V. 1.—I guess he had in view here the anecdote respecting *Galen*. See the Context.

prove them, leading them by degrees to their full strength and powers of action.

To prove the same thing in a more scientific way. It has been observed, (and who will deny the truth of it?) that "nothing can be known but by knowing either directly the species to which it belongs, or by knowing other specieses, which enable us to form some notion of the object unknown: If this be true, there can be no Philosophy or Science of any kind, without knowing the genuses or specieses of things; and, as that cannot be attained without *definition* and *division*, it should seem that a good system of Logic, of which the art of *defining* and *dividing* is a principal part, *is the* FOUNDATION OF ALL SCIENCE."*

It is needless to be more particular in enumerating its excellencies and advantages.

And besides all this, the study of Logic, when rightly pursued, is not destitute of the truest and most sublime sort of *pleasure*; For the Mind which is in us, feels itself wonderfully *pleased* and *satisfied* in acquiring that *aptness*, that *activity* and *enlargement* which we find necessary to fill every respect-

* See *Lord Monboddo's Origin and Progress of Language.*

able

able ſtation in life with any kind of dignity and decorum—This, it is true, depends entirely on the method that is purſued. That which you ſay you follow ſeems to be perſpicuous, and an excellent one, and diveſted of every thing that it *ſuperfluous* and *ſcholaſtic*. There can, at leaſt, be *no harm* in uſing *Aldrich*, or *Napleton*, or ſome *ſuch* inferior Compendium, ſo as to get acquainted with a few technical, yet neceſſary, particulars: But by adhering to *Ariſtotle* as your principal Guide, you adopt the old and the beſt method of ſtudying it—a method that will teach you ſomething more *ſolid* and *intereſting* than the ſtupid *jargon* and *rugged babblements* of the Schools: You thus approach to the *fountain-head*:—and better certainly, and more delightful it is, to go to the *pure ſource*, than to drink at a *pitiful ſtream*, eſpecially when that ſtream flows *muddy* and *diſturbed*.

——— *Juvat* integros *accedere fontes*,
Atque haurire. ———

But more perhaps reſpecting this laſt point at ſome future period. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER XVI.

I FORGET whether it was among *La Bruyere's* Apothegms I saw it observed: "That very few know how to pass their leisure-hours"—Whoever made it, I think there is much truth in the observation—And by leisure-hours he means all such as cannot be well devoted either to bodily exercise or severe study: Of this kind you have, most days, one or two on your hands.

Now to avoid passing such intervals in illiberal pursuits or those which are altogether frivolous, one should always have some fixed employment for them: Perhaps they cannot, for the most part, be more pleasantly or more wisely employed, than in reading the best *English* Poets, especially *Milton* and *Shakespeare*—in perusing well written Tours and Voyages, or periodical Papers, or some candid and sensible Biographer—The History of *England*, and other Compositions of the sort, which, to read them properly, require much time and care,

care, had been better deferred till you have finiſhed a regular courſe of ſtudy in Ancient Literature.

But in order to peruſe our firſt-rate Authors with moſt advantage, I would adviſe you to read with care the learned Biſhop *Lowth's* excellent *Engliſh* Grammar: Nor would it be improper, if after it you read *Hermes*, that philoſophical and admirable Production of the late *Mr. Harris*: Theſe two Treatiſes will throw great light on Language in general, and eſpecially that of our own country, of which it would be a ſhame to a polite native of *Britain* not to have a complete and thorough knowledge: And beſides, theſe books (*Hermes* in particular) are intimately connected with your *logical* purſuits.

I ſee no reaſon why one ſhould too ſcrupulouſly abſtain from NOVELS: Thoſe of *Fielding*, and ſome of *Smollett's*, with a few others, will ſerve to *unbend* the mind, and to form an *eaſy, familiar* ſtile. The *Vicar of Wakefield*, and the *Adventures* of the brave and "broad-hearted" *Robinſon Cruſoe* I ſhould wiſh to read every year, and I ſhould always read them with increaſing ſatisfaction—Probably

bably there is not a book of the kind capable of affording so much pleasure and improvement. — But as to that heap of *crude* and *unnatural* stories, which wrong-headed boys and girls are perpetually piling up, your good sense will teach you to hold them in the contempt they deserve. "Qui inter *hæc* nutriuntur, (to use the words of *Petronius Arbiter*, speaking of the *Rhetoricians* of his time) non magis *sapere* possunt, quàm *bene olere* qui in *culinâ* habitant."*

Let me intreat you to give up some of these hours to the *French* Language: If I am not mistaken, you can already *read* and *write* it with some readiness and accuracy. You modestly ask my opinion with regard to your learning *Italian*: — If my opinion has any weight, I would by no means advise you to it: You have at this time enough on your hands; and you should pay chief attention to those studies, whose end is to *strengthen* and *enlarge* the Powers of Reason. For my own part, I see not the wisdom of filling one's head with more foreign languages than what may be of use for some particular occasion, or conducive to one's real improvement.

* Satyricon, page 2.

ment. However, the ſtudy of it, was it only for the ſake of being able to read the *Inferno of* DANTE, the ſo much admired Author of *Chaucer* and *Milton*, and who is reckoned the *Father* of *Modern Poetry* — I ſay, the ſtudying it, was it only for this, may, at ſome future period, be an agreeable amuſement.

If you give but little attention to ſuch hints as theſe, you will be able to paſs every leiſure moment you have ſo as to *unbend* and at the ſame time *poliſh* your mind: And by thus regularly filling each interſtice of your time with ſome *harmleſs* and *liberal* employment, you will not only not be diſpoſed to *complain* of the *tedioufneſs* of life, or *philoſophize* on its *vanity*; but you will, moreover, be better able to keep your paſſions from running aſtray, and to go through your other ſtudies with greater pleaſure and advantage — *Theſe* are conſiderations of no *little* importance.

We are told that Dean *Swift* — in ſuch things particularly well worthy of imitation — *regularly* and moſt *ſcrupulouſly* allotted *certain portions* of the day to *certain purſuits*; the morning to what required moſt thought

and

and attention, and the evening to ſome elegant amuſement; having his Watch generally before him in order to be regulated with regard to his hours of ſtudy and recreation. And we learn from Hiſtory, that the Great *Alfred*, the Honour and Pride of *England*, who fought in perſon fifty-ſix battles by ſea and land, was enabled, during a life of no extraordinary length, by an *exact* and *regular* diſtribution of his time, to *acquire more knowledge* and even to *compoſe more books* than what many ſtudious men of equal abilities, though poſſeſſed of the greateſt leiſure and of every opportunity, have, in more fortunate ages, been able to compaſs or attain.* —Let theſe, and other examples of the kind, be always conſidered as having *that weight* and *influence*, which naturally belongs to them.

There is no need of adding more. Farewell.

* See *Hume's Hiſtory of England.*

LETTER

LETTER XVII.

TO finish at this time what I meant to say respecting Logic. Though the Principles of reasoning are born with us, and are the same in all ages, yet Logic (as is generally allowed) was not cultivated as a *Science* before the time of *Zeno Eleates*, about 500 years (that is) before the *Christian* Era;[a] and being by him first applied to the conducting of Dialogues and convivial Conversation, it was stiled *Dialectica*, or *Ars Dialecticæ*.

To the attention with which it was now studied may we not attribute, in a great

[a] *Strabo* indeed observes (XVII. in the beginning) that the *Phenicians*, on account of their commerce, invented Logic and Arithmetic — As, says he, Geometry was invented by the *Egyptians*, ὡς την Λογιστικην, και Αριθμητικην (συστηναι φασιν) παρα Φοινικων, δια τας εμπορειας — But these were never considered as SCIENCES in *Phenicia* — We can conclude no more from this passage than that with regard to commercial matters the *Phenicians* were just able to *dispute* and *calculate*.

measure,

measure, the cause of LETTERS arriving at so wonderful a pitch of perfection in *Athens* during this and the following Century?

Immediately after *Zeno*, we find *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Xenocrates*, *Speusippus*, *Antisthenes* with many others, making a conspicuous figure in the list of the ancient Philosophers. Most of these did not pretend to add any thing to what *Zeno* had left, and the improvements of the rest were of little or no importance: So that it remained in a very imperfect state (scarcely indeed formed into a regular Science) before the time of *Aristotle*. He was born at *Stagira* in *Macedon*, somewhat more than half a Century after the death of *Zeno*; and coming to *Athens* about the age of eighteen, he studied under *Plato* for near twenty years. He it was who reduced Logic from a rude sketch into that form which has been never since improved: *Hence* succeeding writers on the subject have derived all their knowledge. And this, among other things, is a striking proof of his great abilities.

Considering the discoveries and the improvement which he made in this and other branches of Literature, his master *Plato* may

may be excuſed for paying him thoſe high compliments — ὁ ΝΟΥΣ. And again: ὁ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΗΣ. Notwithſtanding ſuch honourable teſtimonies of *ſuperior* excellence from ſo *able* a Judge, it has been the faſhion with ſome *Moderns* to treat *Ariſtotle* contemptuouſly, and to tax him with being inſipid and affectedly abſtruſe. This, and all complaints of the kind, may probably be accounted for, without tracing them to that general want of correct Taſte in ancient Erudition, and that deſpicable effeminacy of manners and purſuits which we find ſo prevalent and extenſive. It will be worth while to give this a moment's conſideration.

To any one that glances over the Hiſtory of Logic after the days of *Ariſtotle* and his Succeſſors, it will appear obvious that, in proceſs of time, it was ſhamefully corrupted and abuſed. This abuſe and corruption made its *firſt* appearance among the idle Sophiſts and Rhetoricians of *Greece* and *Rome*. But after that the *Greek* and *Roman* Empires were no more, and when Ignorance and Barbarity reigned at large, we hear little of the Arts and Sciences before the beginning of the Ninth Century: They now began to appear

among

among the *Arabians*; for this people, being ſpurred on and encouraged by their Caliph *Almamunis*, (who is alſo called *Abu Gaafar Abdallah*) were at length diverted from purſuits of War to thoſe of the *liberal* and *literary* kind. He erected and eſtabliſhed Seminaries of Learning in ſeveral places, eſpecially at *Bagdad*, *Cufa*, and *Baſora*: In ſhort he ſeems to have ſpared neither pains nor expence to inſtil into the minds of his ſubjects a taſte for *Grecian* Literature.

Nor did his exertions prove altogether unſucceſsful. The fury of their religious Warfare was by this time partly ſubſided: Peace and Tranquillity were in ſome meaſure enjoyed amongſt them: And beſides, the nature of their Language, which was brought to a high degree of perfection about two Centuries before,[a] and which (we are told[b])

[a] This was effected by a ſort of poetical Academy, that uſed to aſſemble at ſtated times, in a place called *Ocadh*, where every Poet produced his beſt Compoſition, and was ſure to meet with the applauſe that it deſerved; the moſt excellent of theſe Poems were tranſcribed in characters of gold upon *Egyptian* Paper, and hung up in the Temple of *Mecca*. See the ingenious *Sir W. Jones's Eſſay on the Poetry of the Eaſtern Nations.*

[b] See *Aldrich's Logic* — the Preface.

is

is no leſs adapted for *philoſophical*, than *poetical* Compoſitions, was a circumſtance favourable to the deſign of this celebrated Caliph: — So that during his reign many *Greek* Productions were tranſlated into *Arabick* with much ſucceſs, and were held in very high eſtimation — But none ſo much ſo, as the Works of *Ariſtotle*. Theſe they ſtudied with laudable emulation, and propagated the knowledge of them not only in *Syria* and *Africa*, but alſo in ſome parts of *Italy*, and in *Spain*, where, having now ſubdued this country, many of the moſt learned of them came over, and eſtabliſhed Schools of Learning. Hence the *Saracens* have been looked upon as the firſt Reſtorers of Literature in *Europe*. — The *Stagirite* was the great object of their purſuit; and the ardor with which they ſtudied him ſeems at length to have dwindled into the mereſt abſurdity and enthuſiaſm.[a]

With the ſame frenzy we find the *European Chriſtians* were ſoon infected; For hence it was that during the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, (though indeed ſome

[a] See the ſubſtance of theſe remarks reſpecting the *Saracens* in *Moſheim's* Eccleſ. Hiſt. Vol. II. and III. paſſim.

of them appeared much earlier) ſprang up that ſwarm of miſguided Zealots who are commonly called *The Scholaſtic Writers*, &c. Theſe men, inſtead of conſidering Logic as intended to *explain* the *principles* of true Learning and the rules of good Criticiſm, conſidered it — miſtaking thus the *means* for the *end* — as the Perfection of all Wiſdom, and as a Science entirely *independent on*, and *unconnected with*, any other whatſoever — Like thoſe miſerable Wretches in common life, who, acquiring a paſſion for money, *merely becauſe it is money*, never once think of the uſeful purpoſes it is deſigned to ſerve.

Whoever was well verſed in logical and metaphyſical knowledge, was now looked upon as ſufficiently learned, and was ſuppoſed to ſtand in no need of being acquainted with any other Art or Science: To learn *Ariſtotle* by heart was every thing: And we are told that ſome religious Sects learned his *Categories* even inſtead of the *Catechiſm*, and at Church a ſection of his Ethics was ſometimes read inſtead of a Chapter in the Bible. *O Tempora! O Mores!*

But Enthuſiaſm of every kind is always accompanied with Error. Thus it was that theſe Schoolmen were not ſo much animated

by

by the glorious Love of Truth, as by a rage of angry disputation; and this made them soon perplex and deform the pure doctrines of Reason with a multitude of idle subtleties and ridiculous distinctions. They loaded the memories of their indefatigable Scholars with a quantity of barbarous terms and scholastic precepts, delivered in the most uncouth style and manner imaginable, and all such as could repeat this jargon with readiness and rapidity were considered *Prodigies* of Eloquence and Erudition. Every soul of them had the name of *Aristotle* in his mouth, while very few understood his Philosophy, and not one was capable of applying it with any sort of advantage, or propriety.

Hence appears the Evil of admiring only some *one particular* Science: "And thus we see the use, nay the *necessity* of *enlarging* our literary views, lest even *Knowledge itself* should obstruct its own growth, and perform in some measure the part of Ignorance and Barbarity."[a]

But absurd and intemperate as these men were in their notions, yet they maintained their empire in the Schools till near the beginning of the Seventeenth Century; and

[a] See *Hermes* — the Preface.

indeed a great deal of their nonſenſe continued longer, and even at this time of day there are perhaps *ſome veſtiges* of it ſtill remaining.

However, when a more enlightened age reſtored to men the right uſe of their Reaſon, the dry interpretations of theſe *Lunatics* (it is ſcarcely too harſh a term) met with general diſapprobation; and their huge Volumes of Commentaries on this ſpeculative ſubject, (which by the way had been at firſt ſtated in as clear a manner as it will admit of,) are now ſunk into that contempt and oblivion which they ſeemed deſtined for. But, as is commonly the caſe when matters are handled with *ſo much paſſion* and *ſo little judgement*, they did an irreparable injury to the cauſe they wiſhed to eſpouſe: For men were ſoon diguſted with their quibbling ſtuff and nonſenſe, and began to entertain a very indifferent opinion of the uſe and importance of the *Science itſelf*, and of Him who had brought it to ſo high a pitch of perfection.

It was thus that *Ariſtotle* fell into diſrepute; and the complaints and declamations which have been made againſt him ever ſince are to be traced to no other ſource—HINC ILLAE LACHRYMAE.

But

But it is not to be denied, (for why ſhould not one conſider things with all *poſſible impartiality?*) that this Philoſopher is *ſometimes* obſcure and abſtruſe. Inſtead, however, of raiſing cavils againſt him for being ſo in a *few* inſtances, we ſhould admire him rather for being *generally* clear and intelligible. Who but *Ariſtotle* could have handled ſo *intricate* and *ſpeculative* a ſubject—a ſubject not *ſuſceptible* of any *ornament* or *embelliſhment*—who but he could have handled it ſo much *according to Science*, and with ſo much *order*, and *perſpicuity*, and *propriety?*

And beſides we allow, that in this and his other Acroamatic Works, he is perhaps frequently *deficient* in point of *compoſition*; for it is very probable, as my *Lord Monboddo* obſerves,[a] that theſe are to be conſidered as *minute-books*, which he occaſionally uſed in delivering his Lectures, and which it is every reader's buſineſs to *ſcrutinize*, and *enlarge* upon. Indeed all his Works require to be read with *all poſſible care* and *attention*.

Of every prejudice againſt him on this head, therefore, I would have you totally diveſt yourſelf: If, by chance, you ever find

[a] See *Origin and Progreſs of Language, Vol. II.*

him

him *obscure* or *inelegant*, remember that it is in the *very nature of his subject*: He is, however, in both these respects to be considered superior to his Interpreters: You will every where find him a *perfect* and *thorough* master of the subject in hand, explaining all its fundamental Principles in a just and most beautiful Analysis, and in general not difficult to be understood.

I shall only add that you will do well first of all, to study the Categories or Predicaments; which, as their doctrine is esteemed to be the foundation of all Philosophy and of Logic itself, are very properly placed at the head of his *Organon*.

Possessed of a competent knowledge of these, you will be able to prosecute your present studies with greater advantage and success: Being concise and contained in a few pages, they perhaps may stand in need of some illustration: Here then a good and sensible Commentator might be of service; and there is one which universally bears that character, I mean *Ammonius Hermeias*.—*Vive, Vale. Vince.*

LETTER

LETTER XVIII.

ACCUSE me not of being inconsistent with myself, if I advise you to be on your guard against indulging too much what I have been so anxious to have you acquire, I mean your habits of industry and application. For even in our search after Knowledge, we should proceed with temper and judgement, often *varying* our ideas and relieving the mind by means of *exercise* and *amusements*. Though the life of most liberal-minded men would have many dull and tedious intervals without the assistance of books, yet, rather than contract such a fondness for them as to impair one's Health and Good Humour, two of the most valuable blessings we now enjoy, it would be far better to quit them *altogether*, and pass our days under the shades of *Ignorance* and *Obscurity*; nothing *on earth* being *equivalent* to so great a loss.

A few remarks on this subject you will not perhaps consider as impertinent or entirely

tirely uſeleſs; at leaſt it will be better than to waſte time and paper about the common news of the day.

Agricola uſed to ſay: That in the prime of youth he was ſo paſſionately fond of the ſtudy of Philoſophy, that he would have carried it to an extreme, had not the prudence of his mother checked his impetuous diſpoſition: "Scilicet, as it is added by his ſententious Biographer, ſublime et erectum ingenium pulchritudinem ac ſpeciem excelſæ magnæque gloriæ *vehementiùs*, quàm cautè, appetebat: Mox mitigavit Ratio et Ætas; retinuitque, *quod eſt difficillimum*, ex ſapientiâ *modum*."* It is the ſame with many a young man; who, having once imbibed a reliſh for true Knowledge, and perpetually thirſting after a larger draught of it, is apt, like the brave *Roman*, not to be aware that *too intenſe* an application leads to conſequences of a very *fatal* nature: But thoſe—who, to avoid theſe conſequences, give up their *whole* time and attention to the care and enjoyment of the *body*, we have nothing to do with *this ſort of Philoſophers*:—'Tis from the other quarter we apprehend dan-

* See *Tacitus in his Life of Agricola*—the beginning.

ger;

ger; and the remedy is to be applied accordingly.

To preſerve the ſound Conſtitution, which Nature has given you, as little impaired as poſſible, nothing ſeems ſo conducive as *Early Riſing*, *Temperance*, and *Exercise*: Theſe ingredients, properly mixt together, make the beſt *Recipe* for the Preſervation of Health — To ſay a word on each particular *ſeparately*, and *in order*.

Seven, if not ſix hours-ſleep is certainly ſufficient for one of your *age* and *healthy temper* of body: Any greater indulgence, inſtead of *refreſhing*, will, on the contrary, only *blunt* the *mental* faculties, and too much *relax* the *corporeal* ones: And this ſhould be done, if in your power, at a ſtretch; — one nap and a way. As the *Phyſician* will inform you that the morning-air *braces* the *nerves*, and *diſtends* and *purifies the lungs*, giving to the whole body freſh vigour and activity; ſo will the *Moraliſt* argue, with equal truth on his ſide, that the mind is at this time of the day moſt *fit* and *diſpoſed* for *virtuous* and *manly* ſentiments: Not having as yet entered on its daily occupations, it is naturally inclined, and, as it were,

were, compelled to contemplate the various parts of the Creation with reverence, and cheerful gratitude. It is *now* that every thinking young man considers how to lay out properly the remainder of the day, congratulating himself, at the same time, on his *steady progress* in Virtue and Knowledge.— We are told that Chief Justice *Hale* used to attribute to his having constantly made a right use of this part of the day not only the *good old age* he lived to, but also the *extensive Learning* of which he was master.

Temperance, as well as Early Hours, is not only a grand *preservative* of Health, but it is principally by means of it that a sound constitution and every virtuous endowment of the Mind is first acquired, or at least fixed on a sure basis: For it is this great Cardinal Virtue which renders a man *fit* and *disposed* to discharge with *propriety* the several duties of life, which, as a free and rational creature, he owes to God,— to himself,—his friends,—and mankind in general.

Intemperance of all kind is evidently bad and pernicious—Inasmuch as it tends to heat

heat the blood, it quickens its motion, and thus makes it ſtrike with too violent a momentum againſt the delicate texture of the brain, the operations of which are thereby deranged, and the Powers of Thought conſequently diſturbed, or perhaps totally deſtroyed.

—— Know whate'er
Beyond its natural fervour hurries on
The ſanguine tide,—whether the frequent bowl,
High-ſeaſoned fare, or exerciſe to toil
Protracted,—ſpurs to its laſt ſtage tir'd life,
And ſows the temples with untimely ſnow.[a]

So that even if we have no regard for our Conſtitution, the decline of which we may not perhaps *immediately* perceive, we ſhould cultivate Temperance as being the only means of enjoying the right and full uſe of that Faculty whereby Man is ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed.

Without this *Nurſing-Mother* of all that is *Great* and *Liberal*, GOOD HUMOUR, *properly ſo called*, cannot long ſubſiſt: And deſtitute of this amiable and enlivening quality

[a] Art of Preſerving Health, ii. 501.

Learning,

Learning, and *Virtue*, and *Religion even*, lose all their grace — all their attractive excellence. True Cheerfulness and Serenity is not only a sure sign of an *honest* and *well-regulated* Mind, but it is the best preservative against *Enthusiasm* and *Infidelity*. The tenets of *Calvinism* — are they not enough to make one's blood chill with horror? — In short — *all Enthusiasm* contains something gloomy and dark, and which does violence to the common feelings of our Nature — Was there but more Benevolence and Charity in the world, we should see less of the dismal effects of that horrible Pest of Society. — And if there be such Mortal, (for it hath been justly called in question) as a *thinking Atheist*, must he not be at bottom an uncharitable, suspicious, morose, malevolent sort of an animal? —— GOOD HUMOUR then is the very balm of life; and to the studious mind it is a most wholesome and necessary cordial: Have it therefore always at command, and fly from every thing that is *surly*, or *grim*, or *disdainful*.

But I am losing sight of my subject — So much for the two first heads of it.

LETTER

LETTER XVIII. Continued.

ONE word with respect to Exercise.

The *Greeks* and *Romans*, it is well known, used to consider the exercising of the body as an essential part of a Complete Education: Indeed *Plato*, who was himself well-skilled in most of the manly and athletic Exercises, seems to have looked upon this as more deserving of attention than almost any thing besides; because that by means of it the Soul is able to exert most successfully its higher Powers, "the Powers I mean of Reason and Intellect:" The Life of Man has its Essence in *Motion*— Objects from without *first move* our faculties, and thence we move *of ourselves* either to *Practice* or *Contemplation*:[a] Nor, in general, are we fit for doing the *latter* to any good purpose or effect, any more than the *former*, unless the corporeal faculties, "which are in fact the first instruments of our Intelligence," be in an active and vigorous state: Accordingly we find it to be a common

[a] See *Hermes*, III. 4.

observation,

obſervation, and confirmed by Experience, that great ſtrength of Mind ſeldom or never attends a very *ſedentary* life: But the proper end of all Good Learning is to *add to*, and not *impair* the vigour of our mental Powers. Since then they ſtand in certain danger of being hurt and contracted by too intenſe an application, we ſhould enliven and dilate them by frequently diverting them to objects of a lighter and more trifling ſort—

Luſus Animo debent aliquando dari,
Ad cogitandum melior ut redeat ſibi.[a]

To enter a little into particulars. The firſt leiſure hour every morning cannot perhaps be better employed than in walking: This is a *natural* and an *innocent* recreation, and therefore it cannot but be *wholeſome*. What time you ſhould think proper to devote over and above to exerciſe, would, I think, be well beſtowed on *Fencing*, *Muſic*, or *Riding*.

The learning how to make a proper uſe of your weapon would, as *Milton* words it,[b] not only keep you healthy, nimble, and well in breath, but it is alſo the likelieſt means

[a] *Phædrus* III. 14. [b] See his *Tractate on Education*.

to

to make you arrive at your full growth and ſtature, and to inſpire you with a gallant and fearleſs Courage; which, being tempered with ſeaſonable Lectures, and Precepts of true Fortitude and Patience, will turn into a native and heroic Valour, and will make you ſcorn the cowardice of being guilty of any wrong action or inſolent behaviour.

I mentioned Muſic becauſe I know you have a natural turn that way, and have made no inconſiderable proficiency in this agreeable Art: Had not this been the caſe, it would not be adviſeable to think of learning it now, for it would be time idly and fooliſhly thrown away. Though one be not of the ſame opinion with the *Egyptians* of old, who, as ſome ſay, from a ſuppoſition that it tends to enervate the Mind, forbad *men* to cultivate or practiſe Muſic; yet you ſhould avoid all *effeminacy* in your exerciſes of this kind, as well as in other things. But the "*ſolemn* and *divine* Harmonies of Muſic, heard or learnt, *recreate* and *compoſe* the ſpirits, and, if wiſe Men and Prophets be not extremely out, have a great power

over

over dispositions and manners, to smooth and make them gentle from rustic harshness and distempered passions: And this would not be unexpedient after meat to assist and cherish Nature in her first concoction, and send the Mind back to study in good tune satisfaction."—This puts me in mind of a young man, noted no less for *Rational Oeconomy*, than for his industry and strong natural abilities, who, whilst Undergraduate, in order to avoid the expence as well as the danger attending drinking-parties, used to retire every day after dinner into his own *Rooms*, and there pass a couple of hours over two or three glasses of wine, in playing on his Harpsichord, and reading *Virgil*: This no other than whom I mentioned in the beginning of our Correspondence under the name of *Cleanthes*, and who promises to be in time one of the first characters in Great *Britain*—But not to digress.

Music then is an elegant recreation, and wonderfully congenial to the minds of men, tending to *compose* those of a *volatile* cast, and to *rouse* the more *melancholy* and *languid*; subduing the violence of rough and impetuous

[a] See *Milton, as above.*

Passions

Paſſions by fixing the attention on objects of an innocent nature; — and therefore to be conſidered no weak advocate on the ſide of Reaſon.

Over and above the advantages to be derived from other Exerciſes, ſome plauſibly alledge, that Riding is attended with one peculiar to itſelf, the opportunity I mean of enjoying a more freſh, and purer air; and thoſe who are at all acquainted with the Oeconomy of the Human Body will readily allow that this is a moſt important conſideration: Hence it is that the *Dumb-Bell*, and Σκιομαχια, or the *Fighting with your own ſhadow*, are extremely deficient.

Plato and *Pliny* the Younger recommend Riding as a thing wholeſome for the joints and ſtomach. But there is no need of multiplying authorities.

I would not, however, tie you down to any particular method of proceeding; for here, (as has been obſerved with regard to other matters) the proper uſe to be made of minute rules and directions is neither to be too exact, nor altogether negligent of them, and they operate beſt when once formed into a habit. I only wiſh to *apprize* you that

ſome ſuch Exerciſes as theſe, taken *ſeaſonably*, according to *leiſure* and *convenience*, and not to *exceſs*, are *abſolutely* neceſſary for preſerving a ſound Conſtitution, and alſo for forming a proper judgement of it: *Socrates*, whoſe memory we all revere, uſed to adviſe thoſe about him to make their *Health* their *chief* ſtudy, and to ſay to them: "That it was a hard thing if a man of ſenſe, who took care of his Exerciſes and Diet, did not better know than any Phyſician, what was good or bad for him."—And at the ſame time that proper Exerciſes keep us in good Health and contribute to an external gracefulneſs of mien and deportment, forming, in ſhort, that ETEZIA which the Ancients ſo much valued, and which in good truth is ſo infinitely valuable;—beſides this, I ſay, they tend to form a manly and cheerful turn of mind: So that hence we have an effectual antidote againſt complaining of the *tediouſneſs of life* to which ſedentary perſons are ſo liable—It is a fooliſh, a villainous, a dangerous complaint. *Vale.*

PHILANDER.

LETTER XIX.

FURNISHED with a competent knowledge of the *Greek* and *Latin* tongues from having perused a few short Treatises in them, you will be now more capable of undertaking and going through with propriety the Histories of those celebrated People. Although this study requires a good deal of care and attention, yet it will be an agreeable *relaxation*, compared to your pursuits of the *abstract* and *more philosophical* kind—And I would have you consider it in that light.

If we read History in a proper manner we shall find it to be the very "*Anatomy of Philosophy*:" Here the Passions and all the Faculties of the Human Mind are continually engaged in action and exhibited to view. To observe the playing of all these, and the various motives which call forth their exertions, will afford abundant matter of instruction and delight, and it is a speculation not

unworthy of the Philoſopher even. With room for indulging it, Hiſtory will largely ſupply perſons of almoſt all ranks and ſituations.—Nec vero ſum inſcius eſſe utilitatem in hiſtoria, non modo voluptatem.*

Now its great, general object ſeems to be to form good and uſeful and intelligent Citizens; or, in other words, to improve us in Virtue and Knowledge; and that in a way which, with the bulk of mankind, is far the moſt effectual—by the Examples I mean and the Experience of others.

What! ſuppoſing we find in Hiſtory (as has been ſaid) little more than a detail of the *Vices* and *Follies* of our fellow-creatures—ſhould that be any reaſon for our not reading it? Quite the reverſe. For we generally find that the bad and reſtleſs Paſſions of Men, however ſucceſsful they may be for a time, lead them by *certain*, though perhaps *ſlow* and *gentle*, ſteps to misfortune and contempt; and, if ſtill indulged, are ſure to end in their miſery and deſtruction. But thoſe, on the contrary, who act upon good and upright principles, in what diſtreſs ſoever they may happen to be involved, yet

* Cic. De Fin. &c. V. 19.

at

at laſt we *often* ſee them diſperſe the dark cloud, and obtain their proper reward;—are *always* able to derive comfort from within themſelves,—and appear *amiable* and *reſpectable* even in the eyes of the *moſt abandoned.*

——— *abaſh'd* the Devil *ſtood,*
And felt how awful Goodneſs is, and ſaw
VIRTUE *in her ſhape how lovely* ——*ſaw, and pin'd*
His loſs[a]———

So that the temporary ſucceſs of Vice and Folly, and the depreſſion of real Merit, ſhould equally teach us reſignation to God's Providence, and make us form right opinions of whatever we meet with on this *motley*, and frequently *diſtreſſful* ſtage of Human Life.

Phyſicians tell us that, in the Oeconomy of the Human Body, it is the conſtant buſineſs of the *Inteſtinal Tube* or *Canal* to ſeparate from the excrementitious and hurtful the nutritive part of our aliment—to *retain* the one, and *eject* the other:—Exactly ſuch, with regard to the Oeconomy of the

[a] P. Loſt IV. 847.

Mind,

Mind, ſhould be the office of our *Judgement:* And *here* in particular we ſhall have continual occaſion to employ it: If we do this, we may derive no leſs advantages from the *wicked*, than from the *virtuous* Examples we meet with in our Hiſtorical Purſuits, as well as in the affairs of common Life.

Nonne vides, Albî ut male vivat filius? utque
Barrus inops?—magnum documentum, *ne*
Patriam Rem
Perdere quis velit.[a]

Thus then in order hereby to become *better* men, we ſhould accuſtom ourſelves to ſift and weigh thoroughly every action and event, ſo as to be able to make pertinent reflections upon them, and draw from them juſt and proper concluſions—And thus we ſhall ſoon acquire a habit of thinking and acting for ourſelves.

But again.——As the ſtudy of Hiſtory contributes to *improve us in Virtue*, (which ſhould be its firſt and great aim) ſo does it in no leſs degree furniſh us with *elegant* and *uſeful Knowledge*.

In ſtudying it with a view to this point,

[a] Lib. 1. Sat. IV. 109.

we

we ſhould give chief notice to the progreſſive expanſion and improvement of Human Intellect, and the gradual civilization of Society; tracing, with care and judgement, the *Riſe*, the *Progreſs*, the *Decline*, and again the *Revival* of the Sciences, and of the liberal and neceſſary Arts. We ſhould alſo conſider in every view how the "changes that have happened in the Laws and Opinions of Mankind correſpond with their improvement in the Art of governing," and be leſs anxious to know *where*, or *when*, or *how many*, were the battles fought by the the *Greeks* and *Romans*, than acquaint ourſelves with their *manners*, and the *means* whereby the *former* repelled the attacks of the *Perſians*, and the *latter* ſubdued the World; and how *they* again in their turn were deſtroyed and annihilated.—Thus by diligently obſerving the *connexion* between *Cauſe* and *Effect*, and deducing the one from the other, we ſhall not only furniſh ourſelves, in the ſafeſt way, with a great variety of important Knowledge, but ſhall alſo *improve* and *confirm habits* of *reaſoning* with *accuracy* and *correctneſs* — expanding thus our Mind and ſtrengthening its faculties. —Here there

is

is laid open before us a large field for Inquiry and Contemplation.

But to come nearer to your present reading this way—I find I consider the subject in too *general* a view.

It is not from any blind submission to the authority of our Ancestors, nor yet from the idle notion of magnifying the Wisdom and Virtue of *remote* times in order to declaim against the *present*, that we are directed, during our younger years, to go through a regular Course of Ancient History: But Reason and Experience tell us, that this is by far the best, and perhaps indeed the *only sure* way of laying a good foundation for a store of practical and useful Knowledge. There can be nothing more plain than that the Mind, when strengthened and expanded by having been used to contemplate the Civil Constitutions and Popular Business of *Greece* and *Rome*, comes with singular advantage to the study of those of our own Country, and of other modern Nations: And as it is of greater consequence to remember whatever relates to these last, and to form a right judgement of them, we shall be now more

capable

capable of doing ſo: The many particular arguments in ſupport of this notion are too obvious to be mentioned. At the ſame time we ſhall imbibe *ſomething* of the ſpirit, — of the reſolute, though often irregular and miſtaken Virtue of that brave People, who would rather have exchanged *life*, for what they in a great meaſure thought *utter annihilation*, than their own Laws for thoſe of their *Perſian* or *Carthaginian* Invaders.— The reading of them makes one's blood *glow* within one.—Would to God it would ever tend to inſpire us all with a true love for our Country, and a veneration for our Well-founded Conſtitution! That it would make us quit the paths of *Luxury* and *Licentiouſneſs*, and ſtand *unmoved* in the cauſe of *Liberty!* Fair LIBERTY! what glorious deeds have been performed by thy *real* votaries!

Add to all this, that unleſs we are tolerably well verſed in their Hiſtory, we can ſee but few of the hidden beauties and nice touches and alluſions to be found throughout their Poems, their Orations, and even in their Philoſophical Compoſitions. — Hence this branch

branch of Learning tends greatly to the illuſtration of ſeveral others.

Hiſtory then thus conſidered is a moſt excellent ſtudy, full of what is *animated*, and *inſtructive*, and *agreeable*, —a ſort of Philoſophy, in ſhort, " which teaches by Examples how we ought to conduct ourſelves in *all public* and *private* ſituations.[a] But ſhould you look upon it merely as an exerciſe calculated for the Memory, and regard *nothing but circumſtances* relating to *Place* and *Time*, you muſt loſe all the *Uſeful*, and the *Pleaſant*, which is ſo happily blended in every good Hiſtorian; and you might as well read a bare Chronicle, as the maſterly account of the *Peloponneſian* War.

But ſtill an attention to *dates* and the *ſituation* of *places* is *by no means* to be *diſpenſed with:* So that Chronology and Geography are particularly uſeful: Theſe, indeed, as ſomebody obſerves, are *the two Eyes* of Hiſtory; and without them, it would certainly be full of darkneſs and confuſion. It would be adviſeable therefore to have always by your ſide, when engaged in theſe ſorts of

[a] *Bolingbroke's Letters on the Study of Hiſtory.* L. III.

ſtudy,

ſtudy, either *Helvicus*, or ſome ſuch compendious Chronologiſt, together with *D'Anville's* Maps, which I believe are reckoned as good as any.

I ſhall only add that in the mean time you would do well to read *Plutarch* and *Cornelius Nepos*: For, after having gone through a *particular detail* of ſome public tranſaction, by running over the *Lives* of the principal men concerned in it, you will be able to recollect the whole, and to treaſure up whatever may be moſt worthy of remembrance. In theſe agreeable Biographers, eſpecially the *latter*, we find an aſtoniſhing fund of information compriſed within a very narrow compaſs, and related in the moſt elegant and correct ſtyle; free from every thing that looks like prejudice, or moroſeneſs, or affectation.

A great deal more might be ſaid on this copious ſubject: To point out how *particularly* neceſſary it is to perſons in *particular* lines of life — in ſhort, to treat it in a manner ſuitable to its dignity and extent, would require a Volume: But I am perſuaded you will want nothing to induce you

to

to make yourſelf competently acquainted with the *Grecian* and *Roman* Hiſtory, and with that of thoſe nations *neceſſarily* with which the other may interfere: It would be needleſs therefore to ſpeak minutely of its more particular uſes and advantages, eſpecially when your ingenious Tutor is always at hand: —

—— *Sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu*
Sit, melius cauſas reddet tibi:—mî *ſatis eſt, ſi*
Traditum ab antiquis morem ſervare, tuamque
(Dum cuſtodis eges) vitam famamque tueri
Incolumem poſſim: Simulac duraverit ætas
Membra Animumque tuum, nabis ſine cortice.[a]—

[a] Horace — as before.

LETTER

LETTER XX.

IT gives me much pleasure to hear that you have gone through the *Organon* in a regular manner: As you seem sensible of the excellence and right tendency of the Doctrine it contains, I am under no sort of apprehension of your applying it to sophistry, or idle and disputatious wrangling.

Of all the branches of Literature this Science, though perhaps it may be the most tedious, and productive at first of but little satisfaction, yet certainly it is the most useful and extensive of them all. There will be always need of calling forth your logical acquisitions, this being the great clue whereby we can attain to an accurate knowledge of the other parts of Learning. And especially with regard to what you are now going to take in hand, you could not have done better than acquaint yourself previously with the principles and proper use of Logic: Indeed it is altogether necessary to have a just notion of the use and nature of the Syllogism, before

we

we can undertake the ſtudy of Rhetoric with any great advantage or propriety: Accordingly we find it to be the opinion of all competent judges in the matter, that "thoſe who would addreſs men with all the efficacy of Perſuaſion ſhould cultivate Rhetoric along with Logic:"[a] As the latter conſiſts in the forming and improvement of Right Reaſon, the former ſuppoſes this already done, it being its buſineſs to give to arguments elegance, and weight, and dignity. 'Tis obvious then in what order they ſhould be ſtudied.

There is a mutual connexion and dependence between the ſeveral Arts and Sciences: Than that ſuch prevails between Logic and Rhetoric, nothing can be more evident; and it ſeems not unlike to what we find between the Fifth and Sixth Books of *Euclid:* In the one you are taught a doctrine of *univerſal* application, which in the other is exemplified in the demonſtration of certain Theorems and Propoſitions. In the ſame manner, we have ſeen that Logic may be applied without any kind of limitation; whereas

[a] See *Mr. Harris's Philological Inquiries* — See alſo the *Abb. Fleury de choix, &c. des Etudes. p.* 121.

Rhetoric

Rhetoric is under a little restraint, being chiefly confined to things of a public nature, and using only digressive arguments: The same thing *Zeno the Stoic* used to illustrate more elegantly by a Simile taken from the Hand: He compared the *close* power of Logic to the Fist or Hand compreſt, and the *diffuse* power of Rhetoric to the Palm or Hand open — "Cum compressérat digitos, pugnumque fecerat, *Dialecticam* aiebat ejusmodi esse: Cum autem diduxerat, et manum dilataverat, palmæ illius similem *Eloquentiam* esse dicebat. Atque etiam ante hunc *Aristoles* principio Artis Rhetoricæ dicit, illam artem quasi ex altera parte respondere Dialecticæ: ut hoc videlicet differant inter se, quod hæc ratio dicendi latior fit, illa loquendi contractior."[a]

Notwithstanding this near alliance between Rhetoric and the most generally useful of all the Sciences, yet it has been considered by some as a deceitful and pernicious Art, as a mere engine which (they say) was invented only to manage and work upon the disorderly Populace, and insinuate wrong no-

[a] See Cic. Orator 32.

tions

tions of things, moving the paſſions, and thereby miſleading the judgement, and is never to be applied but as Phyſic for unhealthy ſtates. But what is all this to the purpoſe? Is it not ſpeaking againſt the uſe of the Art merely from the abuſe of it? "'Tis indeed much the ſame thing as to declaim againſt Fencing, becauſe a ſkill in that exerciſe may enable us to wield the ſword well, to fight a duel, and run one's antagoniſt through with greater dexterity and eaſe."

The ſame kind of reaſoning (if it can be called reaſoning) will hold quite as well againſt the moſt uſeful thing on earth. There is no Virtue or Science of any ſort which is not capable of miſapplication and abuſe: And who will deny that whatever is moſt perfect in its kind is, when abuſed, productive often of the greateſt miſchief and diſorder? — Hence no weak argument might be drawn in favour of Rhetoric and Eloquence.

True Eloquence, in fact, is nothing more than the Perfection of ſpeaking, and can have no ſure foundation but in good Morals: And its right aim is to root out of the Mind every thing contrary to what is *Fair* and

Good,

Good, to defend Juſtice and Truth, and prevent them from being trampled under foot by the wicked artifices of thoſe who conſult merely their own intereſt and the indulgence of unbridled paſſions. — Malus Homo eſſe non poſſit bonus Orator.

Eloquence is not ſo properly employed in diſcuſſing ſpeculative matters, as in explaining and enforcing the practical ends of Human Life and Moral Action: * Then it aſſumes its proper dignity and character: Nor is there here any neceſſary connexion between moving the paſſions, and miſleading the judgement: For the ends of Truth and Perſuaſion are then eſſentially different when the Orator holds out to the Imagination falſe and fictitious images: In this caſe Falſehood becomes apparent Truth, and Eloquence the inſtrument of deceit; but here it is no hard matter to guard againſt all deception and impoſture: — Yet theſe ends are one and the ſame, when ſuch impreſſions are made on the Imagination and Paſſions, as conſiſt and agree with the dictates of Right Reaſon: In this caſe Eloquence comes in to the aid of Argument,

* See the Eſſays on the Characteriſtics. — See alſo Quint. viii. 3.

and impresses the Truth, which Logic teaches, in a warmer and more effectual manner: It paints Good and Evil in true and glowing colours, and thus inspires us with double ardor to embrace the one, and reject the other.

But so far is Eloquence from being the instrument of deceit, that, on the contrary, the *moral* is much more *natural* and *therefore* likely to be *more successful* than the *immoral* application of it: Because, ere the *dishonest* application can take place, circumstances must be *wrested*, and misrepresentations imposed on the fancy, in opposition to Truth and Reason: Whereas in the *proper* application, nothing further is necessary, than to draw out and impress those images and analogies of things, which *really exist* in Nature.*

We conclude then, that the proper and natural Business of Eloquence is to be subservient to the cause of Truth and Virtue, delineating and recommending only what is good, and manly, and liberal.

But it is foreign to my purpose to go about answering all, or any of the objections

* See the Essays mentioned above.

that

that might be made to this Art: And there is little need of expatiating on its excellence and utility, or of insisting on its being *particularly* necessary to those who are to fill any high or public station in Life; where they shall have frequent occasion to address mankind, and point out to them how the true Happiness of the *Individual* and that of the *Community* at large are *inviolably connected*; — it being their business to enforce Doctrines, and establish Laws which shall conduce to the well being of the *Whole*. *Aristotle*, in the beginning of his Treatise on this subject, has just touched upon such its principal uses and advantages; but what he hath said is, as usual, full of instruction— To him therefore I would refer you.

And this I do the more willingly, because you say you are to follow him *here* as well as in Logic: With regard to these things you cannot be led by so safe and intelligent a guide. It is obvious at once that the RHETORIC of *Aristotle* is the source from whence all succeeding Writers on the subject have derived their materials. The Books of *Cicero* indeed, as one might well expect

from ſo fine a genius, are written with great elegance and propriety, and are certainly to be recommended for ſeveral reaſons; but yet whatever ſcientific knowledge of the ſubject they diſcover, we find it all in this little Tractate of the *Stagirite*, and here it is expreſſed in a more accurate and compact manner, and more according to ſcience. *Cicero* was himſelf an Orator: *Ariſtotle* a Philoſopher.

Quintilian again is very far from being an indifferent Writer; but as a *Critic* he is to be compared to *Ariſtotle* (this is an obſervation of ſome of the ableſt Judges) juſt as much as the *Philippics* of *Cicero* are to be compared to thoſe of *Demoſthenes*. It has indeed been alledged, in *praiſe* of *Quintilian*, that "no Author ever adorned a ſcientifical Treatiſe with ſo many beautiful metaphors as he has done:" Is not this the very circumſtance which is moſt faulty in this, and a tribe of other Critics? Are matters of Philoſophy and abſtruſe Science to be diſcuſſed in a ſtyle belonging to the Poet, or the Orator? Surely not.

Next to *Quintilian* we may very properly mention *Longinus*: His ſtyle, like that of the

the former, is blameable, being too florid and ſhowy: This they both learned, it is probable, in the Schools of Declamation which were ſo frequent in their time. He ſpeaks of *Homer*, of *Demoſthenes*, and of *Cicero*, in a moſt figurative and pompous way, as if wiſhing to rival thoſe great men in their own diſtinct Arts. "It is plain, that his imagination was lively and vigorous, and the opinions he delivers are penetrating and juſt, but he has not ſhown a capacity for that rational and ſober Inquiry which is eſſential to all PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM."[a]

Notwithſtanding the *comparative* inferiority of theſe ingenious Writers, they may be read with great pleaſure and advantage: The matter is always good and valuable: Only care ſhould be taken, leſt by amuſing the Fancy they tend to form an unjuſt Taſte, and give a wrong turn to the diſcriminating Powers of the Mind. Now the reverſe of this is ſure to take place in reading *Ariſtotle*: It is his peculiar excellence, at the ſame time that he improves the Judgement, to

[a] See *Philological Inquiries*, p. 10, &c.

correct and regulate the Imagination—This consideration is of no ſmall importance.

Ariſtotle is likewiſe remarkable for that clear arrangement and comprehenſive brevity which we ſeek for in vain in other Authors. If we read him with thought and attention (and it will be of no avail to read him otherwiſe) we ſhall always find him meaning a great deal more than what he ſays, and well acquainted with the nature and powers of Human Intellect; each Chapter, eſpecially thoſe in the beginning of his Second Book on the ſubject now under conſideration, diſcovering very deep penetration into the receſſes of the heart, and a thorough knowledge of life and manners; and exhibiting, at the ſame time, admirable examples in the ſound analytical way of reaſoning. You muſt not, however, look for any thing more in him, than the genuine and elementary Principles of the Art, founded in Nature, and analyſed with perſpicuity and good ſenſe: The application of them is (as it ought to be) left entirely to your own judgement: And if you wiſh to be able to apply them with any ſort of ſuc-

ceſs,

ceſs, look up to the great examples of *Demoſthenes* and *Cicero*:—imbibe ſomething of their ſpirit, ſomething of their manner of compoſing; but this can never be done, even in any degree, without their almoſt incredible induſtry and reſolution.

But I abſtain from ſaying any thing more. The mind, we know, is pleaſed with making its own remarks, and retains ſuch with greater care and ſafety. I will therefore only obſerve, that in this Treatiſe he is not ſo deficient in point of Compoſition, as in that upon Logic, the ſubject being different: His periods are rather ſmooth and well turned, and his ſtyle always correct, and not ſeldom elegant even, and ſomewhat ornamental. Farewell.

LETTER

LETTER XXI.

HAVING already hinted at the true nature and proper buſineſs of Eloquence, and having withal endeavoured to confirm your opinion reſpecting the Author who has beſt explained its firſt Principles, it may be worth our while to conſider in few words (though without pretending to treat the matter philoſophically) at what *period*, and in what *ſoil* and *climate*, theſe Principles were *moſt* cultivated and applied with *greateſt* ſucceſs.

Eloquence, or the Power of Perſuading, is eſſential to, and therefore coeval with, Society. For ſome rays of Eloquence, however faint and obſcure, muſt have appeared, as ſoon as men began to mix and converſe with each other.[a] But it is not to be ſuppoſed that they gave any ſort of attention to it, or improved it in the leaſt, before they found themſelves free from violence and furniſhed with the neceſſaries of life.

[a] See *Cic. de Oratore*, i. 8.—See also *Quintil.* iii. 2.

Of

Of what nature Eloquence was originally it is no hard matter to conjecture: Every kind of Compoſition was, at firſt, highly poetical: Thus *Strabo*[a] informs us, that the moſt ancient Writing approached, all of it, very near to the ſtyle of Poetry—We muſt neceſſarily conclude, that the firſt ſpecies of Eloquence was alſo of this complexion—But thoſe, who afterwards cultivated the ſpeaking and writing Arts, diſſolved indeed the meaſure, but preſerved at the ſame time whatever elſe was poetical——Such were [b]*Cadmus the Mileſian*, and *Pherecydes*, and *Hecataeus*, and their Scholars: Ειτα οι ὕστερον, αφαιρουντες αει τι των τοιουτων, εις το νυν ειδος κατηγαγον, ὡς αν απο ὕψους τινος.

But when Eloquence in the earlieſt times was decked in the ſplendid language of Poetry, we are by no means to conſider it as then regularly formed into an Art. It is ſaid to have made its *firſt* appearance under

[a] Lib. I. towards the beginning.—*Caſaubon* obſerves upon the place: Ergo, ex ſententia *Strabonis*, antiquiſſimi quique ſcriptores proximè ad ſtylum Poetarum accedunt: Quod profecto verum eſt.—Ac mihi quidem perſæpe *Herodotum* cum lego, *Homerum* aliquem videor legere; quem tamen *M. Tullius* (Orat. 12. & 55.) ait ſolutum omnibus legibus fluere—Sed de his non eſt hîc agendi locus.

[b] See *Strabo* as before.—Theſe are ſuppoſed to have lived near 600 years before *Chriſt*.

this

this shape among the *Sicilians*, who, as *Cicero* quotes from *Aristotle*,[a] being naturally a keen and litigious people, and upon an expulsion of their tyrants standing in need of eloquent pleading in order to recover their private property, thus became the first Inventors of an *Art* and *Rules* for speaking. And this Invention is attributed to (one knows not whom) two persons named *Tisias* and *Corax*: These were soon succeeded by *Gorgias Leontinus*,[b] to whom indeed some give the honour of having *invented* the Art of Rhetoric—But he is generally considered little more than a vain and disputing Sophist.

In *Sicily*, however, it does not seem to have arrived at any degree of Perfection: Here, it is true, Rhetoric was first taught and invented, and men were made conversant in disputation; but among the *Sicilians* we hear nothing of the GREAT and SUBLIME in Eloquence: Nor are we to look for this in any other place than the *Grecian*

[a] See *Cic.* Brutus, 12.—And *Arist.* De Rhetor, in the beginning. See also *Cic.* De Orat. I. 20. with other Parts of his Works—And, if you please, *Quintil.* iii. 1.

[b] He was born about 500 Years before the Christian Era, and lived 109 years.

Republics:

Republics: "Hoc autem ſtudium non erat *commune Græciæ*, ſed *proprium* ATHENARUM." For who would expect to find it under the rigid Diſcipline eſtabliſhed at *Lacedæmon*, or who under the Ariſtocracy of *Corinth?* But in *Athens*, "*the Mother of Arts and Eloquence*," the ſoil was adapted to its nature and favourable to its growth. Though this celebrated City, "*the Eye of Greece*," was the common place of reſort, where Philoſophers and great men met from all quarters to paſs *ſome part* at leaſt of their lives in the cultivation of the *Fair* and *Good*, and where their mutual aſſiſtances and emulation muſt have wonderfully contributed to the rapid advancement of all the branches of Literature, yet this Art even *here* would not, I am perſuaded, have reached ſo high a pitch of perfection, had not the form of Government been *Democratical:* Hence Eloquence became the great inſtrument whereby to arrive at the firſt Dignities in the State—And hence all the Powers of the Soul were awakened and rouſed to action.

Many of the other Sciences and fine Arts have flouriſhed under different forms of Go-

[a] See *Cic.* Brutus, 13.

vernment;

vernment; but Eloquence, like the Sensitive Plant, contracts itself and ceases to display its beauties on the slightest touch from the hand of Oppression, or despotic Power. Nor can we indeed find it, I mean that *sublime* sort which *glows* through the pages of *Demosthenes* and *Cicero*, showing itself in any limited Monarchy, or the best established Oligarchy: So that "Public Freedom itself can give it no considerable play, where that Freedom has any other basis, than what is founded on a Democracy." It is upon this principle therefore, and not (as *Mr. Hume*[a] alledges) from a *neglect* of the Art, that we are chiefly to account for the difference between modern Eloquence and that which prevailed during the free state of *Athens* and of *Rome*. Then the Orators gave their labours gratis to the People, and the People repaid them with the Honours and Preferments, which they had the power to bestow: This was a wise and happy Constitution, where by a necessary connexion between Virtue and Honour, they served mutually to produce and perpe-

[a] See his Essay on Eloquence.

tuate

tuate each other; where the reward of Honours excited Merit, and Merit never failed to procure Honours —— the only Policy which can make a Nation great and prosperous.[a]

As the kind of Oratory practised by the *Greeks* and *Romans*, cannot subsist or even take root but under a *free*, *democratic* Government; so it has arisen to highest Perfection in times of *war* and *disturbance*. Had not *Attica* and its fair Metropolis been invaded, and in danger of being destroyed by *Xerxes*, the *Spartans*, and the one-eyed King of *Macedonia*, we should not, it is probable, have heard *so much* of the fame of *Themistocles*, and *Pericles*, and *Demosthenes*—

Those Ancient! whose resistless Eloquence
Wielded at will that fierce Democracy;—
Shook th' Arsenal,—and fulmin'd over Greece
To Macedon *and* Artaxerxes' *Throne.*[b]

Rhodes too was a place where Oratory was in great repute and cultivated not without

[a] See *Middleton's Life of Cicero*, Vol. I. Sect. 2.

[b] Par. Reg. IV. 265.

success,

ſucceſs, having of all the neighbouring Iſlands leaſt of the redundancy of the *Aſiatic* manner, and approaching neareſt to the purity of the *Athenian*—" *Rhodii* ſaniores, et *Atticorum* ſimiliores :[a]" But the Civil Conſtitution here was purely democratical, and the Public Affairs were often in as tempeſtuous and fluctuating a ſtate as the Sea which ſurrounded it.—If, again, we come down to *Rome*, we ſhall find that the moſt ſpirited Orations of *Cicero* were delivered during the troubles occaſioned by the bloody deſigns of *Catiline*, and the fraud and rapacity of *Verres*. " It is only great occaſions that give room for great exertions, and call forth great abilities."

But to ſupport this opinion, which ſome indeed have endeavoured to controvert, it is not neceſſary to adduce any arguments: Fact and Experience have more force than any argument whatſoever; and theſe prove the matter beyond a doubt.

Having ſaid ſo much, though in a general way, of the *riſe* and *progreſs* of Eloquence; you may perhaps expect that I ſhould take ſome notice of its *decline*: But there is not

[a] See *Cic.* Brutus, 13.

room

room here to enter on a ſubject ſo extenſive: Adviſing you therefore to inveſtigate this matter yourſelf, and referring you for information to that admirable DIALOGUE, affixed to the Works of *Tacitus*, "De Cauſis Corruptæ Eloquentiæ," I would only obſerve that the three *principal* cauſes ſeem to have been: — I. That enervated, though ſweet and pleaſant ſort of Eloquence firſt introduced into *Athens* by the learned *Demetrius Phalereus*,[a] and which was afterwards much imitated there. II. The Schools of Declamation. III. The Changes which took place in their Government, and which were immediately followed by a *diminution*, and at length by a *total loſs* of LIBERTY.

[a] See *Cic.* Brutus, 9. — See alſo *Dionyſius* of *Halicarnaſſus*, *De Oratoribus Antiquis*, — the beginning.

LETTER

LETTER XXI. Continued.

TO paſs over to thoſe who made the moſt conſiderable figure in this Art; and to take a curſory review of them.

Here it will be neceſſary to look back, even as far as the old Sophiſt *Gorgias Leontinus*. When he firſt introduced the Art of Rhetoric into *Athens*, his antitheſes and other artificial forms of ſpeech were then held in high eſtimation. Some improvement was made on *Gorgias* by his Contemporary *Antiphon*, who, as well as a Rhetorician, is alſo reckoned one of the Ten Orators of *Athens*;[a] and becauſe of his mild and elegant way of expreſſing himſelf, he had the ſurname of *Neſtor* given him: Indeed his talent in this reſpect was ſo great, that he profeſſed to cure perſons of grief and melancholy merely by his manner of ſpeaking to them: But not likely to make his fortune in this way, he applied himſelf to Rhetoric and left behind him a Treatiſe on the different forms

[a] See *Plutarch's Account of the Ten Orators.*

of

of ſpeech, and containing rules and precepts about the rhetorical Art: This was the firſt thing of the kind, and was held in no little repute.

Much about the ſame time lived *Andocides*: He too is placed among the Ten Orators, and was remarkable for a plain, unornamented way of ſpeaking.

Theſe, however, had a great deal more of the Sophiſt and Rhetorician than of the Orator: And as they are to be conſidered *ſomewhat* behind *Themiſtocles* in point of *time*, ſo are they *very much ſo* in point of *merit*—*He* is the firſt Orator of whom we read any thing extraordinary: He lived in times of confuſion and of danger; and was no leſs eminent for his oratorial powers, than his great ſkill and abilities in directing the affairs of War and all kind of State-Buſineſs.

Pericles, who comes next in ſucceſſion, was the firſt who joined the ſtudy of Philoſophy to that of Eloquence,[a] and he was alſo the firſt Orator in *Athens* that delivered *premeditated* and *written* Speeches, thoſe before

[a] See Cic. Brutus 11.

him using to speak off hand — δεινὸς τρόπος γραφῆναι λόγον εν δικαστηρίῳ εστι, των πρὸ εμοῦ φιλοσοφούντων.[a] A plain proof of the superior excellence of this way, provided it be done with proper address; for hardly any one's Eloquence is said to have been more powerful than that of *Pericles*: The Poets are loud in his praises: *Eupolis* says of him — That PERSUASION perched on his lips, and that he alone of all the Orators left behind a sting in those who heard him:[b] — And *Aristophanes* — That he lightened — thundered — put all *Greece* in confusion:[c] — "Hujus suavitate maximè hilaratæ sunt *Athenæ*; hujus ubertatem et copiam admiratæ, ejusdem vim dicendi terroremque timuerunt: *Hæc* igitur ætas *prima Athenis* Oratorem *prope perfectum* tulit:"[d] And this superiority *Socrates* attributes (and so does *Cicero* after him) to his having studied under the Philosopher *Anaxagoras*, and

[a] See *Suidas*, *under Pericles*.

[b] ——— πρὸς δὲ γ' αυ τυτῳ ταχ' ἡ
ΠΕΙΘΩ τις εστιν αθανατος τοισι χειλεσιν,
Οὕτως ἀκριβὴς, και μονος των ῥητόρων
Το κεντρον εγκαταλειπει τοις ακροωμενοις.

[c] Ηγρεπτ' — εβροντα — ξυνεκυκα την Ελλαδα.

[d] See Cic. Brutus 11.

his

his being able thereby to derive assistance from different parts of Literature.[a] There seem to have been some of his Orations extant in *Cicero*'s time;[b] but unfortunately they are now no more.

Contemporary with him was the eloquent Historian *Thucydides*. It still remains a doubt whether he is to be reckoned among the Orators: *Cicero* is decidedly against it: *Thucydides* res gestas et bella narrat et prælia, graviter sane, et probe: Sed nihil ab eo transferri potest ad forensem usum, et publicum. Ipsæ illæ Conciones *ita multas habent obscuras abditasque sententias, vix ut intelligantur*; quod est in Oratione civili vitium *vel maximum*. Quæ est autem in hominibus tanta perversitas, ut, inventis frugibus, glande vescantur? An victus hominum, *Atheniensium* beneficio excoli potuit, oratio non potuit? Quis porro unquam *Græcorum* Rhetorum a *Thucydide* quidquam duxit? At laudatus est ab omnibus: Fateor:—sed ita ut rerum explicator prudens, severus, gravis; non ut in judiciis versaret causas, sed ut in historiis

[a] See *Plato's Phædrus, and Cicero's Orator.*

[b] See Cic. De Oratore II. 22.—See also *Brutus* 7.

bella narraret. Itaque *nunquam est numeratus Orator*.[a]—But *Suidas* obſerves: That as *Thucydides* excelled others in moſt things relating to State-Affairs both as a Counſellor and a General, ſo alſo καλλει λογων.[b] Many Moderns are of the ſame opinion. For my own part I agree entirely with *Cicero*—But read him over carefully yourſelf, and form your own judgement upon him.

About thirty or forty years after[c] flouriſhed thoſe famous Teachers of Rhetoric, *Lyſias* and *Iſocrates*: Nor yet were they contemptible Orators, though little converſant in Public Buſineſs: Their Orations were chiefly made for others to deliver, or to ſerve as models for the uſe and inſtruction of their Scholars—En *Græciæ* quidem Oratorum *partus* atque *fontes* vides, ad noſtrorum annalium rationem veteres; ad ipſorum, ſane recentes.[d] *Lyſias* is ſaid to have delivered but one Speech in Public, and that at the *Olympic* Games.[e] And *Iſocrates*, it is thought, never

[a] See Cic. Orator 9. [b] See *Suidas*, under *Thucydides*.

[c] That is—about 400 years before Chriſt.

[d] See Cic. Brutus 8—12—and 13.

[e] See *Plutarch*'s Account of the Ten Orators.

ſpoke

ſpoke oftener.—[a] "Huic *Hyperides* proximus, et *Æſchines* fuit, et *Iſæus*, et *Lycurgus*, et *Dinarchus*, et is, cujus nulla extant ſcripta, [b] *Demades, aliique plures*: Hæc enim ætas effudit *hanc copiam*; et, ut opinio mea fert, *ſuccus ille* et *ſanguis incorruptus* uſque ad hanc ætatem oratorum fuit, in quâ *naturalis* ineſſet, non *fucatus nitor*."

But in *Eloquence* the Palm was not *at once* obtained, as it was in *Poetry* by *Homer*: "Nam plane quidem *perfectum, et cui nihil admodum deſit*, *Demoſthenem* facile dixeris: Nihil acute inveniri potuit in eis cauſis, quas ſcripſit, nihil (ut ita dicam) ſubdole, nihil verſute, quod ille non viderit; nihil ſubtiliter dici, nihil preſſe, nihil enucleate, quo fieri poſſit aliquid limatius: Nihil contra grande, nihil incitatum, nihil ornatum vel

[a] See Cic. Brutus 9. Underſtand *proximus* here with reſpect to *time*, and not as it is to be underſtood in the place quoted, with reſpect to *rank*, or *merit*—And yet they are not here placed in the exacteſt order—However, they all lived in the ſame Century.

[b] The Works of three of the others, as well as thoſe of *Demades*, are now *entirely* loſt: Thoſe of *Hyperides* were extant as late as the Ninth Century; for *Photius*, Patriarch of *Conſtantinople*, kept a journal of the Authors he peruſed, amongſt which was *Hyperides* the *Athenian* Orator. See Philological Inquiries, p. iii. ch. iv.

verborum gravitate vel sententiarum, quo quidquam esset elatius."[a] Thus then, in the opinion of the best judges, this great man excelled all that had been before him, and, we may add, all that came after: Indeed *Cicero* seems to be the only one that can in any respect deserve to be compared with him: But *Cicero* when placed by his side will ever appear to disadvantage. *Homer* was not greater in the Poetical Art, than *Demosthenes* in that of the Orator: His Compositions are a standing proof of the wonderful capacity of the Human Mind, when diligently improved and when roused with honest emulation and the glorious love of Liberty: Those who are best able to judge of them, readily acknowledge that of all human productions these approach nearest to perfection.[b] *Æschines* did not hesitate to attribute his own ruin and disgrace, less to the method with which his adversary knit together and wound up his Oration, than to the manner in which *the wild beast roared*

[a] See Cic. as before.

[b] See *Lord Monboddo's Origin and Progress of Language — on the Composition of Demosthenes.*

it

it out.[a] Now here one ſhould think *Æſchines* was an able and impartial judge.

Permit me to take my leave of you at preſent with a ſhort digreſſion. I am ſenſible that *general* Criticiſm is not ſo ſatisfactory as to enter into *particulars*. But I have, as much as poſſible, purpoſely abſtained from ſaying any thing on the *particular* merits of this or that Author, wiſhing only to make you exert your own faculties. Nor would I have you by any means conſult ſuch books as profeſs to make this their buſineſs: Many there are of the kind; and though moſt of them are written without taſte and without correctneſs, yet they may tend to bias your judgement. *Read the Ancients themſelves, but read them with care:* And as you go through each, having deliberately made up your mind upon the ſubject, ſuppoſe you draw a ſhort delineation of his literary character —— This would at leaſt

[a] *Æſchines*, on his being baniſhed from *Athens*, retired to *Rhodes*, where he opened a School of Oratory; and having read aloud his antagoniſt's Oration on the famous conteſt between them, *De Coronâ*, aſked his Scholars what they thought of it: They replied it was great—it was admirable: Whereupon *Æſchines* is ſaid to have added: Τι δε, ει αυτου τον θηριον τα αυτου ρημαλα βοωντος ακηκοειτε;—See *Pliny's Epiſtles*.

teach

teach you to read with due attention: It will alſo accuſtom you to reflect and think for yourſelf, and to form a ſtyle for conveying thoſe reflexions. "Juſtneſs of thought, as well as refinement in language, and manners, and good breeding of every kind can, it is well known, be only the effect of proper culture, and *repeated trial* and *experience*."—Communicate your ſentiments to ſome friend. Were I thought worthy of that honour, I ſhould not at firſt expect any thing *finiſhed* or *unexceptionable*: *Uſe* and *Habit* is almoſt every thing. And ſhould I happen to ſee matters in a *different* light, I would readily give you my opinion, *ſuch as it is*, with candour and with freedom. Perhaps you would find me, as *Boileau* expreſſes it well:

Cenſeur un peu facheux, mais ſouvent neceſſaire,
Plus enclin à blâmer, que ſçavant à bienfaire.

LETTER XXI. Continued.

TO come back to our ſubject.—In the elegant Treatiſe quoted ſo often, I mean *Cicero's De Claris Oratoribus*, which is commonly called *Brutus*, you will find a fuller, though perhaps not the moſt *regular* and *compact* account, of the point under conſideration; together with a minuter liſt of thoſe among the *Greeks* who had any claim to be ſtiled Orators: With regard to the Eloquence of his own Country and thoſe who excelled in it, I refer you there altogether: Except what he himſelf has left us, we ſhould have had little to enable us to form an opinion in this particular: And indeed it is chiefly owing to him that the very names of the *Roman* Orators are at all known to us.—Let what has been ſaid excite you to acquire an *accurate* knowledge of this matter.

But

But to conceive any notion of Ancient Eloquence itself, you must read in the original the Orations of *Demosthenes*: Nor can you surely want motives to read those Compositions which the ingenious *Greeks* ran from all quarters to listen to: His rival *Cicero* says, with equal truth and generosity, "non modò ita memoriæ proditum esse, sed ita *necesse* fuisse, cum *Demosthenes* dicturus esset, ut concursus, audiendi causa, ex *tota Græcia* fierent:"[a] Neither can you read them at a more *seasonable* time; for it was these *Aristotle* had before him in drawing up his RHETORIC: They are therefore the best Commentary upon that Treatise of his, and the most agreeable in the world: And his Treatise again will enable you to see their excellence and structure with greater nicety and with better judgement. —— Many of *Cicero*'s also are truly great and sublime.

Besides the pleasure, and the improvement with regard to forming a good style and the being used to practical modes of reasoning, with the other advantages to be derived from

[a] See *Brutus*, 84.

a judi-

a judicious perusal of the Ancient Orators, we find in them many anecdotes and historical facts, which perhaps have no where else been recorded — at least no where with so much *elegance* and *exactness*: Nor is there any danger of seeing them misrepresented; being such, for the most part, as relate to the acts and characters of persons then living, and spoken before an audience, that was generally as well acquainted with them as the Orator himself, and therefore not to be imposed upon: Accordingly our great Countryman observes; "Orationes sane virorum prudentium, de negotiis et causis gravibus habitæ, tum ad *rerum ipsarum notitiam*, tum ad *eloquentiam* multum valent."[a]

But to step a little aside once more, and to conclude this Letter. — Whatever relates to Sacred Scripture I hold in high veneration, and never wish to speak of it but with all the reverence it deserves: Now though they contain passages of the *most beautiful, and sublimest kind*, yet we should always remember that these Writings, having a far

[a] De Augmen. Scient. Lib. II.

nobler

nobler end in view, never meddle in the least degree with the affairs of human Literature: And, moreover, all those who know what the unbiassed Principles of Reason are, and who have investigated the subject, and the Nature of man with *fairness*, and *diligence*, and *ability*, must, I think, be necessarily convinced, that the Writings in question contain a Revelation of the Will of the Author of that Nature, and are proposed in a manner admirably well adapted to it considered under a *general* view: It would be therefore a very *foolish*, if not an *impious* thing, to judge or speak of them according to the *fluctuating precepts* and *vague speculations* of a *few mere literary* men:—In this place, nevertheless, I cannot help taking notice of *Paul* of *Tarsus*, whom *Longinus* reckons among the famous Orators:[a] And is it not with justice? Nay—as a Logician too, he may be safely compared with the most subtle reasoner of Antiquity—And to a man of thought and observation it would be needless to point out the apparent Wisdom of selecting this Apos-

[a] See a *Fragment of Longinus*.

tle

tle at that particular crisis of the wonderful scheme of Christianity—To testify the truth of what has been just said, we might adduce the whole of his writings and his conduct; but witness, more particularly, his Epistle to the *Romans*, and that pathetic and persuasive one to his friend *Philemon*: In the *former* we see all the *closeness* and *subtlety* of *Aristotle*: in the *latter* all the *pathos* of *Demosthenes*, or, rather perhaps I should have said, all the *unstudied*, *unaffected* Eloquence of the admirable *Socrates*:[a] Read over this little Epistle with attention: consider the circumstances relating to it: observe the simplicity, the strength, which the

[a] Among the principal Orators of *Athens* should have been reckoned the admirable *Socrates*: He did not indeed make use of any rhetorical and artificial embellishments: Of such borrowed ornaments he did not want the assistance: His Eloquence was like his Life, both totally free from Art: His Address to those base men, his Judges, as it is recorded by *Plato* and *Xenophon*, is plain and affecting, and sublime, highly characteristic of the man, and in my mind more persuasive than a *Philippic* of *Demosthenes*: Perhaps, indeed, it would be easier to learn to speak like *Demosthenes*, than like *Socrates*—Is, qui omnium eruditorum testimonio, totiusque judicio *Græciæ*, cum prudentia, & acumine, & venustate, & subtilitate, tum vero eloquentia, varietate, copia, quam se cunque in partem dedisset, *omnium fuit facile princeps*. Cic. De Orat. III. 16.

argument

argument carries along with it: in short, judge of the whole, if you please, by any *sober* Laws of Criticism, and I will maintain that you never read a finer, or a more perfect piece of Oratory. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

LETTER XXII.

I AM wonderfully pleased with your last Letter, as it informs me of your intending to pass this short Vacation at my little *Villa*. Being convinced that in making me this visit you act (as you always do) on a noble and exalted principle, the principle of True Friendship, I am under no apprehension that my frugal plan of living will be at all disagreeable to you. However, to form some notion how you are likely to spend the ensuing month, see a full account of the manner in which I

pass

pass my days: Should you think it tedious and abounding with *Egotism*, remember (though we never gain by it) how naturally fond we all are of talking of ourselves —— What we are all then so liable to should be considered with great candour.

The little Village where I am Curate, often puts me in mind of the flourishing state of *Goldsmith's* AUBURN, which he has celebrated in one of the best Descriptive Poems in our language. The House I live in is not large, but neat and convenient; the neighbourhood social, genteel, and sensible; and my salary, though small, yet sufficient to exist upon — *Importuna tamen Pauperies abest*. You are not ignorant that my mother and sister live along with me: They are what I may call *Liberal Oeconomists*.

Thus retired, I endeavour to discharge the duties of my Profession with all possible fidelity. Religion (we are told) is too generally considered as matter of little moment, and is greatly refined in this our age: — It therefore gives me much comfort to see that my little Flock, allowing for the unimproved state of the understanding of most

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of them, have a good notion of the aim, and nature, and importance of Chriſtianity, and endeavour to live according to its precepts. I contrive to make each family, how poor and obſcure ſoever, a ſhort viſit once a week: And in theſe viſits, though I take care that my behaviour ſhall be ſuch as to command the reſpect due to their Paſtor, it is beſt to put off all unneceſſary forms, and endeavour in the way of converſation to bring in ſomething pertinent and uſeful. This I conſider as part of my duty, and for that reaſon I feel no ſmall ſatisfaction in diſcharging it:—beſides, the good people love and revere me—and to a reaſonable man is not this alone ſatisfaction enough?

This takes up but a little portion of my time: The reſt is employed between reading, bodily exerciſe, and the ſociety of a few friends.

The little Learning I gleaned up, when in College, I now find of the greateſt conſequence, as it enables me to proſecute my ſtudies with pleaſure and improvement. A well written Book is a moſt precious article in one's *Viaticum* through life; and ſhould

we

we not pity the man, whatever honours or riches he may have, who has not the convenience or the capacity of enjoying it?—Indeed to a young perſon, who in the Univerſity has acquired little more than habits of idleneſs and intemperance, the being thus ſecluded as it were from the world muſt certainly be one of the moſt irkſome things on earth. The ſports of the field, without a mixture of that *pure* and *ſolid* pleaſure which ariſes from properly exerting the faculties of the Intellect, will ſoon loſe all their zeſt—all their novelty. The correct *Boileau* has the ſame truth with more elegance—Take it in his words:

— Je ne trouve point de fatigue ſi rude,
Que l'ennuyeux loiſir d'un mortel ſans etude.

Three or four hours therefore in the morning, and from ten to eleven at night, are ſpent in ſome ſerious and regular courſe of ſtudy, in arming myſelf with ſtrength of mind and reflexion ſufficient to regulate my life, and ſupport me in every ſituation of it. And the evenings I divide for the moſt part (unleſs when I write a long Letter to

Eugenio) between reading ſome agreeable Moraliſt or Hiſtorian to my little Family, and contending at our favourite games of Piquet, or Backgammon, or the nobler one of Cheſs—How ſweet "to rock the cradle of repoſing age!"

"But a too ſtudious and ſedentary life is productive of lowſpiritedneſs, and tends of courſe to impair one's Health and Good Humour:" True:—Hence then one is induced to take one's gun or fiſhing-rod, and attended by truſty *Ranger* paſs away an hour now and then among the fields in refreſhing the mind and exerciſing the body; thus avoiding thoſe many inconveniences which a dull and torpid inactivity brings along with it: And in theſe excurſions I am generally fortunate enough to meet with ſomething to make a ſmall diſh for my table; for a Perch, or a Partridge, with a good joint of meat, is almoſt all the dinner you are to expect.——

Form'd on the Samian *Schools or thoſe of* Ind,
There are who think theſe paſtimes ſcarce humane;
Yet in my mind (and not relentleſs *I)*
His life is pure that wears no fouler ſtains.[a]

[a] Art of Preſerving Health.

I would

I would not have you mistake me in this matter. He indeed, especially in my line of life, that minds little more than shooting, or hunting, or dancing, or any other such trifling occupation, is deservedly neglected and despised — There is a very wide difference between using a thing by way of amusement and making it the principal object of one's pursuit —— the widest imaginable.

What also furnishes me Exercise is the care and cultivation of my little Garden: This I take entirely upon myself. I cannot afford, nor perhaps would I chuse, to employ a man on purpose. And here I make a point to endeavour to excel my neighbours in the neatness of laying out my ground and in the delicacy of my fruit — Is it not laudable, *Eugenio*, even in such trifles, and especially in things of higher moment, whilst we act perfectly consistent with Virtue, unstood in its most extensive sense, to attend to that well known line of the noble *Grecian*?

Αιεν αριςευειν, και ὑπειροχον εμμεναι αλλων.*

'Tis thus I *exercise* and *amuse* myself.

* Il. ζ. 208.

But there is no living without Society, and ſenſible Converſation: This alone can teach us how to apply properly the knowledge we acquire in ſolitude, poliſhes our manners and enlivens the ſcenes of a retired life: An opportunity of enjoying theſe pleaſures and advantages is afforded me at our excellent neighbour's, *Philoxenus*. Here one is always ſure to meet with genteel and rational company. Having been formerly engaged in a public and honourable capacity, his connexions are numerous, and among perſons of Diſtinction, as well as of Senſe and Merit. I long to introduce you to this worthy man. He loves and encourages whatever is great and amiable in Human Nature.—He is a *ſincere* Chriſtian, and a *profound* and *elegant* Scholar—and what can a man be more? I never read the character, which *Pliny* * draws of his friend *Titus Ariſto*, without thinking of *Philoxenus*: The latter indeed is in ſome reſpects (and I ſpeak with all impartiality) ſuperior to the brave *Roman*; but that ſuperiority he derives altogether from his Religion. He

* See *Pliny's Epiſtles*, I. 22.

is,

is, in ſhort, among many others, a living proof that *True Chriſtianity* and *True Philoſophy* may meet in one and the ſame perſon; ſo that they are by no means, as ſome bold men have ſuggeſted, inconſiſtent things — Far otherwiſe.

A few other friends I have of conſiderable value. Though but a Poor Curate, I take care to behave with proper reſerve towards coxcombs, and all narrow-hearted people; and can, thank God, look down both on their ſmiles and ſupercilious airs with all poſſible indifference. — I hate and deteſt the leveling-principle, as unnatural and abſurd — But be *thoſe* alſo far from me who can pride themſelves *merely* on being of this or that order of men, of this or that ſituation in life. Than aſſociate with ſuch, give me rather the friendſhip of one like *Philoxenus*, and let me enjoy it far from the haunts of theſe men. Their Wiſdom, be it what it will, has not made them truly wiſe. Their thoughts and notions, however ſpecious, are illiberal all of them, and ſhallow, and vain. *Mere* birth, *mere* money, *mere* any thing, except VIRTUE and

LEARNING, can give no man living any *real dignity*.

When we meet together, we do all we can to promote innocent mirth and cheerfulness. Some indeed suppose that this is not compatible with true Religion. These men have their opinion: We have our's: But as that is totally different, we exclude every thing of the *surly* kind, and admit nothing but *Good Humour*, and *Temperance*, and *Candour*, and *Universal Benevolence*, and *manly Politeness*.

—— *Purâ sed libertate loquendi*
Seria quisque jocis nullâ formidine miscet.[*]

Thus we find Conversation a most agreeable and instructive exercise, tending to give ease to the whole conduct, and to our language elegance and propriety.

Should any of my *rich* neighbours, as the country people call them, come and dine with me, I never make much alteration in my dinner: They know my income, and did I live beyond it, they would *despise* and *avoid* me. They come, like yourself, from

[*] Claudian De Laudibus Stiliconis, Lib. II.

motives

motives of *Friendſhip*; and not in that ſtarched, formal, and moſt inſipid way which is ſo common in modern times.— They live, it is true, in a different manner: I too, had I the means, would probably on ſuch occaſions enlarge my plan, but ſtill ſo as to conduct things with *Oeconomy*, *Simplicity*, *Temperance*; without which it is not to live — But the means are wanting: Neque tamen ego invideo aliis bonum, quo ipſe careo; ſed contra, ſenſum quendam voluptatemque percipio, ſi ea, quæ mihi denegantur, amicis video ſupereſſe.[a]

I am ſenſible that Philoſophers will tell you, that he who enjoys Health and a bare ſubſiſtance, enjoys enough; that ſuch gewgaws, as riches, conduce not to the real Happineſs of man; and ſo forth. Conſidered merely as riches, no man on earth can admit their aſſertion in a more extenſive ſenſe than myſelf; but conſidered as the means of doing good, of living with comfort and ſatisfaction, it muſt be allowed, on the other hand, that they then become

[a] See *Pliny's Epiſtles*, I. 10. He had no buſineſs to ſay— Neque enim ego, ut *multi*, invideo—*Pliny* had a good deal of pride and vanity in him.

no

no improper object of desire even to a *Philosopher*.

Hæc perinde sunt, ut illius animus, qui ea possidet:

Qui uti scit, ei bona; illi, qui non utitur rectè, mala.[a]

But by no means do I say that the man, who has inward Peace of mind, who has universal Benevolence in his heart, and can think with pleasure on his life and death, is in any situation an object of pity, or contempt. Quite the reverse—*He* and *he alone* is the truly happy—the truly great man.—How sweetly does your favourite and most correct Author express my notion!

FORTUNA, *sævo læta negotio, et*
Ludum insolentem ludere pertinax,
Transmutat incertos honores,
Nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna:—
Laudo manentem;—si celeres quatit
Pennas, resigno quæ dedit, et mea
Virtute me involvo, probamque
Pauperiem sine dote quæro.[b]

[a] Ter. Heauton. A. I. Sc. 2. [b] Lib. III. 29.

But

But to return.

It is thus, my friend, I live. If you can relish this sort of life, hasten to our humble dwelling. We anticipate the pleasure of endeavouring to make things agreeable to you. Between the Harpsichord, rural diversions, visiting our worthy neighbours, engaging in friendly Conversation, or in the *scientific* game of Chess, we shall, I hope, prevent the hours from appearing very dull and insipid. *Plays*, or *Balls*, or *Operas*, or any other public entertainment, here we have none——

At secura quies, et nescia fallere vita,
Dives opum variarum;—at latis otia fundis,
Speluncæ, vivique lacus;—at frigida Tempe,
Mugitusque boum, mollesque sub arbore somni,—
NON ABSUNT—

LETTER

LETTER XXIII.

YOU may be ſure I was no inattentive obſerver of your manners and conduct whilſt you were among us. Should I now ſit down and inform you of whatever appeared to me a little aukward in them, I know you would readily forgive me, and conſider it rather as a proof of my ſincerity. Conſcious indeed of many weakneſſes and failings in myſelf, I ſhould not probably be ſo ready to *commend* where I did not meet with *ſomething* to *blame*; nor, on the other hand, ever take notice of little blemiſhes, was I not convinced that your praiſe-worthy qualifications are by far more numerous—I wiſh to have you arrive as near *perfection* as poſſible — And this, perhaps, made me obſerve you with leſs than common candour, and (according to the vulgar phraſe) make a mountain of a mole-hill.

Nothing is more certain, and no obſervation has been more frequently made, than that

that Learning, and even Virtue itſelf, unaccompanied with true manly Politeneſs, loſe much of the dignity and amiableneſs naturally belonging to them. The mere bookworm can, I allow, derive much pleaſure from his extenſive reading; and the Heart of the truly good man is an Aſylum whereunto he can always retreat and find comfort. But as Good Breeding is by no means inconſiſtent with Virtue and Knowledge, and tends to excite in others a deſire of practiſing and attaining theſe valuable acquiſitions, it therefore becomes highly worthy of our attention: And he who is poſſeſſed of it, together with Wiſdom and Integrity of Mind, is the man that can be ſaid to *enjoy* life; being at eaſe with himſelf, and giving eaſe and ſatisfaction to all around him.

But this Politeneſs does not, as I apprehend, conſiſt in being able to make fine ſpeeches or a faſhionable bow—in knowing how to wear a pleaſing ſmile—or in any other of thoſe *apiſh geſticulations* and *deceitful diſtortions* which the World is apt to conſider as the *Paragon* of Good Manners. The Politeneſs I mean is of *another* ſort. It is nothing

nothing more nor leſs than a *deſire of pleaſing, refined* and *improved* by *Education* and *Converſe* in the *World*, but *proceeding* from *Benevolence* and *Uprightneſs of heart*. The Principles of it are given us by Nature, or acquired by Philoſophy: Theſe I know you have in a high degree; but to give them all the poliſh and luſtre, of which they are capable, you are not now in the proper School: This is to be done only by a free intercourſe with genteel, ſenſible, and mixt Company.

It is to your being excluded from this I attribute your exceſſive unwillingneſs to give your opinion upon any ſubject before you were previouſly acquainted with that of other perſons. No doubt all of us ſhould be cautious and reſerved in this reſpect, and young men more eſpecially—modeſty and diffidence being our greateſt ornaments: And it ſhould be our care rather, to take hints from the Converſation of others, adding thus to our ſtock of knowledge, than be forward to diſplay the little we may have acquired.

All this is certainly true: But at the ſame time there is a wide difference between a

becoming

becoming aſſurance and a childiſh baſhfulneſs: It is only "free communication and debate that opens and enlarges the mind, and improves the underſtanding — without this there is a dull ſtagnation of the intellectual faculties."

For the ſake then of their own improvement not only with regard to what is polite and decent, but alſo with a view of acquiring ready habits of reaſoning and inveſtigation, young men, particularly when aſked, ſhould frankly deliver their own genuine ſentiments; free however from all kind of affectation, and that ridiculous deſire of mimicking *the Great* and *the Wiſe*, to which Youth is ſo liable, as well as from the ſilly ambition of appearing otherwiſe than they really are. But when engaged in debate, one ſhould be diffident and conciſe as to the arguments we uſe, and ſhould learn to "acquieſce and ſubmit to Truth as ſoon as we are convinced of it, whether by our Antagoniſt's reaſoning, or upon a better conſideration of our own." This is always a ſure proof of a great mind.—I have no notion, ſaid a moſt amiable and learned man, of differing

fering from worthy persons, living or dead, for the sake of *singularity* or of *contradiction*, in which I can discern no charms, and neither pleasure nor profit.[a] Well would it be, did we all but strive to imitate his example.

Some persons, with respect to these matters, have a happy knack at asking a few pertinent questions, so as to induce people to speak on those topics with which they have reason to think them best acquainted: Of such topics, however, they themselves should not be entirely ignorant. And thus they polish their own minds by rubbing them, as it were, upon those of others — To the same purpose *Bacon* says elegantly: "Prudens Interrogatio est quasi dimidium Scientiæ. Rectè siquidem *Plato*:[b] Qui aliquid quærit, id ipsum, quod quærit, generali quadam notione comprehendit; aliter, quî fieri potest, ut illud, cum fuerit inventum, agnoscat?[c]" But beware of those who are influenced only by motives of idle curiosity, or of seeing your temper and the

[a] *Dr. Jortin* — See *his Remarks on Eccles. Hist.* II. 2.

[b] *In Menone.*

[c] *De Augment. Scient.* V. 3.

depth

depth of your knowledge—All ſuch are infallibly either tale-bearers, or troubled with a dark, invidious ſpirit.

I ſhall take notice of but one thing more; and that is the uneaſineſs and perplexity which to a keen eye was ſometimes obſervable in your mode of addreſs. Where this is glaring, the greateſt abilities become an object of indifference and neglect, ſometimes of contempt. However odd the aſſertion may appear to cool Reaſon, yet Experience every day ſhows the truth of it: "That he who is able to accommodate himſelf to the innocent pleaſures and humours of mankind, and is accompliſhed in all the graces of behaviour, will, with ſuperficial talents, prove generally more ſucceſsful in life, than the man, who, without theſe ſecondary qualifications, has the genius and learning of *Dante*, or of *Bentley*, or even of the immortal Author of *Hudibras*." So true is *Boileau*'s obſervation:

C'eſt peu d'etre agreable et charmant dans un livre;
Il faut ſçavoir encore et converſer et vivre.

The

The Ladies particularly, in whose opinion easy, agreeable fellows are the only great men, the only Philosophers, will not readily overlook this defect. But sensible as we are that every Lady has not the learning of *Madame Dacier*, nor yet the wit and poignancy of *Ninon de l'Enclos*, there is only need of little spirit and confidence, and this aukwardness would soon disappear. It originates, for the most part, from timidity. Perhaps the only good end of frequenting female company, is to acquire a becoming and liberal address, to refine the manners, to sweeten the disposition, diverting the mind from the cares, the business, and the vexations of life, and to unbend it with cheerfulness and vivacity: Now this cannot be obtained without entering into a *free* and *easy* Conversation, of which decent unconstraint is the very *life* and *grace*.

I say no more. Nor do I send you these hints with any other view than just to remind you, that, trifling as such things may appear, it is necessary, nevertheless, to give some attention to them; and then every little foible of this sort will gradually wear away of itself.

Having

Having in your present tranquil and studious retirement laid in a stock of sound Knowledge, you will be able to appear in the world with singular advantage; and I have no kind of doubt but you will soon discover in Conversation that delicacy and discernment which arise from an acquaintance with Polite Letters, and in your dealings with mankind, that dignity, and probity, and punctuality, which are the natural result of Sound Philosophy.

I shall address this to you in College, where I hope it will find you safe arrived, and busy in digesting and applying the Principles of Rhetoric, which undoubtedly demand more study and attention than those of Politeness —The *Muses* are to be first of all attended to: The *Graces* follow after: They are most agreeable companions: *United*; they form the *instructive, humane, genteel* friend, whose *Erudition* ever *improves* one, whose *Politeness* is ever *pleasing*:—*Separated*; they may communicate a *temporary*, but no *lasting* or *general* satisfaction——But I have done. Farewell.

LETTER XXIV.

IN whatever light we consider each others characters, it will be always more pleasing to a heart of common honesty to point out what is amiable and praise-worthy, than such things as are of a different nature: I am therefore quite impatient to send you a few more remarks which bear some relation to the subject of my last.—Do you ask why I did not communicate these things by word of mouth?—I answer, that as you have promised to keep these Letters by you, you may perhaps, when you have nothing else to do, occasionally read them over. I only wish they might furnish you with some useful hints. Of this, however, I am certain, that they will never do you harm.—And besides, somebody has observed—That to praise people to their face, as it is nothing less than to tax them with Vanity, so likewise a man must have patient ears to hear himself censured in the same open manner:—

ner:—But by communicating one's thoughts on paper, there is time to reflect that the perſon who hazards to offend another, not with views to his own, but that other's advantage, gives the ſureſt proof of Love, and Eſteem, and Friendſhip.——But of this enough.

The defect or two (if they can be called ſuch) which I have already pointed out to you, had no other origin than the want of a decent ſhare of confidence. It was with great pleaſure I diſcovered in you nothing of that *Falſe* Modeſty which leads aſtray and corrupts many a youthful Mind. Obſerve all thoſe of licentious lives among you, (for even that Seminary of Virtue and Learning is not without its Libertines) and you will perceive that in general they are chiefly actuated by this weak and vicious principle. "It is not ſo much the Paſſions that firſt ſeduce us, as a bad Example," and the want of that reſpect and reverence which every one of us owes to himſelf. Where this reverence is not found, nothing is more certain than that *there* the tranſition to vice, folly, low-breeding, and infamy of every kind, is always extremely eaſy.

The hard thing is, to be able to acquire that conduct which ſhall preſerve dignity and decorum, without any mixture of haughtineſs, or blameable compliance: If we deviate on the one hand, we are ſure to be contemned and ridiculed for our pride, or inſolence, or ſingularity; — if on the other, to be deſpiſed for want of a manly ſpirit, and the poor opinion we entertain of our own worth and character. The line therefore which runs between theſe two Extremes ſhould be our clue. But perhaps it is not ſo eaſy to point it out, as to diſtinguiſh it by your own obſervation. What gives me pleaſure is to find that you *have* diſcovered it, and that by adhering to it you are becoming wiſe without oſtentation, and without incurring either the hatred or the envy of men of ſenſe—on the contrary, all *ſuch* will reſpect and encourage you.

The mere Fop indeed, or the Libertine, would have you ſuppoſe that he conſiders you as an object of contempt, and thinks himſelf a much ſuperior man. As long as he keeps within the bounds of Good Breeding, let him enjoy his fanciful and ſhort-

lived

lived pleasure, unenvied and undisturbed. But believe me he acts the hypocrite; for Virtue and Manly Sense will never cease to be universally revered —— It is what the greatest Fool will admire, though he has not the spirit to attain to it:

Knaves fain would laugh at it; some great ones dare;
But at his heart, the most undaunted son
Of Fortune dreads its name and awful charms.[a]

To this then I attribute that Sweetness of Disposition, and that general Decency of conduct which were so distinguishable in you — And hence too proceed your correct notions respecting Morality and Religion.

Be not astonished that the importance of this subject never induced me to speak of it before; I purposely avoided it: I am sensible that the advice of parents or guardians, on such subjects particularly, is for the most part attributed to the peevishness or garrulity of age, and for *that very reason* is but seldom regarded: And, though expostulations properly timed and conveyed are useful and

[a] The Art of Preserving Health.

neceſſary, yet here it is much the ſame when a friend expoſtulates. But let a man, when he knows how to think, conſider this matter and his own nature fairly and honeſtly, and with diligence and deliberation—That is the only way—True and Genuine Virtue, like Genuine Knowledge, is not to be learnt as a thing by rote, not "to be poured into the Mind, like water into a ciſtern, that paſſively waits to receive all that comes;"—nor yet is it to be acquired from contemplating its lovelineſs in the animated deſcriptions of Poets, or Moraliſts, or Philoſophers; but there muſt be an *exertion* of the *intellectual faculties*, and an immediate perception of its worth and excellence.

There is not certainly a vice which is more ſhocking in itſelf, or forebodes worſe conſequences, than that faſhionable levity and contemptuous irreverence in which Religion is ſo generally conſidered. This in truth is the natural conſequence of that effeminate and falſe kind of pleaſure, which originates from a fooliſh and unmanly compliance with weak, thoughtleſs, unprincipled Examples. Cheerfulneſs is always pleaſing:

Even

Even the levity and innocent ſallies of Youth have, *when properly timed*, ſomething amiable in them: But when ſuch a Religion, as that recorded by the Four Evangeliſts, becomes the object of ridicule or neglect, here Candour itſelf cannot furniſh the mereſt ſhadow of an excuſe. A little reflexion ſurely would make every man conſider this weak and illiberal practice with juſt abhorrence—" But reflexion is not the characteriſtic of Youth"—True—Yet, at the ſame time, is not a *total* want of it the characteriſtic of a brute, an ideot, or the mere ſottiſh and worthleſs debauchee? Let me here ſubjoin the pointed words of a great man: "A beaſt without Reaſon (ſays he) is a much more honourable Creature than a beaſt with Reaſon."

" Singularity, as has been well obſerved by the *Adventurer*, is in its own nature diſpleaſing: But yet there are occaſions on which it is noble to dare to ſtand alone: To be pious among Infidels, to be diſintereſted in a time of general venality, to lead a life of Virtue and Reaſon in the midſt of Senſualiſts, is a proof of a Mind intent on nobler things than the praiſe or blame of

men,

men, of a ſoul fixt in the contemplation of the higheſt Good, and ſuperior to the tyranny of cuſtom and example."

But in writing to you, ſhould I not aſk pardon for dwelling ſo long on this ſubject? For I have good reaſon to hope that you will not only ſteer wide of all folly in this reſpect, but that your general conduct will be of eſſential ſervice to the cauſe of Virtue, making it appear that neither levity nor moroſeneſs, nor auſterity, nor merely exhauſted paſſions are the proper companions of Virtue and True Religion: And this no doubt is of much higher conſequence than to be barely a Scholar, or a man of Science of any kind; inaſmuch as to *act* well is of infinitely higher moment than the ability of *writing* or *ſpeaking* well—" Hanc ampliſſimam omnium Artium, bene vivendi Diſciplinam, vitâ magis, quàm litteris perſequere."[a]

Obſerve then the ſum of the whole: Virtue with the True Religion for its proper baſis, and Learning, and Politeneſs are abſolutely neceſſary to form the character of the Compleat Gentleman: That theſe valu-

[a] See *Cic. Tuſcul. Quæſt.* IV. 3.

able

able accomplishments are uniting themselves in you I have little room to doubt: It is an union which softens all the anxieties of life: It gives relish to all present enjoyments: It discloses future ones to view. Who then would not undergo some pains, and assume some courage to make such an acquisition? My dear *Eugenio*, persevere to tread in this honour able, this upright, this liberal path— Depend upon it, it will conduct you to real Happiness and Glory: But in the mean while forget not to pay as frequent a visit as you can to him who loves you with all the affection of a brother——

Tecum etenim longos memini consumere soles,
Et tecum primas epulis decerpere noctes:
Unum opus, et requiem pariter disponimus ambo,
Atque verecundâ laxamus seria mensâ:
Non equidem hoc dubites, amborum fœdere certo
Consentire dies, et ab uno sidere duci.[a]

[a] Persius. V. 41.

LETTER

LETTER XXV.

THE other day my valuable neighbour *Philoxenus* related to me the following Story: It happened within his memory and under his own immediate obſervation: He alſo adviſed me to write it down for your peruſal; adding, with a benevolent ſmile;— "Trifling as it ſeems, I know our young friend will apply it to his own advantage: And it may ſerve to temper thoſe grave Lectures in Philoſophy which, I am perſuaded, he daily ſtudies"—Take it then, in ſubſtance, juſt as I had it from his own mouth.

Antonio was the only ſon of a worthy Clergyman. In perſon he was elegant and well made. And from his countenance, which was now beginning to glow with ſentimental life and expreſſion, you might ſoon diſcover that his mind was the ſeat of Innocence and Contentment—*Antonio* was the Picture of Happineſs.

In

In his Eighteenth Year, the age alluded to, he was ſent to the Univerſity; being well prepared for the reception of Knowledge, and juſt able to perceive its end and importance. During the firſt year he purſued his ſtudies with ſuch ſteadineſs and regularity, as made his friends have good reaſon to hope that in time he would be an honour to the Profeſſion he was intended for, and a comfort to all around him. But, when placed in *man*, what are our hopes — our beſt expectations?

When a twelvemonth had almoſt expired, he was invited to paſs the Long Vacation with his father's brother. His Uncle lived in a village near TOWN, univerſally beloved for his Virtues, and univerſally reſpected for his Erudition. In the ſame neighbourhood lived a Gentleman, whoſe Eſtate, though large, was yet inadequate to his expences; He lived in a gay ſtyle, and excelled in almoſt all the genteel but ſuperficial accompliſhments of the times —— His children had imbibed his notions, and imitated his example.

Of this Gentleman the fair *Louiſa* was the ſecond daughter. Though born of unexceptionable

exceptionable parentage, and poſſeſſed of many both of the perſonal and mental excellencies of *Fielding*'s SOPHIA; yet all this did not procure her many ſuitors: — for *Louiſa* had lofty notions, but no fortune.

You have already concluded that the paſſionate and inexperienced heart of *Antonio* was ſoon affected by being near the influence of charms ſo powerful. The affection was mutual. Nothing however could be more unfortunate to each, or leſs promiſing of comfort and felicity. But inſtead of oppoſing the firſt attack of the "*Belle Paſſion*," and breaking its force by dividing it into deſires of different kinds, he ſuffered himſelf to be captivated thereby, and was ſoon *totally* reduced to its mercy.

Meanwhile he is obliged to go back to College; having no doubt vowed eternal conſtancy and fixed on a plan of correſpondence. This he took care not to neglect. How indeed could he have neglected it, for it became the only thing which engroſſed his attention? He was now altogether unfit for that ſort of application and that active

exertion

exertion of the intellectual faculties, whereby alone ſound Knowledge is to be acquired.

Of courſe thoſe Monuments of Ancient Wiſdom and Magnanimity, (the *Greek* and *Latin* Claſſics I mean) which a few months before he had begun to inveſtigate with ſo much eagerneſs and reſolution, were now permitted to lie in his *Study* unmoleſted and unexplored —

—The Mind
Diſſolv'd in female tenderneſs, forgets
Each manly Virtue, and grows dead to Fame.

In ſhort, he became remiſs and heedleſs about every ſerious purſuit, ſo as to neglect the neceſſary Exerciſes of the College, and conſequently incur frequent Impoſitions: One of which happened to ſuit his preſent turn of mind: Idleneſs was his theſis: The Compoſition to be either in Proſe or Verſe. As it is ſhort, and there being ſomething pretty and ingenious in it, I will here inſert it.

An

An ODE to IDLENESS.

GODDESS *of* EASE! *leave* Lethe's *brink,*
Obſequious to my Muſe, and me:
For once endure the pain to think,
O ſweet Inſenſibility!
Parent of Eaſe and Indolence!
Bring Muſe, bring numbers ſoft and ſlow,--
Elaborately void of ſenſe; —
Then ſweetly thoughtleſs let them flow.

II.

Near to ſome cowſlip-painted mead,
O let me doſe away dull hours!
And under me let Flora *ſpread,*
A ſopha of her ſweeteſt flow'rs.
And, Philomel, *thy notes O breathe!*
Forth from behind the neighb'ring pine;
Where murmurs from the ſtream beneath
Shall flow in uniſon with thine.

* See this Ode ſet to Muſic by *Dr. Boyce.*

For

III.

For Thee, O IDLENESS! *the woes*
Of Life we patiently endure:
Thou art the ſource whence Labour flows; —
We ſhun thee but to make thee ſure:
For who'd endure War's toil or waſte?
Or who th' hoarſe thund'ring of the Sea?
But to be idle at the laſt,
And find a pleaſing end in Thee.

After having trifled away two whole years in building caſtles in the air and forming imaginary ſchemes of Happineſs, all his chimerical expectations were daſhed at once. *Louiſa*—the fair and fickle *Louiſa*—is ſuddenly married to another! One, as much inferior to *Antonio* in the endowments belonging to the Head and Heart, as he was his ſuperior in thoſe of Fortune.

Something *ſimilar* to this is the fate of all ſuch *early* and *puerile* attachments. They are the creatures of a warm imagination, cheriſhed by ſtrong paſſions, and ending for the

the most part in vexation, disgust, or disappointment.

Ninon de l'Enclos understood matters of this kind better than most people: She has an observation very pertinent to the point in question: "We are foolish enough (says she) on our first entrance into life, to conceive the highest felicity to consist in mutual love: We then suppose this passion to be founded on esteem, sustained by the acknowledgement of every amiable quality, refined by the most perfect delicacy of sentiment; and finally corroborated by the reciprocal confidence and unrestrained overflowings of two fond, chaste, and faithful hearts, now melted into one: But unfortunately this image flies from us, like an *Utopian* dream, whenever we try to fold it in our embrace: We are soon undeceived, and yet generally too late."

It was indeed too late for poor *Antonio!*—Calamities far more grievous were the natural consequence of this idle attachment.

Having for some time pensively reflected on this frivolous affair, he became weary and dissatisfied with himself; and from hence to a disgust

a diſguſt with whatever is *Great* and *Honourable* the tranſition is eaſy, and almoſt imperceptible. Every thing becomes a burden to us, and the whole concludes with ſinking gradually into a ſad Miſanthropy, or licentious Diſſipation. Here it ended in the latter. Behold the once virtuous, the humane, the modeſt *Antonio* ſunk into the moſt abandoned Libertiniſm!

To be brief. He betook himſelf to *London* — His expences greatly exceeded his income. Penury, Diſgrace, and Miſery in various ſhapes oppreſs him: At laſt he falls a victim to the intemperance of his life: a melancholy proof — "That Love of all the Paſſions, when indulged *too early* and carried into *extravagance* and *exceſs*, neceſſarily occaſions the greateſt diſorder, the greateſt miſchief, and infelicity."

LETTER XXVI.

ELOQUENCE and Poetry have been always considered so nearly allied, that an excellency in the one implies a capacity for the other; the same qualities being essential to them both — a sprightly fancy, fertile invention, flowing and numerous diction.* And whoever would study them with greatest pleasure and advantage, should study them as closely connected and joined together; taking the Poetical Art immediately after that of the Orator. Having then finished, so much to your own and your Tutor's satisfaction, whatever relates to Rhetoric and Ancient Eloquence, it is with singular propriety you pass on to the study of Poetry.

Now I am glad to find that you have already carefully perused the two inimitable Poems of *Homer*: To these next in merit, though not in time, succeed the *Greek* Tra-

* See *Middleton's Life of Cicero: Sect.* xii.

gedies;

gedies: You therefore do well in purposing to set about them without delay: Indeed there is a particular reason for your reading these admirable Compositions just at this period; — for, being about to be lectured in *Aristotle's* POETICS, you could not possibly understand that Philosophical Treatise without a competent knowledge of this higher sort of Poetry. For in drawing up his Book on the Art of Rhetoric, as he was there chiefly guided by the Orations of *Demosthenes*; so in like manner the rules and precepts in his POETICS are founded altogether on Principles derived from *Homer* and the Tragic Poets — But suppose we take our leave of him for a moment, and say a word or two of the Art itself.

Is it necessary to observe that Poetry is productive of most innocent, most constant, and the sublimest kind of *delight*? No man of common sense and common feeling has ever called this in question: And to go about proving it would be much the same as to make a Theorem of the plainest Axiom of *Euclid*, and then proceed to show the truth of it in a regular demonstration. Whatever has been said of Learning in general, of its

tendency to *polish*, to *enliven*, and *recreate* the Mind, may perhaps be more particularly applied to all Good Poetry, the sort of Poetry I here mean. How thankful then should we be to INDULGENT NATURE, — though she has ordained that TRUTH shall be placed at some distance from us, but has given us withal an irresistible desire to inquire after it, which Inquiry at the same time is to be attended with *labour* and *much trouble*, — yes, nevertheless, how thankful should we be to her for having kindly provided this, and the other fine Arts, to *relieve* and *amuse* us, encouraging us in our pursuit, and rendering it *less difficult* as well as *less tedious!*

But this is not all. Good Poetry tends also to *improve us in Virtue* — to *invigorate* and *confirm* every *liberal* and *manly* notion.

A just taste in the elegant Arts has great affinity and connexion with the moral taste. Both of them discover what is right and what is wrong. Fashion, temper, and education have an influence to vitiate both, or to preserve them pure and untainted; neither of them are arbitrary nor local, being implanted in Human Nature, and governed by

Principles

Principles common to all men.* Should it be ſaid that a correct and virtuous turn of Mind is to be acquired rather and improved from ſtudying the Sciences, ſtill it muſt be allowed that the liberal Arts, and above all others that of Poetry, aſſiſt very much in giving it that quickneſs, and all that elegance and delicacy, which enables it to exert itſelf, on every occaſion, with *becoming dignity* and *propriety*. — But ſurely it does more.

The Poems of *Homer* in particular are replete with moral and uſeful leſſons of every kind, expreſſed and inculcated with all poſſible ſweetneſs and ſimplicity. The attending properly to ſuch Poetry as his cannot fail of helping to *refine* and *regulate* the *paſſions*, to *root out* of the mind whatever is *baſe* or *illiberal*; to impreſs it with a proper ſenſe of the *Fair* and *Good* — to *call forth*, in ſhort, all the *manly* and *generous* ſentiments belonging to our Nature. Hence the civilized States of *Greece* almoſt *adored* this extraordinary man — and indeed he deſerved adoration more than any of their popular divinities. Hence they repeated his Works, and liſtened

* See *Lord Kaimes's Elements of Criticiſm — the Introduction.*

to the recital of them, with raptures bordering on enthusiasm — And for all this I can readily excuse them; nay, I admire their taste, and applaud their sensibility —

Aimez donc ses écrits, mais d'une amour sincere:
C'est avoir profité que de sçavoir s'y plaire.[a]

On the same principle also they encouraged the Tragic Poets. You will see at once that these abound in moral precepts, and short, pithy reflexions, studying how to catch every opportunity to bring them in, and always placing them in the most striking point of view — *Euripides* is so remarkable in this respect, that they used to call him *the Philosopher of the Stage*. Deservedly then were those who woo'd the Tragic Muse, and brought to perfection this sublimest sort of Poetry, to be considered at that time, —

——————— *Teachers best*
Of Moral Prudence, with delight receiv'd
In brief sententious precepts, while they treat
Of fate, and chance, and change in human life;
High Actions and high Passions best describing.[b]

[a] *Boileau's Art of Poetry — Chant Troisieme.* [b] P. Reg. IV. 259.

And

And even *Plato* (whose objections to the Art seem as imaginary and unreal as the Republic whereinto he would not admit it) allows that *Lyric* Poetry tends to ennoble the Human Mind, infusing into it good and great sentiments, and is useful in matters of Religion — Χρυσεα φορμιγξ.

— τον ευχμαστων χαραγων σεβεννας
Ασιαδ' πυρος —

But it is not my intention, at present, to take notice of the several kinds of Poetical Compositions: Nor indeed is it necessary to do this; to show that all Good Poetry has chiefly in view to exhibit the native loveliness of Virtue, recommending whatever is great and amiable, and exposing to contempt and ridicule every species of vice and folly: And here the Poet is more likely to succeed than either the Philosopher or Historian: The reason is common and obvious: For no scientific or simple account of manners or of actions and events, can be half so forcible, as a just and animated imitation of them: — Now in imitating these properly consists the great excellence of Poetry.

* See *Pindar* — *Pyth.* 1.

" Adeo

"Adeo ut (to sum up the whole with high authority) Poesis ista non solum ad *delectationem*, sed etiam ad animi *magnitudinem* et ad *mores* conferat: Quare et merito etiam *divinitatis* cujuspiam particeps videri possit, quia *animum erigit* et in *sublime rapit*; rerum simulachra ad animi desideria accommodando, non animum rebus (quod Ratio facit et Historia) submittendo."[a] Again: *Strabo* says that those of old used to consider Poetry — φιλοσοφιαν τινα πρωταν — Οι δ' ημετεροι (he adds in the strain of an enthusiast) ϗ μονον Ποιητην σφαρον εναι τον σοφον.[b] And the severe *Stagirite* allows it to be something more *philosophical* than History, something of greater *weight* and *dignity* — φιλοσοφωτερον ϗ σπουδαιοτερον Ποιησις Ιστοριας εστιν. — as being conversant about things of more general application — as being at liberty to represent them in a nobler and more scientific order, and capable of expressing and inforcing them with superior energy. —

[a] See Bacon, de Augment. Scien. II. 13. — The whole Chapter is well worth the reading.

[b] Lib. I. towards the beginning. See the Context — You will find there an elegant and a pretty long Eulogium on this fine Art.

[c] See his *Poetics* — VII. VIII. &c.

Nec

Nec magis expressi vultus per ahenea signa,
Quam per Vatis opus mores animique virorum
Clarorum apparent.[a]

So much then, in a cursory way, of the pleasure and improvement to be derived from the Art.

LETTER XXVI. Continued.

ONE word, by way of digression, with regard to the method of *reading* Poetry: Here it may not be amiss to attend to *Quintilian*'s admonition: He says it should be done so as to resemble neither prose nor singing: "Sit autem imprimis (these are his words) lectio virilis, et cum suavitate quadam gravis: et non quidem prosæ similis; quia carmen est, et se Poetæ canere testantur: non tamen in canticum dissoluta, nec psalmate (ut nunc a plerisque fit) effœminata."[b]

[a] Hor. Lib. II. Ep. I. 248. [b] See Quintil. 1. 8.

Though

Though it is probable that the ancient Poets, and Orators even, delivered their Compositions in a manner bordering rather on the latter — somewhat similar perhaps to our recitative-way, the variation of the numbers here as well as in Music being meant to express and move the passions; yet when we read any of them, we should incline more towards plain prose: It is not indeed possible that we should in the least resemble the *Greeks* and *Romans* in reading their Works, for we read them according to the accents of our own Language; and all know that the accents in *English* differ widely from those of the Ancients: "Their accents were real notes of Music, or variations of the tone, by which the voice is raised higher, with respect to musical modulation, upon one syllable of a word than upon another; and were entirely distinct from what we call the quantity of the syllable."*

In perusing the Poetry of the Ancients, therefore, we know nothing of that delightful and harmonious Music — nothing of the Ρυθμος, the Μελος, the Μετρον, which to them

* See a very able and full Account of this matter in *Origin and Progress of Language*, Vol. II.

appeared

appeared in the composition itself, and in the manner of reading it, and we cannot of course derive from it half as much pleasure as they did. However, we should as often as possible read such their productions audibly, and with suitable elevations and depressions of the voice: We shall thus more freely enter into the spirit of the author's style and manner, and of consequence see his meaning with greater force, and all the imagery and nicer delicacies of composition; There is still a stronger reason for doing this, if an eminent Poet and Physician[a] is not mistaken: He advises you —

To read aloud resounding Homer's *strain,*
And wield the thunder of Demosthenes —
The chest so exercis'd improves its strength;
And quick vibrations thro' the bowels drive
The restless blood, which in unactive days
Would loiter else through unelastick tubes.

But to return to *Aristotle,* and to conclude this Letter.

[a] Dr. Armstrong — See his elegant Poem — *The Art of Preserving Health,* IV. 73. See also the lines which follow those quoted.

In

"In order to understand and relish the beauties of Poetry, and reap all the advantages to be derived from it, one should know what good Poetry is, and be qualified to judge of its merit with truth and precision. To enable us to do this the more surely is the great end of reading *Aristotle*'s POETICS. No doubt the merit of genuine works of Art stands on a foundation *antecedent* and *superior* to all *critical* authority. And all the Books that have been written upon the subject of any Art have been formed from the practice of the Art already invented, not the Art from the Books."[a] This is plainly the case with regard to the Treatise now before us: Perhaps there is nothing in it, which was not well known to every good Poet of that age, except the Philosophical Principles on which *Aristotle* has founded the Poetical Art. But it must be allowed, on all hands, that without a competent knowledge of these Principles, it would be much the same for us to attempt to estimate and determine the merit of good Poetry, *Homer*'s for example, as it must be for a mere smatterer in the *Greek* Grammar to judge of and criticize his Lan-

[a] See *Origin and Progress of Language*, Vol. II.

guage.

guage.—It is not then *to be made a Poet*, but *to be able to understand thoroughly* the Poet's Art, that you read this Philosophical Tractate. But not to incroach on another's province.

It is scarce necessary to observe that this little Work is imperfect. This will appear without any other proofs (for other proofs there are) than from comparing the first and last sentences of what is come down to us:[a] He sets out with an intention of investigating the Principles of Poetry in general, and concludes the Fragment with only having considered those of Tragedy and Epic Poetry.

Though we have reason to lament the loss of his observations on Comedy (for he has here but just taken notice of it) and on the several kinds of *Lyric* Poetry, yet we should congratulate ourselves that this precious monument of Ancient Wisdom has escaped the destroying hand of Time — Fortunately for us it contains the two noblest branches of this noble Art. Imperfect and mangled as it is, 'tis a portion of Criticism not unworthy of its Author; executed with

[a] See also the beginning of his Sixth Chapter.

all

all possible brevity and exactness, and containing in almost every sentence of it some truth of weighty moment: So that you must not run over any part hastily, but read the whole with all the attention you found necessary for understanding his Treatises on Logic and Rhetoric. There is evidently a very intimate connexion between the subjects of these Three Books, Logic being the proper foundation of the other two, and Rhetoric holding a middle place between it and Poetry—Their being then thus connected, they will tend to interpret and elucidate each other.

For as you have already perused those his Tractates, and being pretty well acquainted with his method and way of reasoning, you come to this little Work with great advantage. There will be no need of consulting the Commentators. There is indeed a passage or two a little difficult from the corruption of the text; but these your Tutor, and not the Commentators, will best explain, if they are capable of explanation.

Upon the whole: Get *Burgess*'s ingenious Edition of *Burton*'s PENTALOGIA: Read over those Tragedies with attention; and, if you

you are so disposed, read over again *Horace's Art of Poetry* — this indeed is nothing more than a collection of precepts made out of *Aristotle*, and delivered in easy, elegant, and harmonious Verse. As you are acquainted with the language, you may also read, at a leisure hour, *Boileau* on the same subject. He has laid down, after *Horace's* manner,[a] all the leading rules of the Art with much taste and classical elegance. *Vida* is not without merit, but will not bear to be compared with those just mentioned.—But (I say it again) let the *Greek* Tragedians be principally attended to. Having once read *Homer*, I am persuaded you will be acquainted with him more and more — Whatever is SUBLIME and BEAUTIFUL in this Art, or in any other with which it is intimately connected, we find it *all* in that divine Bard — "Whose POEM *Phœbus* challenged for his own."

Thus prepared, you will be sufficiently able to understand the POETICS; and that will teach you the true nature, and wherein consists the excellence of GOOD POETRY. Farewell.

[a] He tells you, towards the End, that he was principally guided by *Horace*.

LETTER

LETTER XXVII.

I AM far from thinking myſelf equal to the taſk of writing a proper Hiſtory of the *Greek* and *Latin* Poetry. The ſuccinct account, therefore, which I am now going to ſend you, is only meant to give you ſome general notion of its riſe and progreſs. And I ſhould be happy, if from hence you were excited to employ ſome of your future leiſure in inquiring into the origin of this beautiful Art, and its ſubſequent revolutions, after a manner more exact and philoſophical. Nor are ſuch Inveſtigations, in my opinion, barely entertaining; for to obſerve the gradual expanſion, and exertions of the Human Mind, in whatever line, and upon whatever ſubject they are diſplayed, cannot ſurely be leſs productive of *inſtruction* than of the moſt *rational kind of pleaſure.*

The invention of the Sciences in general, and of thoſe Arts which were ſuggeſted by Neceſſity to relieve the immediate wants of mankind,

mankind, is on all hands attributed to the ancient *Egyptians*. It may be ſaid indeed that theſe Arts muſt have been *every where* practiſed, in ſome rude way, ſoon after men began to enter into and cultivate Society: Be it ſo: *Egypt*, however, was the country where they firſt aſſumed any regular form, and arrived at any high degree of perfection. And as they were gradually advancing towards perfection, their principles were inveſtigated, new diſcoveries were made, and of courſe additional improvements neceſſarily took place.—Hence was firſt excited a thirſt after Knowledge; and hence the Sciences derived their origin.

The *Egyptians* were naturally, even to a proverb, of a moroſe and melancholy diſpoſition. It is not probable, therefore, that thoſe Arts, whoſe chief aim it is to unbend the Mind and furniſh it with elegant amuſement, were at all encouraged amongſt them, or held in any great repute. Accordingly we have no good authority to ſay that Painting, Muſic, and Poetry, ever appeared in any flouriſhing condition in *Egypt*. Some indeed have ſaid that there the men were forbidden by law to play on any muſical inſtrument,

it being considered by the surly and rigid *Egyptian* as tending to effeminacy and the corruption of Good Morals.

Greece then, tho' she received the Sciences and some of the Arts from *Egypt*, was not in like manner indebted for her *Poetry* — nor yet to *Phenicia* or any other Part of the East; from whence, notwithstanding, we readily acknowledge the *Greeks* to have derived no small share of their civilization. In short, we may venture to say that the Poetry of *Greece* was not, like the other parts of her Philosophy, an *exotic* plant; but, like the Language in which it glows, was as it were purely αυτοχθων: and, like the Mythology which furnished it with such a multitude of fine images, we are to consider it as originating from the Ingenuity and Creative Fancy of the *Grecian* People, perpetually contemplating the smiling and variegated scenes of their own country.

It would, perhaps, be no hard matter for the Philosophic Mind to trace the gradual progress and improvements of the Sciences, and the *necessary* Arts, and mark the causes which gave them birth: But it is not so with regard to those of the *liberal* kind:

The

The origin of these, though of a much later date, is yet more difficult to be determined; it being inveloped, for the most part, in fable and obscurity, and arising probably from mere chance. Those, however, which we commonly call *mimetic*, are in general derived from *natural* causes—viz. From that love of imitation which is inherent in man;—from his great superiority in this respect over all other animals;—and from the pleasure he enjoys in indulging this propensity and in contemplating the effects of its indulgence. It is from hence that *Aristotle* derives the origin of Poetry.[a]

But of the particular time it began to be cultivated as an Art he does not make any mention: Neither has he, nor any other

[a] See the Poetics, IV. This opinion, however, has been ingeniously disputed by some who would consider pure original Poetry to be only the language of strong Passions, expressed in exact measure, with forcible accents and significant words. See *Sir W. Jones's Essay on the Arts commonly called Imitative*—Perhaps indeed the first Poetry was not less the effect of the vehement operation of the several Passions upon the Mind, than of that propensity to imitation which is natural to man, and in which he so much excells all other animals given this way; both these causes seeming to unite in producing the effect—Here a field for speculating opens before you. Investigate the subject, and settle the dispute.

writer on Ancient Poetry, given us any regular account of its gradual advancement from its perfect ſtate to that of its maturity and ſplendor; the few anecdotes, which lie ſcattered here and there concerning it, ſerving rather to awaken one's curioſity, than afford any ſatisfactory information.

However in the dark we may be reſpecting the exact Period when Poetry firſt appeared in *Greece*, and how little ſoever it may contribute to relieve the wants and weakneſſes of man, (to which it is likely we owe almoſt every very early invention) it is certain, nevertheleſs, that its origin bears claim to very high antiquity. The firſt Compoſitions of every kind are generally allowed to have been made in a ſort of numerous or poetical ſtrain; — for, there ſeeming to be a congenial relation between the ſenſes, which Nature hath given us, and the cadence and melody of Verſe, the Memory is much more retentive of what is committed to it in that way, than in any other. Hence it came paſs that Legiſlators and Philoſophers in the earlieſt times adopted Poetry as the great medium of in-

ſtruction:

ſtruction: And hence the wonderful effects, heightened no doubt by fable and tradition, which are attributed to the numbers of *Orpheus*, *Linus*, and *Amphion*.

Silveſtres homines Sacer Interpreſque Deorum
Cædibus & victu fædo deterruit Orpheus;
Dictus ob hoc lenire tigres rabidoſque leones.
Dictus et Amphion, Thebanæ *conditor arcis,*
Saxa movere ſono teſtudinis, & prece blandâ
Ducere quo vellet. Fuit hæc Sapientia quondam,
Publica privatis ſecernere, ſacra profanis —
Concubitu prohibere vago — dare jura maritis —
Oppida moliri — leges incidere ligno.
Sic honor & nomen divinis Vatibus atque
Carminibus venit.[a]

Thoſe reformers of mankind juſt mentioned are ſuppoſed to have lived about a hundred years before the time of *Homer*. But from *Homer* himſelf we may learn that Poetry was cultivated as an Art in times probably much ancienter than thoſe of *Linus* and *Orpheus*; for in the *Odyſſey* he fre-

[a] Hor. Art of Poetry, 391.

quently mentions a kind of people by the name of ΑΟΙΔΟΙ or BARDS,[a] who used to sing at banquets consecrated to festivity and the purposes of Religion: These banquets were chiefly held upon gathering in the fruits of the earth; and the songs of the Bards on such occasions consisted in Peans to their Gods, or in celebrating some famous action of their Heroes, who in process of time were commonly honoured with Apotheosis.

In the αυτοσχεδιασματα, the hasty and extemporal Compositions of these Bards, we may venture to fix the origin of the *Greek* Poetry: Beginning thus from popular use it was modelled at length by the study and application of future ages into a most useful, and sublime and extensive Art: being made subservient to the cause of Virtue, and di-

[a] These old Bards are always represented as highly favoured of Kings and Princes, who used to appoint them Guardians over their Children, and, in case of their own absence, over their Wives—See Odyss. γ. 266 — as being men of great Temperance and Learning, universally esteemed by Mankind, and instructed and beloved by the Gods — Odyss. θ. 471, &c. See also *Plato* De Repub. III. Σωφρων δε (says *Athenæus* commenting on these Authors and partly transcribing the words of *Strabo*, Lib. I. towards the beginning) Σωφρων δε τι ην το των αοιδων γενος, και φιλοσοφων διαθεσεις εσχεν. See Athen. Deipnosop. I. 11.

vided

vided by degrees and branched out into different ſpecieſes of compoſition according to the different turn and humour of thoſe who cultivated it.*

The *Iliad* and *Odyſſey* afford abundant proofs that in *Greece* the Arts had arrived at a high pitch of maturity before the days of *Homer*. Of the Art of Poetry, however, after loſing ſight of the obſcure periods alluded to above, we have no veſtiges remaining, nothing but mere fabulous accounts, till we find it ſhining with all its ſplendor in the two EPIC Poems of that extraordinary Man: How it acquired ſuch a ſtate of perfection muſt, in a great meaſure, nay for ought we know, it muſt be *entirely* attributed to his wonderful and tranſcendant abilities.

* See the Poetics, IV.

LETTER

LETTER XXVII. Continued.

HAVING traced the *Greek* Poetry, after some sort of manner, as far as *Homer*, we shall be able to observe its subsequent progress with greater ease and certainty: For all those, who studied it with any success after this period, are in one way or other ultimately indebted to him.[a] Nor are the *Poets* alone indebted to this singular man. For the *Historian*, the *Orator*, and the *Philosopher*, (none of whom appeared for about Four Centuries after *Homer*[b]) owe to him something of that musical rotundity of expression, and sublimity of sentiment,

[a] It was this obvious remark which made the fantastical Painter recorded by *Ælian* draw *Homer* with a copious stream issuing out of his mouth, and all the Poets that succeeded him, placed at certain intervals, busy drinking of it.

[b] There appeared indeed in *Greece* Prose-Writers before this period, but their Works are lost: — I mean such as *Pherecydes* of *Syros*, and *Cadmus* and *Hecatæus* of *Miletus*; the two former lived from about 240 to 320 years after *Homer* — *Hecatæus* about 50 or 60 years after them. But *Herodotus* is the oldest, whose writings are come down to us, and between him and the Poet are usually reckoned about four centuries.

which

which render their Compoſitions *pleaſing* as well as *uſeful*.——But not to wander from our ſubject.

It has been obſerved already that Peans, or Hymns addreſſed to the Gods, conſtituted probably the firſt Poetical Productions, properly ſo called. We ſhould not therefore be ſurpriſed to find LYRIC Poetry making its appearance very early, I mean under a regular form. Though the Poems of *Homer*, eſpecially the *Margites*, which *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks of with reference to this point, were of great aſſiſtance to thoſe who cultivated this branch of Poetry; yet it ſeems to have ſprung more immediately from the imperfect ſketches of the ancient Bards: Its *original* deſign, notwithſtanding the different forms it afterwards aſſumed, being to ſing forth the praiſes of the Deity, or perpetuate the fame of eminent Wiſdom and Valour—And hence I believe it is the *only* ſpecies which *Plato* would chuſe to admit into his Commonwealth, and is alſo the only ſpecies practiſed by the *Hebrews*, and by them alone practiſed with propriety. ODE or SONG was the *gene-*

[a] See the Poetics, IV. and paſſim.

ral

vol name it went by: But the many different names given to particular species of it are derived either from the author, or from the measure wherein they are written, or from the occasions and purposes to which they were originally applied. The Ode was first formed, and cultivated with most success by *Archilochus*, *Alcman*, *Alcæus*, *Tyrtæus*, *Sappho*, *Stesichorus*, *Anacreon*, *Pindar*, with some others; almost all of whom flourished in the Second and Third Century after *Homer*, that is to say, about the Sixth and Seventh before the *Christian* Era.

A little more than 500 years before the same Era flourished the Poet *Simonides*. Though far from being an indifferent *Lyric*, he chiefly excelled in ELEGY, of which it is probable (at least the first who composed a regular Elegy) he was the first inventor. At first this name was given to what is commonly called the *Epitaph*, and consisted of but one or two Distichs. It afterwards grew into a larger Poem, but then contained only funeral lamentations, or such encomiums as it is natural for man to make upon the death of his friend or near relation: Nor was it I believe used in any other way,

before

before the amorous Wits of the *Augustan* Age adopted this metre to express their love and whine out their frivolous complaints.[a]

The Origin of TRAGEDY is somewhat antecedent to that of the *Elegiac* Poem. The best Critics trace the first dawnings of this admirable kind of Poetry from *Thespis*,[b] who is thought to have flourished about the time *Simonides* was born. As *Lyric* Poetry took its rise from the Hymns or those hasty Compositions which they sang in honour of their Gods, so did *Tragedy* originate from a branch of the *Lyric*, called the *Dithyrambic* Ode.[c] The business of this

[a] It has been observed by an entertaining Critic, that the writing Epistles under feigned characters is a high improvement on the *Greek* Elegy, because of the dramatic air it gives it — See the *Essay on the Genius and Writings of Pope*, Vol. I. p. 295. Had the merely introducing of feigned characters been all, this remark would have been true; but the general design of the Elegy is surely altered for the worse.

[b] See, for abundant conviction, *Bentley*'s learned and ingenious *Dissertation upon Phalaris* from p. 224. to 310.

[c] See the Poetics — Διθυραμβος was a name of *Bacchus*. The nature of this Ode was afterwards varied. The Ode of *Catullus*, where he so pathetically represents *Atys* lamenting the injury he had done himself, upon his being struck with madness by *Cybele*, is looked upon as the best, perhaps the only good specimen of the *Dithyrambic* Poem, which is now extant.

Ode

Ode was to celebrate the praiſes of *Bacchus* in a *ſerious*, though *frantic* and *raving* manner.

In proceſs of time theſe Compoſitions were delivered with ſuch extraordinary enthuſiaſm and geſticulation, as to make it no difficult matter for *Theſpis* to invent what is uſually attributed to him. For he is allowed to have done no more than regulate the Chorus, and introduce an Actor, who, whilſt the Chorus pauſed in their Peans to father *Bacchus*, ſtepped forth and related ſome great event, or celebrated ſome renowned hero: The Fable, if indeed it deſerved the name, was then very ſimple, and not of any latitude — μικρος μυθος, as *Ariſtotle* calls it. — With theſe ſorts of amuſements, exhibited at the time of their Vintage, was *Theſpis* wont to entertain the Villages of *Attica*. At the celebration of the *Bacchic* Hymn before mentioned they uſed to ſacrifice a Goat, by way of revenging the injury that poor animal did the young tendrils, to the Manes of the God of Wine: This Goat became now the Prize to be contended for by the Poets. — Hence proceed the firſt

dawning,

dawning, and hence the very *name* of Tragedy.

About 60 or 70 years after the time of *Thespis*, the genius of *Æschylus* began to display itself. He did not so much reform the rude and unfinished sketches of his Predecessor, as *create Tragedy anew*. It was in his hands that this Poem first assumed its proper dignity, and became modelled into a regular, and dramatic performance; being made subservient to Truth and Virtue, acted on a *fixt* Theatre, and adorned with every suitable decoration. For instead of regarding the enthusiastic ravings of *Thespis* and his imitators, *Æschylus* studied the Great FATHER of POETRY, and took from him almost all his materials. Indeed he had little else to do besides erecting a stage, and converting his Dialogues and Characters into scenes, so as to make them turn upon one principal action or event with due regard to the unity of time and place.*

Upon comparing the Plays of *Æschylus* with the Poems of *Homer*, *M. Brumoy* ob-

* See *Lord Shaftesbury's Advice to an Author*, Part 1. Sect. 3. This is by far the best production of this pompous and self-sufficient Writer.

serves,

ſerves, in his elaborate account of the *Greek* Theatre, that Tragedy is nothing more than an *Abridgement* of the *Epic* Poem: And *Æſchylus* himſelf uſed to ſay that he had only copied *in relief* what he found ſo finely delineated in the *Iliad* and *Odyſſey*.

But however great the merit of *Æſchylus* may be, (and very great it certainly is) yet Ancient Tragedy wanted many of its eſſential parts, till *Sophocles* and *Euripides* came to finiſh it.* Theſe Great Men have ſtood unrivalled. Their beauties and various excellencies, though they may lie in a different track, ſeem not nevertheleſs to have raiſed the one above the head of the other. In a word, this Poem in their hands appears to have arrived at the higheſt pitch of Human Perfection.

And ſo much, by way of a ſhort ſketch, of the riſe and progreſs, of the *Lyric*, the *Elegiac*, and the *Tragic* Poem.

* Some time before the death of *Æſchylus* — about 450 years before *Chriſt*.

LETTER

LETTER XXVII. Continued.

WE come next to COMIC Poetry. As the feast of *Bacchus* before mentioned, besides the *Dithyrambic* Ode, there were sung some wild and scurrilous Compositions called φαλλικα, tending to *mirth*, *ridicule*, and *buffoonery*. Now as Tragedy took its rise from the former, the latter in like manner gave birth to Comedy.*

* Και ἡ μεν (Τραγωδια) απο των εξαρχοντων τοῦ διθυραμβου, ἡ δε (Κωμωδια) απο των τῶν φαλλικα—See the Poetics, IV. The Festivals, at which they used to sing the *Dithyramb* and these Φαλλικα, were usually held in *Villages*; when they exposed in this kind of composition the faults and foibles of licentious individuals. The word Comedy then may be derived from Κωμη and ωδη—Others would derive it from ωδη, and Κωμος or Κωμαζω, because on such occasions they used to sing and live *riotously*.—The reward that was given to those who came off conquerors in this sort of literary contest was a cask of Wine: Hence it was at first called Τρυγωδια; but it soon changed its name into Κωμωδια—And it is probable (as our great Critic conjectures) that this last was the old and common name both for Tragedy and Comedy; till they came to be distinguished by their peculiar appellations, and cultivated as two sorts of Poetry. See the *Differt. upon Phalaris*, p. 308.

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A due ſeparation between theſe two kinds of Poetry, I mean the *Tragic* and *Comic*, did not probably take place before the time of *Æſchylus*; for is it not likely that the rant of *Theſpis* ſavoured almoſt as much of the one as of the other? both of them being originally all of a piece — all Σατυρικη και Ορχηστικη, dancing and ſinging after a wild manner: And indeed we find that ΚΩΜΟΙ was a name ſometimes given to the Plays of *Theſpis*.

Comedy was at firſt looked upon as unfit for reforming or improving the manners of mankind, and as totally incapable of that elegance and refinement which it afterwards attained. Hence no doubt the reaſon why it continued ſo long in a rude ſtate: For it conſiſted for a long time of nothing more than ſinging ludicrous and unpoliſhed verſes, and then dancing to them — ſimilar, perhaps, to what our Great Navigator found at *Otaheitè*, and in the neighbouring Iſlands[a] — But to go on.

We are left rather in an uncertainty reſpecting him who invented this ſpecies of

[a] See *Captain Cook's Second Voyage, page* 156, *and* 174. *et ſeq.* 4to.

Poetry,

Poetry, and who first formed the Comic Drama: A regular plot or fable is said to have been first [a] composed by *Epicharmus* and *Phormis*, who lived in *Sicily* in the time of *Gelo* and *Hiero*,[b] and but very few years before *Æschylus* began to distinguish himself.[c] But, like most other branches of Polite Literature, it had made but few and slow steps towards perfection, before it found its way into *Athens*, where the Sciences and fine Arts were beginning to shine with uncommon splendor. In *Athens Crates*, *Eupolis*, *Cratinus*, were among the first who applied themselves to Comedy, and improved it: — But these are men of whom we know little besides their names —

— Κλεος οιον ακουομεν, ουδε τι ιδμεν.

[a] See the Poetics, III. — See also V.

[b] About 480 years before the time of our Saviour.

[c] Indeed a great many respectable Authors unanimously attribute to *Epicharmus* the *invention* of Comedy. A few others are of opinion that this honour belongs to *Susarion*. If these are in the right, the origin of Comedy must be about 40 years *older* than that of Tragedy: If the advocates for *Epicharmus* are so, (which is most probable) it is about 20 years *later*. *Susarion* was of *Megara* in the neighbourhood of *Attica*, and *Epicharmus* of *Megara* in *Sicily*. See Poetics III.—See this point learnedly discussed in *Bentley's Dissertation upon Phalaris*, p. 199. & seq.

About 400 years before the *Christian* Era, the *Athenians* were entertained with the witty productions of *Aristophanes*. To him it may be said that Comedy was as much indebted for its regulation and improvement, as Tragedy had been to *Æschylus*. The *Margites* of *Homer* was of singular assistance and advantage to this Poet — ὁ γὰρ Μαργίτης (as *Aristotle*[a] has it) ἀναλογον ἔχει, ὥσπερ Ἰλιὰς καὶ Ὀδύσσεια πρὸς τὰς Τραγῳδίας, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος πρὸς τὰς Κωμῳδίας.

But *Aristophanes*, whatever his wit and humour may have been, seems to have mistaken the proper end of Comedy: For instead of exposing the follies and foibles of men, and reprehending such vices as are too trivial or too fantastical to be noticed by the Magistrate, he assumed a privilege which by no means belonged to him, and took upon him to call them to an account, in plain and direct terms, for every public transaction they were engaged in: And besides, his scurrilous abuse of the worthiest character that lived

[a] See as before, Ch. IV.—The *Margites* was a ludicrous Poem of *Homer*, which has not reached our times. It is supposed to have been written in the *Iambic* as well as in the *Hexameter* measure. There is no forming an opinion of it from the four or five lines that are now extant.

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in his time and country was to the last degree indecent and unpardonable. — The kind of Comedy, which he and his Contemporaries practised, is usually called the OLD Comedy.

But upon the conclusion of the *Peloponnesian* War, when the Government was totally altered, this licentiousness of the Comic Poets was checked, and in time absolutely prohibited. They then began to have recourse to fiction, and draw known characters under supposititious names; but this was done in such lively and striking colours as to leave no room to doubt where their Satire was directed. This, however, which is called the MIDDLE Comedy, was certainly no small improvement upon what had been in vogue before.

But this species of Poetry was not yet come to that pitch of perfection, which it arrived at in the hands of *Philemon* and *Menander*.* These Writers excelled *Aristophanes* and his buffooning imitators in an elegant description of private life, and more

* *Philemon* is said to have begun to display his abilities for Comedy about 340 years before *Christ*. *Menander*, who distinguished himself in the same way about 10 years after *Philemon*, has obscured, or rather obliterated the fame of his Rival.

particularly in the plan or plot of their Drama. Their Wit alſo was more natural and delicate, and the Moral more inſtructive. The few Fragments we have of *Menander* ſerve only to excite our regret for the loſs of his Works, and to confirm us in the opinion — That he was, perhaps, the moſt *correct* and the moſt *elegant* Comic Poet that ever exiſted.* — This is what we commonly call the NEW Comedy.

Some attribute this gradual improvement in Comedy to the changes which happened in the Government: Others flatly deny this, and account for it from the natural and growing influence of the fine Arts — But as this would be a ſpeculation ſomewhat foreign to our preſent purpoſe, I ſhall leave it to yourſelf to inveſtigate and determine the queſtion — ſatisfied with having propoſed it.

About 40 years after the death of the elegant and ſententious *Menander*, that is to ſay about 260 years before the beginning of the *Chriſtian* Era, *Theocritus* invented a *new* ſpecies of Poetry. When we conſider that

* See *Menand. and Philem. Reliquiæ* — publiſhed by Le Clerc.

the

the employment of the ſhepherd is of the higheſt antiquity, and was then reckoned an *honourable* as well as an *innocent* way of life; when, beſides, we call to mind the celebrated beauties of *Arcadia* and of ſome other Provinces of *Greece*, together with the ſtriking ſimplicity of ancient manners, one is apt to be ſurpriſed that it was ſo late before the PASTORAL was found out and cultivated. But yet at the ſame time we ſhould remember that great is the difficulty, and ſlow has been the progreſs of invention. "However obvious a thing may be to us, nurſed in the boſom, as it were, of Arts and Sciences, yet we ſhould not from thence conclude that it was an eaſy thing for thoſe, who lived in the earlier ages and who had every thing to invent, to make any new and valuable diſcovery."

We ſhould alſo remember that almoſt all Human Learning and Genius was long confined, in a manner, within the walls of *Athens*; and *Attica* we are informed was not a very fruitful or variegated country. The ſullen proſpects it afforded, (ſullen at leaſt in compariſon to many other parts of *Greece*,) and the occupation of its inhabi-

tants, would have never furnished even the rural and fertile Imagination of *Theocritus* with such a variety of sweet and natural objects as are crouded together in most of his *Eidyllia*. For, generally speaking, we find there has been, and perhaps must be, a concurrence of many favourable circumstances not only with regard to the *time*, but also to the *country* of the Author of any thing *new* and *unheard of* before.

It is upon this principle that *Mr. Blackwell*[a] has, in some measure, accounted for the unrivalled excellence of *Homer*'s Poetry: And just in the same way *Dr. Warton* refutes an erroneous opinion respecting the Pastoral, and assigns the true causes which gave it birth. The account, which this entertaining Critic has given of the matter in hand, being much better than any thing I could have advanced, I will therefore take the liberty of transcribing it for your perusal.

"That the design of Pastoral Poesy (says he) is to represent the undisturbed felicity of the GOLDEN AGE, is an empty notion, which, though supported by a *Rapin* and a

[a] See *his Inquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer.*

Fontenelle,

Fontenelle, I think, all rational Critics have agreed to extirpate and explode. But I do not remember, that even these, or any Critics have remarked the circumstance that gave origin to the opinion, that any *Golden Age* was intended. *Theocritus*, the father and model of this enchanting species of Composition, lived and wrote in *Sicily*. The climate of *Sicily* was delicious, and the face of the country various, and beautiful; its vallies and its precipices, its grottos and cascades were *sweetly interchanged*, and its flowers and fruits were lavish and luscious. The Poet described what he saw and felt; and had no need to have recourse to those artificial assemblages of pleasing objects, which are not to be found in Nature. The figs and the honey, which he assigns[a] as a reward to a victorious shepherd, were in themselves exquisite, and are therefore assigned with great propriety: And the beauties of that luxurious landscape so richly and circumstantially delineated in the close of the *Seventh Eidyllium*, where all things smelt of Summer and smelt of Autumn —

Παντ' ωσδιν θερεος μαλα πιονος, ωσδὲ δ' οπωρης,[b]

[a] Eidyll. I. 146. [b] Ver. 133.

were

were present and real. Succeeding Writers supposing these beauties too great and abundant to be real, referred them to the fictitious and imaginary scenes of a *Golden Age*."[a]

I shall only add—That *Theocritus* was not only the *inventor* of the *Pastoral*, but, like *Homer* in the *Epic*, and *Archilochus* in the *Iambic* Poem, carried it at the same time to such perfection as succeeding Writers in the same way have aimed at to little purpose.

Perhaps I should have taken notice much sooner of a set of men, who, though they wrote in verse, seem not nevertheless to have properly deserved the title of Poets—those I mean who composed the EPIC CYCLE. In all probability this Cycle consisted of those who put in metre the History of *Thebes* and all the exploits of *Hercules* and *Theseus*, (whose notions respecting the true *Epic* Poem *Aristotle*[b] has justly exposed) together with the whole tribe of versifiers, such as *Onomacritus*, *Lesches*, *Arctinus*, *Eumelus*, and *Stasinus*, the reputed author of the *Little Iliad*:

[a] See the *Essay on the Genius and Writings of Pope*, Vol. I. p. 3.

[b] See the Poetics, Ch. VIII. &c.

These

Thefe wrote in verfe a full account of the fabulous times of *Greece*, bringing them down to the period when fable and tradition began to vanifh. Their works, taken together, were called Κυκλος, or Επικος Κυκλος, or ο των Επικων Κυκλος — But why it was fo called, caufam non video aliam, (fays the learned Commentator on *Athenæus* [a]) nifi præftantiam figuræ ejus: Nam quia orbis figura omnium abfolutiffima et capaciffima eft; propterea id corpus, quod hiftoriam fabularem contineret univerfam a capite ad finem propè totam, *Orbem*, aut *Circulum* nominarunt.

So then this Work contained a regular, complete, and continued feries of events which happened in the early and fabulous ages — Quicquid vetuftiffimi Poetæ de origine mundi, de generatione Deorum, de hominum ætate primâ, de Gigantibus five *Titanibus*, deque antiquis Heroibus eorumque geftis cecinerant, eo opere continebatur. It was held in fome eftimation, not fo much on account of the merit or excellence of the

[a] *If. Cafaubon*, VII. 3. Here you will find the beft account of the *Cyclic* Poets that I know of.

Poetry,

Poetry, as becauſe of its comprehending a circumſtantial relation of the Mythology of ancient *Greece*—ουχ ἕνεκα διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς πραγμάτων. Hence proper ſubjects might be formed and ſelected for the exerciſe of abler talents.

As to the *Poetæ Minores* among the *Greeks*, there is none of them who invented any new ſpecies of Poetry; unleſs indeed we except thoſe fantaſtical geniuſes, who, in the language of *Dryden*,

——— *wings diſplay, and altars raiſe,*
And torture one poor word a thouſand ways,—

forming the ſhapes of eggs, wings, globes, hatchets, and I know not what, with the meaſure of their verſes, protracting and clipping them ſo as to repreſent ſuch and ſuch figures:—Of theſe whimſical Poetaſters it is not worth our while to take any further notice.

Something probably ſhould have been ſaid of thoſe petty, but ſmart and agreeable Compoſitions, the EPIGRAM and the EPITAPH. The ANTHOLOGIC Poets flouriſhed at different times and in different countries, and we have

have ſtill extant many beautiful ſpecimens of their productions.

In the Epigram we are not left far behind the ingenious Ancients. But as to the Epitaph, (which indeed, as was obſerved before, is a branch of the Elegy *) in no kind of Compoſition (unleſs we except that dramatic and entertaining way of writing, the DIALOGUE)—I ſay, in no kind of Compoſition is their ſuperiority over us more conſpicuous than in this: *We* have too much fulſome panegyric: *They* have all that is natural and all that is affecting.

By way of concluding this part of our ſubject, I will ſend you two celebrated imitations of the Ancient Epitaph—the beſt perhaps that have been made in modern times—The one by the very learned and ingenious *Dr. Jortin*: The other by the no leſs learned and ingenious *Dr. Lowth*—The one was written on the death of a wife: The other on the death of a daughter.

* Ελεγειον was a name given to the Epitaph. In the old times they generally made their Epitaphs in a ſingle Diſtich, Hexameter and Pentameter; whence in proceſs of time an Epitaph at large came to be called Ελεγειον. See the *Diſſert. upon Phalaris*, p. 499.

By

By Dr. JORTIN.

Quæ te sub tenerâ rapuerunt, Baeta, juventâ,
O utinam me crudelia fata vocent!
Ut linquam terras invisaque lumina solis,
Utque tuus rursum corpore sim posito.
Tu cave Lethæo *contingas ora liquore,*
Et citò venturi sis memor, oro, viri:—
Te sequor:—obscurum per iter dux ibit eunti
Fidus Amor, *tenebras lampade discutiens.*

By Bishop LOWTH.

Chara, vale! Ingenio præstans, Pietate, Pudore,
Et plusquam natæ nomine, chara, vale!
Chara Maria, *vale!--At veniet felicius ævum,*
Quando iterum tecum, sim modo dignus, ero:
Chara, redi!—lætâ tum dicam voce—paternos
Eja, age, in amplexus, chara Maria *redi!*

LETTER

LETTER XXVII. Continued.

WE have now taken a cursory and general survey of the different kinds of GREEK Poetry: It remains for us to take some notice of the LATIN; and that shall be done in a few words.

Greece, which had long been the Seat of LIBERTY and of LEARNING, being at length subdued by the *Romans*, the Sciences and fine Arts began immediately to shrink under the rigid Discipline of those severe and haughty Conquerors. Here therefore we soon find them withering away, and ere long totally decayed. They were indeed soon transplanted into *Italy*.[a]

In *Italy*, however, though that romantic Mythology, with which the Compositions of

[a] The introducing of the fine Arts into *Rome* is usually dated from the time that *Claudius Marcellus* took *Syracuse*, about 200 years before the *Augustan* Age. See *Livy* xxv. 40. See also xxvii. 2. The productions of the ancient Artists were for a long time considered in *Italy* only as a part of private luxury, and sought after from vanity and ostentation, rather than any true taste for their beauties.

the

the *Greek* Poets are so finely adorned and animated, had been already established there, yet it was long before the POETICAL Art made its appearance. For the *Roman* People, greedy still of conquest, aspired after rivalship in no other Art or Science than those of War and Government — *Hæ tibi erant Artes:* This was their great boast — this their sole ambition.

But, at length, when they had little left to conquer, and when PEACE had diffused her genial influence at home, they began to study and by degrees enter into the spirit of the fine productions of *Grecian* Arts and Ingenuity: Soon to attempt to imitate these was but a natural consequence — Take the whole matter in those well known words of *Horace:*

Græcia *capta ferum Victorem cepit, et Artes*
Intulit agresti Latio; — *sic horridus ille*
Defluxit numerus Saturnius; *et grave virus*
Munditiæ pepulere: — *sed in longum tamen ævum*
Manserunt, hodieque manent, vestigia ruris:
Serus enim Græcis *admovit acumina chartis;*
Et post Punica *bella quietus quærere cæpit*

Quid

Quid Sophocles *et* Thespis *et* Æschylus *utile ferrent;*
Tentavit quoque, rem si dignè vertere posset:
Et placuit sibi naturâ sublimis et acer —

For now we find *Nævius*, *Ennius*, *Plautus*, *Cæcilius*, *Pacuvius*, *Terence*, *Afranius*, *Accius*, and *Lucilius*, beginning to cultivate the *Greek* Poetry, and imitate, or rather *translate* certain species of it, particularly the *Dramatic*, with no little fame and success. *Livius Andronicus* indeed had distinguished himself in the same way somewhat before *Nævius*, and was the *first* deserving the name of a Poet that ever appeared at *Rome*.

Not long after *Lucilius*, *Lucretius* shone in DIDACTIC Poetry;* — a species of composition which had been very early practised by *Hesiod*, and afterwards by the Geographer *Dionysius*; unless indeed you would include these among the *Cyclic* Poets.

About the same time *Catullus* began, in a nervous, though not the most polished style, to give his countrymen some notion of the excellence of the *Greek* Ode, the Epigram, and Eidyllium. And then in the *Augustan* Age, when liberal pursuits were liberally

* About 70 or 80 years before Christ.

encouraged,

encouraged, when Modeſt Merit was munificently rewarded and cheriſhed by the foſtering hand of the Rich and Great, whoſe duty it is to reward and cheriſh it, not on account of the Fair Fame they thereby acquire, but rather for the ſake of making our Common Nature as generally beautiful and as generally uſeful as it is in our power to make it; — it was then, I ſay, that *Virgil* and *Horace* brought the *Latin* Poetry to its full ſtandard. Theſe ſtudied "*night and day, and day and night*" the *Grecian* models: They imitated the beauties they found there with the ſkill of a maſter: They therefore of all the *Romans* have approached neareſt to perfection.

The nature of the *Latin* Poetry, we conclude, is altogether analogous to and immediately derived from that of the ingenious *Greeks*; ſo that it would be unneceſſary to give any minuter account of it. Some, however, are of opinion that the invention of the SATIRE belongs to the *Romans*. *Quintilian* ſays expreſsly: *Satira quidem* TOTA *noſtra eſt*[a]—And *Ennius* is called by *Horace*—

[a] See Quintil. X. 1.

— *rudis*

—*rudis et* Græcis INTACTI *carminis auctor.*[a]

But in another place, ſpeaking of *Lucilius*, who is allowed to have only improved much on the Satire of *Ennius*, he derives this kind of Compoſition from its true ſource: For having taken notice of the cutting manner of *Eupolis*, and *Cratinus*, and *Ariſtophanes*, and thoſe others, who were writers of the Old Comedy, he immediately adds:

HINC *omnis pendet* Lucilius, *hoſce ſecutus,*
Mutatis tantùm pedibus numeriſque[b]—

So that he muſt mean, where he ſays that the Satire was a ſpecies of Poetry *untouched* by the *Greeks*, that they had never cultivated it in that regular manner firſt adopted by *Ennius*, ſo as to make it a Compoſition *totally diſtinct* from Comedy; but that its principles and the firſt notion of the thing, as he explicitly mentions in the paſſage laſt quoted, were derived from the *Greek* Comic Poets, the feet and numbers being only

[a] Lib. I. Sat. X. 66. [b] Lib. I. Sat. IV. 6.

changed from the *Iambic* into the *Hexameter* kind.

Evanthius, a Critic who lived in the Fourth Century in the time of the famous *Donatus*, derives Satire from the very same origin: His words are these: Per Priſcos Poetas, non, ut nunc, penitus ficta argumenta, ſed res geſtæ à civibus palam, cum eorum ſæpe qui geſſerant nomine, decantabantur: Ideo ipſa (ſcil. Comædia) ſuo tempore moribus multum profuit civitatis; cum unuſquiſque caveret, culpa ne ſpectaculo cæteris eſſet, et domeſtico probro. Sed cum Poetæ abuti licentius ſtylo, et paſſim lædere ex libidine cœpiſſent plures bonos, ne quiſquam in alterum carmen infame proponeret, lege latâ ſiluere. Et *hinc* deinde aliud genus fabulæ, id eſt, SATIRA, ſumpſit exordium.*

Perhaps now the more regular way of tracing it would be this: The *Greek* IAMBIC appears to have originated from thoſe ſcurrilous compoſitions, the φαλλικα: Hence alſo the OLD COMEDY: Hence the SATIRE: The φαλλικα without doubt gave birth to them all.

* See a Fragment of his *de Tragædiâ & Comædiâ* prefixed to the *Delphin* Edition of *Terence*.

Upon the whole, then, we can by no means agree with *Quintilian*, that the Satire was *entirely* theirs; but only that it was first formed by them into a *regular* and *distinct* Poem, and was afterwards cultivated as such and greatly improved.

This was the kind of Poetry which kept its ground longest in *Italy*. On the death of *Augustus*, Poetry and Eloquence, and indeed all the fine Arts, underwent a great change. Their growth was checked by the sour reign of *Tiberius*; and the Vanity and Tyranny which ensued gave them the finishing stroke.*

SATIRE, however, in the hands of *Juvenal*, wielded its sharpest weapon against the Oppression and horrible Depravity of those times. But in the death of *Juvenal* was involved the total extinction of all True Poetical Genius among the Ancients: For after his time Poetry continued declining more and more, to the time of *Constantine*, when all the liberal Arts were so far lost, that the *Romans* then had scarce any thing to distinguish them from mere Barbarians.

* See *Spence's Polymetis* — near the beginning.

Let so much have been said, in a general way, of the *Greek* and *Latin* Poetry — And now to put an end to this long Letter. Farewell.

LETTER XXVIII.

HITHERTO you have been engaged in digesting the Principles of those Arts and Sciences, which man, considered solely as a *Rational* Being, might practise in some degree; inasmuch as they treat chiefly of the faculties which are peculiar to him as such, exhibiting the nature of these, and their different modes of operation. Passing over to ETHICS, you come to the most important part of Philosophy, and the ultimate scope of the whole: man having been formed a *Moral* Agent and adapted to a *Social* State; and it being the business of this Science to instruct him how to behave himself in both these

these capacities—to discuss and explain the various duties and relations belonging thereunto.

It is a Science of vast extent. As it leads to the study of mankind in general and all those duties which they severally owe each other, it comprehends necessarily whatever relates to them being formed into a Political Body; and thus it brings us to an acquaintance with the different kinds of Government, or those regulations which contribute most to the Happiness or Misery of Society at large—Hence it was not improperly called by the Ancients ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ: With us it is usually known by the name of MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

But not to speak quite so loosely and incoherently. The principal aim of this Science, considered independently of all others, (which however is by no means the proper way of considering it) seems to be: To investigate the various passions and affections of the human heart; and examine the proper difference between Virtue and Vice, defining their peculiar qualities, and showing their effects both with regard to the Individual and the

Community. From hence we ſhall learn the names of the different organs and impulſes of our Intellectual Frame, their various connexions and combinations, and the ſeveral ſentiments reſulting from theſe combinations: and hence become accurately acquainted with the proper definitions of the ſocial and moral affections of our Nature, with the immediate cauſes which incite them to action, together with their good or bad effects on life and manners. And for the Moraliſt to be ignorant of ſuch things, would be juſt as ſhameful as for the Botaniſt (for example) to be juſt able to ſpeak of the different colours, or forms, or fragrancy of herbs and flowers, without knowing any thing of their names, or of their beneficial and noxious qualities — Nor are we to look upon this *Intellectual Anatomy*, (if one may ſo ſpeak) as being neceſſarily difficult and diſagreeable: Speculative and even metaphyſical Inquiries, as long as they proceed on clear data, being withal conducted with modeſty and ſobriety, are no leſs productive of amuſement, than of ſome of the beſt ſort of inſtruction.

Such

Such, considered merely as a Science detached from and independent of all the other Arts and Sciences, appears to be the principal end of Ethics. But, as has been already hinted, it would be absurd to consider it in that point of view. The end of all our acquisitions is to be able to *practise* them with some propriety — Το τελος εστιν, ου γνωσις, αλλα πραξις.[a] Now the Science of Ethics is the point to which the other Parts of Learning are principally directed, and indeed the only proper foundation of almost all PRACTICAL Knowledge.

To run over particulars. With respect to your Mathematical, and Logical Pursuits, what better end could they answer than to root out of the mind whatever was base, or insolent, or erroneous, and prepare it for the reception of what the *Greeks* used to call, with inimitable brevity, ΚΑΛΟΚΑΓΑΘΙΑ; inuring it to habits of clear and correct reasoning, so as to enable us to convince ourselves, in time, of the eternal and immutable nature of Virtue and the excellence of Good Learning, as well as to see the una-

[a] See *Nichomach.* Ethics, I. 3.

voidable

voidable infamy and deſtruction which lie lurking in the paths of Vice and Folly?

In Rhetoric again and Eloquence, where theſe habits are improved and called to action, the end is ſtill the ſame. Indeed it would be impoſſible to practiſe this part of Human Learning, with any ſucceſs, without a competent knowledge of men and manners, without having imbibed ſound and manly principles, and making our abilities in the Art ſubſervient to the cauſe of Virtue and the Well-being of Society.

"The notion of Morals (as is allowed on all hands) implies ſome ſentiment, ſo univerſal and comprehenſive as to extend to all men, and render the actions and conduct, even of perſons the moſt diſtant, an object of applauſe or cenſure, according as they agree or diſagree with that rule of Right which Nature and Reaſon have eſtabliſhed." Foraſmuch then as that fixt and general Law, whereby we judge of what is right and wrong in all the intercourſes of life, is founded on this Science, *Demonſtrative* and *Judicial* Rhetoric has no ſource, it is plain, from whence to derive arguments without a

ſound

ſound and accurate Syſtem of Moral Philoſophy: The *Deliberative* ſort alſo is, in general, intimately connected with it.

In Poetry in like manner and moſt of the other fine Arts, no leſs than in Rhetoric, as excellence herein conſiſts in the being able to intereſt the ſeveral Paſſions, to deſcribe their effects, and delineate in proper colours the affairs of life, and the manners of mankind; ſo an acquaintance with Ethics becomes an eſſential thing to form the character of a Good Poet: Ποτερον δ' ου δ' αρετην Ποιητε λεγοιμεν αν ηντιν ου αλλην, η την μιμητικην τε βιε δια λογων; πως αν ου μιμοιτο απειρος ων τε βιε, και αφρων;[a] — Nay, there ſhould be more than a *bare knowledge* of the Science: Ου γαρ ουτω φαμεν την των Ποιητων αρετην ως η τεκτονων, η χαλκεων· αλλ' ικανη μεν ουδεν εχεται καλε, και σεμνε· η δε Ποιητε συνεζευκται τη τε ανθρωπε. Και ουχ οιον τε αγαθον γενεσθαι Ποιητην, μη πρωτερον γενηθεντα Ανδρα αγαθον.[b]

If we go a ſtep farther, and look up to thoſe higher ſtations in life, where it is incumbent on thoſe who fill them to govern a People, to enact and ſtabliſh Laws, or, in

[a] See *Strabo*, Lib. I. ſub init. [b] See *Strabo*, Ibid.

any

any eminent character, to inſtruct mankind and inform them of the ſeveral duties and offices belonging to them as rational and ſocial creatures, there will occur at once additional reaſons that they ſhould acquire as much Ethical knowledge as poſſible: Here likewiſe the bare knowledge is not ſufficient.

Δει τον Πολιτων ωεθεωεθαι αιρεμενον,
Την τε λογε μεν δυναμιν και επιφθον,
Ηθει δε χρηςω συγκεκραμενον εχειν.[a]

Example ſhould always go hand in hand with Precept. And the higher the ſtations are wherein we ſtand, the more cautious ſhould we be in this particular. If Vice and Immorality prevail among the ſuperior ranks of life, they will rapidly deſcend to thoſe below. Good Morals, whatever be the form of Government, are the only ſure foundation of Public Happineſs: Where theſe are wanting, things are going faſt to decay and ruin.

Upon the whole: Should it be affirmed, that a ſcientific knowledge of Ethics is not

[a] See *Philem. Frag. Edit. Cler.* p. 316. But ſee particularly *Ariſtotle*'s Rhetoric, I. 2, and 3. See alſo the beginning of the Second Book, with other places.

to

to be acquired by Study, but by Converſation and Intercourſe in the world—I would obviate the aſſertion by this other: No man of ſenſe will put as much confidence in the Empiric going about with his noſtrums and half-formed notions of things, as in him who has philoſophically ſtudied the Oeconomy of the Human Frame, and is able to trace with accuracy the riſe and progreſs of the ſeveral diſeaſes to which it is liable. In good truth, Study muſt lead the way, but Practice and Experience muſt follow after.

Proſecute then, with courage, the *Nicomachean* Ethics; It is by this means, and not from reading the looſe and unfiniſhed Tractates of ſome modern Writers on the ſubject, that you are to lay down a proper foundation. *Ariſtotle* does not indeed dwell much on the paſſions and affections of the mind, probably becauſe he had already diſcuſſed theſe in the beginning of his *Second* Book concerning Rhetoric;* yet, neverthe-

* As this ſubject is ſo intimately connected with Ethics, you would do well to read over again, at this time, that fine and philoſophical account of the Paſſions which he has there given of them.—There is alſo a good Chapter to the ſame purpoſe at

leſs,

less, you will find in him all the principles and scientifical parts of the subject considered with that accuracy and deep penetration, and treated after that perspicuous, analytical and philosophical method, for which you have long since acknowledged him to be so very remarkable.

And besides the good matter contained in this Book, you will find the style of it more elegant than perhaps what we meet with in any other work of his, and not undeserving of the compliment which *Cicero* pays him, where he speaks of the incredible copiousness and sweetness of his language: See the First Chapter of TOPICS to *Trebatius*: Quibus eo minus ignoscendum est, (says he, censuring the Rhetoricians of his time for their inattention to the Great *Stagirite*) quod non modo rebus iis, quæ ab illo (scil. *Aristotele*) dictæ et inventæ sunt, alici debuerunt; sed *dicendi quoque incredibili quadam cùm copiâ, tum etiam suavitate*. And *Dyonisius* of *Halicarnassus* * considers him, alluding perhaps

the end of *Andronicus Rhodius*'s Paraphrase on the *Nicomachean* Ethics: It will be of use to you to read this book; more so perhaps than that of *Eustratius*, Bishop of *Nice*, who is reckoned no bad Commentator upon them.

* See his Book concerning Composition, Sect. 24.

more

more particularly to this Treatise, and that on Rhetoric, as worthy of being ranked among those who have happily blended the *florid* and *austere* species of writing, and whom therefore he properly lays down as the best models of style and composition.

Need I add that I approve entirely of your intention to read about this period the most elegant moral Pieces of the Heathen Writers, especially those of *Plato* and *Cicero*? Thereby you will be able to understand this Science more perfectly and perceive its great importance and extensive application.

Whilst you are engaged in these studies, it will appear at once that those who have written best upon the subject of Morals, and who came nearest to the truth, derived their notions all of them from the excellent *Socrates*, which luckily they have handed down to us in all the variety of composition and elegance of language. Nam, cum essent plures orti fere a *Socrate*, quod ex illius variis & diversis, & in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat; proseminatæ sunt quasi Familiæ dissentientes inter se, & multum disjunctæ & dispares,

dispares, cum tamen omnes se Philosophi *Socraticos* & dici vellent, & esse arbitrarentur.[a]

— From his mouth issued forth
Mellifluous streams that water'd all the Schools
Of Academics, *Old and New; with those*
Sirnam'd Peripatetics.[b]

It was this Great Man, we all know, who first called off Philosophy from physical pursuits, from obscure and intricate inquiries into Nature and the constitution of the heavenly Bodies, applying it to questions of Morality which he considered of greater help to guide man through life with happiness and innocence, and exposing and confuting the several doctrines and opinions of those who affected such pursuits as were either above or below their intellectual capacities. And it is in the Works of his accomplished Scholars, *Plato* and *Xenophon*, and in those of their great admirer, *Cicero*, and most elegant imitator, that we find the noblest specimens of what mere unassisted Reason can do towards teaching man his true nature, his several duties as a moral

[a] See Cic. De Orat. III. 16. [b] Par. R. IV. 276.

agent,

agent, and the rank he bears in the grand ſyſtem of the Univerſe.

But (to conclude the whole) however ſublime may have been the notions of a few Geniuſes of this kind, yet when we compare them with the *pure* and *exalted* Morality of the GOSPEL, we cannot but confeſs, if we judge fairly of the thing and with underſtanding and ability, that the latter is incomparably a much more perfect rule of life, than what *Socrates*, or *Plato*, or *Ariſtotle* could ever pretend to teach: So that we ſhall not only ſee the neceſſity and theg racious deſign of the CHRISTIAN DISPENSATION, but alſo the futility of boaſting of the ſtrength and penetration of unaſſiſted Reaſon; its ſobereſt deciſions being often

—falſe, or little elſe but dreams,
Conjectures, fancies, built on nothing firm.[a]

And hence, when we find the *Academitians*, with all fair and honeſt inquirers into Nature, involving themſelves in doubt and confuſion as to the great end of Human Life, we ſhall be no leſs diſpoſed to admire theſe and commiſerate them, than look

[a] Par. R. IV, 291.

down

down with chagrin, as well on the frosty virtue, the ostentatious and paradoxical tenets of the *Stoics*, as on the astonishing absurdities of the *Pyrrhonists* and *Epicureans*.

If we consider the Science in *this* point of view, it will be a most proper and useful introduction to the study of DIVINITY; and certainly it cannot be applied to any other so good a purpose—PHILOSOPHIA MORALIS in famulitium THEOLOGIÆ reciperetur, instar ancillæ prudentis, et pedissequæ fidelis, quæ ad omnes ejus nutus præsto sit, et ministret.[a]

Let these hints suffice just to apprize you of the end and excellence of Moral Philosophy; and being apprized of it, there is no doubt but you will study it after the best manner, and with becoming diligence and resolution. Farewell.

[a] De Augment. Scient. VII. 3.

LETTER

LETTER XXIX.

THE humourous account you ſent me of your diſpute with the ſtarched Scholaſtic, who would maintain the propriety and advantage of ſuch a plan of ſtudy as was followed in the 16th and 17th Centuries, gave me infinite ſatisfaction: Many there are, I fear, much of the ſame opinion; who harraſs young perſons, raw from ſchool and deſtitute of all preparatory diſcipline, with the "*Intellective Abſtractions*" of ſome modern unfiniſhed Treatiſes on Logic, or Metaphyſics. Others, again, guided by nothing deſerving the name of a Regular Method of Education, involve themſelves and their Pupils in a labyrinth of confuſion and dreary darkneſs. They indeed lecture them with a vengeance, making them read in part half a dozen different books within the compaſs of a day; but after a patient hearing of four years, it is ten to one if their ſtock of learning be at all improved — May theſe Chaotic Geniuſes go on and proſper!

Give me but the humbleſt competency, and let me ſlide through this life free from the guilt of having employed it in contributing to extend the baneful influence of Ignorance and Error!

There is no need of explaining to you, at this time, how both the ways, juſt hinted at, tend infallibly to give the tender mind a diſguſt to every Science and elegant Art, and are much more likely to *impede* than *aſſiſt* it in its purſuit after Sound Knowledge. But I am glad to find that you have had the good fortune to fall into better hands; having been conducted, ſtep by ſtep, on a plan of ſtudy free from all ſcholaſtic jargon, all metaphyſical quirks and ſubtleties; beginning with thoſe things which were moſt ſimple in Literature, and going on in a regular, perſpicuous manner, to what were more abſtruſe: and the different branches of it riſing by an eaſy and beautiful gradation, ſo as to make every article reflect all poſſible light on the adjoining parts. Happy thoſe, did they but know their happineſs, who in their youth are guided after ſome ſuch clear and effectual method to the threſhold of Virtue and of Learning.

As

As you are now nearly at the end of your Course, it may be worth our while to take a short review of the whole; though in doing this I fear I shall be repeating many things that have been already mentioned: but I will rely on your usual candour and good-nature — So difficult it is to divert the attention from what is truly fair and good in itself, and calculated for the best of purposes.

Instead of inveloping in a cloud of abstruse speculations the intellectual sparks which soon appear in the Human Mind, those who have the guidance of youth will (if they are wise) fan and cherish them with the utmost gentleness, watching over them with all diligence, and directing them to things which indeed require attention, but are simple and agreeable, and not of difficult acquisition: Thus accustomed to think, and reason on subjects that lie before them, they will obtain by degrees a *habit* of reflexion: Now a habit of this nature will, in time, furnish them with proper vigour and ability to make their way into the more intricate parts of Literature.

Hence, I imagine, the ELEMENTS of GEOMETRY, when you had already laid up no small stock of school-learning, were committed to your hands — With propriety no doubt. Hence too (for I wish not to broach any new opinion so much as support an old one by the best authority) *Pythagoras* used to consider these Elements as the KEY to all PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE: We all know the inscription on the front of his School: ΟΥΔΕΙΣ ΑΓΕΩΜΕΤΡΗΤΟΣ ΕΙΣΙΤΩ. And *Plato* calls them, *κατα παιδειας οδον* — *the road to all Good Discipline and Instruction.*[a]

At this time it would be altogether needless to expatiate on the utility of this Science: You have observed yourself that all the other parts of Literature are intimately connected with it, and many of them founded thereupon; — that it tends to clear the mind of all illiberal prejudices, of error, and pride, and credulity, — to enlarge its powers, and prepare them for the acquisition of the other Sciences, making them alert, attentive, and anxious to look beyond the

[a] Repub. VII.

bare

bare surface of things: You have also seen that, without a competent knowledge of it, 'tis scarcely possible to understand the writings of the old Philosophers — those of *Aristotle* in particular: for you could not but take notice that in his Treatises on Logic and Rhetoric, and even in his Ethics, he sometimes uses Geometrical and Arithmetical Proportion to explain his precepts and illustrate his opinion.

After spending a year in diligently studying these Elements, and in being made acquainted with some of the higher branches of this sublime and extensive Science, you proceed to those Organic Arts, which (to use the words of our Great Classic[a]) enable men to discourse and write perspicuously, elegantly, and according to the fittest style of lofty, mean, or lowly: LOGIC, therefore, so much as is useful, is referred to this due place, with all her well-couched heads and topics; until it be time to open her contracted palm into a graceful and ornate RHETORIC, taught out of the rules of *Aristotle*.

Obvious it is to every one that *Rhetoric*

[a] *Milton — in his Treatise of Education.*

holds a *middle* place between *Logic* and *Poetry*: 'Tis with great propriety, therefore, you ſtudy it *before* the *latter*, and *immediately after* the *former* — according to the direction intimated in the above paſſage.

Having now digeſted its true principles, you paſs over to thoſe of Poetry: This will pave the way to the right underſtanding of the *other* Elegant Arts, and the laying of a proper foundation for all juſt and liberal Criticiſm. But "I mean not here (if again I may uſe the nervous expreſſion of the ſame Great Man *) the proſody of a verſe, which one could not but have hit on before among the rudiments of Grammar; but that Sublime Art which, in *Ariſtotle*'s POETICS, teaches what the Laws are of a true *Epic* Poem, what of a *Dramatic*, what of a *Lyric*, what Decorum is, which is the grand maſter-piece to obſerve: This will make one ſoon perceive what deſpicable creatures our common rhymers and play-writers be, and ſhow what religious, what glorious and magnificent uſe might be made of Poetry both in Divine and Human things — And now the choice *Heroic* Poems, and *Attic* Trage-

* See *Milton* — as before.

dies

dies of ſtateliest and most regal argument, with all the famous Political Orations, offer themſelves;—which, if they were not only read, but ſome of them got by memory, and ſolemnly pronounced with right accent and grace, would endue us even with the ſpirit and vigour of *Demoſthenes* or *Cicero*, *Euripides* or *Sophocles*."

And juſt before you tread the ſtage of Life (ſo as to enable you to do it with greater honour and ſecurity) the Science of ETHICS will teach you the accurate diſtinctions of the ſeveral Virtues;—will ſhow you how congenial they are to the nature of man, and how the real Intereſt and Happineſs of the Individual is connected, by an *irrefragable* chain, with that of the Community. It being the profeſſed aim of this Science to inquire into the nature and various modifications of VIRTUE, both Moral and Intellectual, it will of courſe comprehend "the beginning, the end, and reaſons of Political Societies:" For there cannot be Virtue, properly ſo called, "till after man becomes a Rational and Political animal: Then he ſhows true courage, very different from the ferocity of the brute or ſavage,—generoſity, magnanimous contempt

of

of danger and of death, friendship and love of country, with all the other Virtues which so much exalt Human Nature."—Here lies open a wide field for useful and instructive Inquiry.

In the mean while you have furnished yourself, during your Private Studies, with a competent knowledge of Ancient History, and some necessary miscellaneous parts of Literature; and have attended, in due order and place, the several Lectures that are read by the University-Professors, with reference to which your College-Exercises seem to be wisely planned and regulated.

In this pleasing, this perspicuous and regular Method, there is no fear of being "*tost and turmoiled*;" no fear of being bewildered and fatigued:—*Tantum series juncturaque pollet!* And this seems to me to be that "hill-side, where may be pointed out the right path of a Virtuous and Noble Education; laborious perhaps at the first ascent, but else so smooth, so green, so full of goodly prospect, and melodious sounds on every side, that the Harp of *Orpheus* was not more charming."[a]

Now all this you are to consider as

[a] See *Milton's Tractate*—— as before.

nothing

nothing more than a good and ſolid foundation whereon to build: Nor is it ſecure to build on any other foundation—on any other I mean than *ſome ſuch* Elementary, Philoſophical, General Courſe of Diſcipline. Scientiarum omnium robur, instar faſcis illius Senis, (ſays my Lord *Verulam*,[a] alluding to *Æſop*'s Fable) non in ſingulis bacillis, ſed in omnibus vinculo conjunctis conſiſtit.

As in theſe preparatory inquiries you muſt have obſerved a wonderful dependence and connexion between the ſeveral parts of Human Knowledge, ſo by having taken an accurate and regular ſurvey of their firſt principles you will be able to enlarge, at ſome future period, any particular portion of it, and purſue with greater eaſe and ſafety and ſucceſs, whatever Art or Science you would wiſh to cultivate. For in order to make a decent figure in any thing, you muſt uſe what you have already acquired as ſubſervient to your future Profeſſion, reſolutely foregoing whatever may be an obſtacle to this, contracting your ſtudies, and, if not confining them within that particular circle,

[a] See de Aug. Scient. p. 39.-- 12mo.

yet

yet directing them ſo as never to loſe ſight of that particular point. It is not poſſible, without very great abilities indeed, to make a decent figure in a multitude of things — So ſhort is the life of man, and ſo narrow are the boundaries preſcribed to his preſent capacity! Farewell.

LETTER XXX.

VEniamus nunc ad eam Scientiam, quâ caruerunt *Græci* et *Romani*, (neque enim tanta illis felicitas conceſſa eſt) *ſacram* dico et *divinitùs inſpiratam* THEOLOGIAM — cunctorum laborum ac peregrinationum humanarum Sabbatum, ac Portum nobiliſſimum.[a]

Firſt of all let me congratulate with you that you have not been "haſtened with the ſway of friends (as *Milton* expreſſes it) to an *ambitious*, or *mercenary*, or *ignorantly zealous* Divinity;" but that the choice of this

[a] *De Aug. Scient.* VIII. *cap. ult.*

Profeſſion

Profession was your own, and proceeded from the best of motives: It is matter of joy likewise that your Education has been conducted in an able and virtuous manner — These are considerations of the utmost consequence.

As you have been studying the Four Evangelists in the original, (the way certainly in which they ought to be studied) and have carefully read GROTIUS *Concerning the Truth of the Christian Religion*, and PEARSON'S *Exposition of the Creed* — books replete with good and profound knowledge; having, I say, already done this, I am well persuaded that you have a proper notion of the principles and design of our Holy Religion, and are no doubt competently qualified to discharge the Ministerial Office with great credit and advantage.

But for those, who are possessed of abilities and of opportunity to improve them, it is by no means excusable to stop here.

Though you cannot but despise the mad notion of those wrong-headed Fanaties, who, in the dark ages, did all in their power to disparage and indeed destroy every kind of Literary Composition of the Heathens, without

out considering in what numberless ways they tend to the right understanding and confirmation of the Sacred Writings; yet you must remember, on the other hand, not to set a higher value on the classical productions of *Greece* and *Italy* than what they really deserve, making such use of them as will render them truly valuable: And let me here remind you, that human learning and attainments can never be applied to so good a purpose as in supporting the interests of that which is Holy and Divine.

But being myself a mere novice in what you are going to enter upon, I will not presume to lay down any particular rules for the conduct of your present studies: Of this in truth there is little need: Your Regius Professor of Divinity is allowed to be a man of deep, and extensive, and elegant erudition. You cannot therefore do better than attend his Lectures in this Science.

With the view then of being benefitted by your observations, I will sit down to give you a few general hints respecting the Plan of study I had partly formed for myself, and which (unless I have good reason to alter it) I hope to put in execution; desiring you would

would speak your mind with all freedom, and inform me of whatever you think amiss in it.

Now in studying Theology we should certainly consider it as a SCIENCE; founded indeed on sound and infallible principles, but yet conducted and brought to its perfect state not by any human means, not by any invention or investigation of man. And here, as in other affairs of Literature, the subject may be divided into two *general* parts; DOCTRINAL and HISTORICAL. With regard to the former, numerous are the books which will assist us in acquiring the knowledge of such things as are within the reach of our present capacities; but the Works of Bishop *Bull* in particular, and *Stillingfleet's* ORIGINES SACRÆ come recommended to us from very high and respectable authority. The *mysterious* parts of Christianity — it becomes us to treat of these with all modesty and awe; not wishing to understand those things thoroughly which it was never meant we should now understand, and resting satisfied that they are accompanied by circumstances proclaiming the Wisdom and Goodness

ness of God, and calculated to promote the real welfare of his creatures.

But as to the *Historical* part of Religion, *Shuckford's* CONNEXIONS, and those of *Prideaux* will probably be of help to one in tracing it down from the first account we have of it to the time of our Saviour Christ. In this inquiry we must expect to find no small share of difficulty and obscurity, arising both from the great distance of time, and from the necessary conciseness of the Narrative: Here then we should carefully compare with each other the different parts, and with whatever other faithful Contemporary Histories we can find: The Holy Scriptures (to use the words of a very learned Antiquary,[a] referring to this point) are remarkably precise and exact; but, when collated and compared, they wonderfully explain themselves, and discover a great many interesting truths; it is therefore injurious to treat them superficially: And if we would but be at the trouble to look into the scope and meaning of the authorities we have recourse to, no writings in the world would so amply reward our pains.

[a] See *Mr. Bryant's Observations on the ancient History of Egypt*, p. 85.

Here

Here the neceſſity of underſtanding *Hebrew* will at once occur to us. As we are both equally ignorant of this ancient and venerable Language, and are both equally deſirous of learning it, let it be our care, *Eugenio*, to lay by a certain portion of each day for this uſeful employment: The very conſideration of our being thus engaged at one and the ſame time will rouſe our ſpirits and alleviate our fatigue. To bring you over to this reſolution and to confirm you therein, let me recommend to your peruſal *Dr. Jubb's*[a] learned and claſſical Diſcourſe on the Study of the *Hebrew* Tongue — It is certainly, on ſeveral accounts, highly worth your reading.

After coming down to the time of our Saviour, the moſt important part is ſtill remaining. We cannot be too careful in conſidering the ſeveral circumſtances relating to that ſacred period when he and his firſt Diſciples lived on this earth, and in inveſtigating, in their own words, the true principles of that moſt important Doctrine they were employed to propagate. Now alſo we ſhould learn the ſcope and tendency of the

[a] *Canon of Ch. Ch. Oxford, and Regius Profeſſor of Hebrew.*

ſeveral

ſeveral EPISTLES written by the Apoſtles, and ſearch after the cauſes which gave them birth.

From their time, again, to the Reformation, we ſee a large field for inquiry opening before us. Our knowledge in this reſpect is to be derived chiefly from ſtudying the original Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtorians, ſuch as *Euſebius*, *Socrates*, *Sozomen*, and *Theodoret*. Nor ſhould we paſs unnoticed, if leiſure be not wanting, the Ancient FATHERS: Their meaning no doubt is always good; and not ſeldom, we are told, is their matter ſo.— In traverſing over this diſmal ſcene there is need we ſhould have much caution, and cool judgement to ſeparate truth from fable, and trace the origin of the different Sects and Hereſies: attending minutely to the circumſtances which led to that great and glorious revolution brought about by *Luther* and his learned aſſiſtant, the mild and amiable *Melancthon*; obſerving with diligence the gradual progreſs of religious Knowledge; and in ſhort making throughout that ſtrict, that fair, diſpaſſionate, and ſober ſcrutiny, which the ſubject ſo well deſerves, and which it will ſo well bear.

From

From the Reformation to the present times comprehends another considerable period, which we must investigate with the same spirit of sedateness, and impartiality; never suffering ourselves to be influenced by any other motive than the love of Truth and a regard to the well-being of Society.

As to Sermon-Writing and other particulars of the like sort, Dean *Swift's* "*Letter addressed to a Young Clergyman*" will afford us much useful information. Should we not habituate ourselves (what the Dean seems to suppose every Clergyman does) always to preach Sermons of our own composing? We shall thus be better able to adapt ourselves to the particular circumstances of our audience, and the most striking character of the times. There is indeed a notion got abroad, shameful in itself and altogether subversive of liberal industry, that this is only expected of the most ingenious and experienced. Noviciates certainly, in every line of life, should not be over confident of their own abilities. I only wish that those abilities (be they what they may) were properly used and exerted. And if they were continually

improved by gentle and gradual exercise, there is no doubt but they would soon be equal to the making of a plain, sensible Discourse.

Let us then, as we have leisure and abilities, deviate from a custom which is so prevalent, but which is laudable, nay *excusable* I should say, only in *particular* cases. Let us fix on a good plain model for style and composition: Imitate him with the pen of a master: Endeavour even to excel him. With this proper model many of the more modern Publications in this way, however splendid and laboured they may be, will by no means furnish us; for (as I judge) they are to be considered as Pulpit-Harangues or Declamations, rather than religious, argumentative, and classical Compositions; or in other words, rather than Good Sermons: There is often more Good Taste and Good Sense in a single page of *Sherlock*, *Butler*, or of *Jortin*, than in whole Volumes of some of them — I will say no more.

In this imperfect sketch you see an extensive field for speculation and inquiry. But it is certainly the *duty* of every man, who engages in this Profession, to make himself *competently*

tently acquainted with these things. And I would fain know in what more useful and comfortable manner can a young Clergyman employ some part of the leisure which falls to his share. In all other Liberal Professions, there is absolute need of unwearied industry and perseverance. And those who arrive at any real eminence in them must needs spend many an hour, and many a day in laborious and well-directed study. Here too the *necessity* of application is at least equally great. How then can it be excusable that we should spend the prime of our life in unmanly indolence, or in vain and trifling occupations?

Being employed in some such Course of Studies, we shall spend our days with satisfaction; we shall be better able to understand the true Principles, and the gracious Nature and Design of our Holy Religion; and shall qualify ourselves to explain it to others, and maintain its cause, as well against the silly, the inconsistent and random attacks of Infidels, as of those who study (from whatever motives) to pervert its Doctrine, and misrepresent its History.

May I whiſper in your ear one word of *advice?*—Beware, nevertheleſs, of Religious Controverſies: It is a ſubject of high and ſerious importance; never to be undertaken but in caſes of neceſſity, and then with reſolution indeed, but not without modeſty, and candour, and ſerioufneſs, and circumſpection: A Pen in the hand of the Polemic is a dangerous weapon, requiring the niceſt ſkill to wield it with propriety: The Heat and Inexperience of Youth, the Supercilioufneſs of Age, the Pliableneſs of Courteſy, and the ſarcaſtic Humour of Ridicule, all or either of theſe will render a man totally unfit for the taſk. What need of mentioning facts to ſupport theſe aſſertions? Facts are but too common and obvious.

So much, in a general way, for our preſent ſubject.—So much alſo for the different ſubjects of this Book.

Here then (if I could do it with any modeſty) I would apply to the *whole* of what has been written thoſe beautiful words of my Lord *Verulam*:[p] Tandem paululum reſpi-

[p] De Augment. Scien. VIII. 3. ſub fin.

rantes,

rantes, atque ad ea, quæ prætervecti fumus, oculos retroflectentes, hunc Tractatum noſtrum non abſimilem eſſe cenſemus ſonis illis et præludiis, quæ prætentant Muſici, dum fides ad modulationem concinnant: Quæ ipſa quidem auribus ingratum quiddam et aſperum exhibent; at in cauſâ ſunt, ut quæ ſequuntur omnia ſint ſuaviora: — Sic nimirum nos in animum induximus, ut in citharâ Muſarum concinnandâ et ad harmoniam veram redigendâ, operam navaremus, quo ab *aliis* poſtea pulſentur chordæ, *meliore* digito, aut plectro.

And now, *Eugenio*, to take my laſt leave of you — May you ſpend the reſt of your days in the continual cultivation of your Mind, and in doing every thing in your power for the real welfare of your fellow-creatures; thus making yourſelf an honour, as well to the Nature, as to the Profeſſion you are of! May you enjoy all the rational pleaſures and comforts of this life! And when the eve of it is about to cloſe, may it cloſe ſerenely — may we die in peace, and in the full and firm perſuaſion of the truth of our moſt Comfortable and moſt Holy

Faith!

Faith! May our Friendship be prolonged with our Life!—In a word: may we, and all men living, employ the whole of our existence, both the present and the future, in the rational service of God who made us, in the improvement of ourselves, and in furthering (as much as in us lies) the true interest and happiness of every being we shall have to associate with! These are the great and leading wishes of my soul: With these wishes I first undertook, and with these I here conclude this our Correspondence. Farewell.

PHILANDER.

Oct. 3. 1785.

THE END.